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Essays on Price Adjustment and Imperfect Information
Luminita Stevens
Understanding how firms set prices is a key step towards settling classic debates in economics
regarding the sources of nominal price rigidities, the mechanisms through which disturbances are
transmitted within and across countries, and the effectiveness of monetary policy in dampening
business cycle fluctuations. This dissertation examines patterns of price adjustment at the firm
level, both empirically and theoretically. The first chapter studies pricing patterns in US
grocery store data. Using a novel empirical method, I identify changes in the distribution of
product-level prices over time. These changes typically occur every seven months and mark
the transition to new pricing regimes. Inside regimes, prices alternate among a small set of
prices with high frequency. This evidence motivates a theory of price setting in which firms
respond to shocks using multiple-price policies that are simple enough to only specify a small
number of prices, and that are updated only on discrete occasions. The second chapter presents
a theory of costly information that generates such simple, sticky policies. In order to economize
on the costs of acquiring information, the firm designs a pricing policy that is a noisy, coarse
representation of market conditions. Moreover, it updates this policy infrequently, based on
imprecise signals about the state of the economy. Despite the high volatility of observed prices,
the firm responds imperfectly to changes in market conditions. The third chapter, co-authored
with Ryan Chahrour, addresses the patterns of adjustment in international relative prices.
We develop a two-country model in which retailers have imperfect information and search for
producers operating in different regions in the two countries. We demonstrate that frictions
at the regional level within countries generate dispersion in international relative prices in the
absence of additional frictions at the national border.
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This dissertation examines patterns of price volatility in product-level data, both
empirically and theoretically. It contributes to two important questions in the mone-
tary and international macroeconomics literature. First, do prices respond quickly and
accurately to changes in market conditions, as in the benchmark flexible-price model, or
are they somewhat rigid, as in the benchmark sticky-price model? Second, why do the
prices of identical products differ across regions and countries?
Price stickiness is frequently used as a key ingredient in macroeconomic models to
generate real effects of monetary policy. The question of how sticky prices should be
assumed to be in these models has been at the heart of a long-standing debate in
monetary economics, since it has direct implications for the role of monetary policy and
its effectiveness in dampening business cycle fluctuations. My approach to this question
builds on the recent literature, which has shifted away from analyzing aggregate data,
to focus on the properties of prices at the disaggregated, product level.
The current challenge is that the data is not consistent with either of the two bench-
mark models of price setting. First, consumer prices exhibit high volatility, even under
relatively stable macroeconomic conditions. Starting with the seminal paper of Bils and
Klenow (2004), recent empirical work1 has found that the prices of individual products
change much more frequently than is typically assumed in standard models with nom-
inal rigidities. Using monthly data, Bils and Klenow (2004) show that prices in the
U.S. typically change every four months.2 Conversely, in order to generate real effects
of monetary policy of the magnitude estimated using aggregate data, the typical sticky
1Klenow and Malin (2010) provides a comprehensive review of a large body of recent empirical
research studying prices in disaggregated data, both in the U.S. and internationally.
2Studies at higher frequencies show even larger volatility. For example, using Japanese daily scanner
data, over the period 1988 to 2005, Abe and Tonogi (2010) estimate that on average, prices change
every three days.
2price model assumes that prices remain unchanged for as long as one year. Hence, this
evidence challenges traditional sticky price models (e.g., those following Calvo, 1983, or
Sheshinski and Weiss, 1977). Moreover, to the extent that all these price changes are
responses to changes in market conditions, such high volatility implies fast adjustment,
and it suggests that price stickiness is an insufficient force for delivering meaningful real
effects of monetary policy.
Based solely on the frequency with which prices change, the empirical evidence would
seem to favor the flexible price benchmark. However, starting with Nakamura and
Steinsson (2008) recent work has also shown that as much as half of this price volatility
is transitory in nature. Importantly, the pattern of prices repeatedly returning to past
levels is at odds with both the sticky price and the flexible price models. In both of these
models, every price change is the result of a re-optimization, hence there is no reason
for past prices to be revisited. Proponents of sticky price models have argued that by
eliminating the transitory price changes one can recover the traditional price stickiness
in the form of sticky regular prices, which may be more relevant in the aggregate.
A growing empirical literature - including work by Nakamura and Steinsson (2008),
Eichenbaum, Jaimovich and Rebelo (2011), and Kehoe and Midrigan (2010) - has sought
to quantity the apparent rigidity underlying the high frequency of adjustment by using
different filters to identify transitory volatility, and to characterizes the properties of
apparently sticky regular prices versus seemingly flexible transitory prices. In parallel,
the theoretical literature (for example, the models of Kehoe and Midrigan, 2010, and
Guimaraes and Sheedy, 2011) has sought to build models that give firms the incentive
to temporarily deviate from rigid price levels, by modeling different constraints for the
firm’s ability to change regular versus temporary prices. At present, how these transitory
price changes should be analyzed empirically, how they should be generated theoretically,
and what they imply for the degree of nominal price rigidity remain open questions in
the literature.
3The first two chapters of this dissertation propose a framework that can simultane-
ously account for both the high frequency of price adjustment and the rigidity of certain
price levels. In this framework, both regular and transitory prices are part of an in-
tegrated pricing policy that is infrequently updated. There are no a priori differences
between regular and transitory prices, as they are all chosen to be jointly optimal. The
first chapter identifies and characterizes such pricing policies in grocery store product-
level data, while the second chapter develops a theory that can account for the empirical
findings document in the first chapter.
The first chapter employs a novel statistical method that builds on the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test. Specifically, I look for breaks in individual price series, by testing for
changes in the distribution of prices over time. Rather than focusing on the properties
of regular versus transitory prices, I focus on the properties of pricing regimes, where
each regime consists of a distribution of prices.
I find that pricing regimes typically last seven months, a long time relative to the
frequency of individual price changes, which in grocery store data is less than one month.
Approximately three quarters of products contain regimes in which a small number of
prices (typically four) are revisited over the life of the regime. Approximately one quarter
of the product-level series consist of regimes in which prices either do not change at all
or change very rarely. While the pattern of single sticky prices can be accommodated
by existing sticky price theories, the pattern of regimes with multiple rigid prices is
inconsistent with existing theories of price-setting. This evidence suggests a new theory
of price setting, in which each firm chooses a rigid pricing policy that is sticky and
simple: it is updated relatively infrequently, and it only consists of a small number of
distinct prices.
The second chapter develops a theory of price setting based on costly information
that generates such simple, sticky pricing policies. I present the dynamic price-setting
problem of a rationally inattentive firm that cannot observe market conditions for free,
4and whose acquisition of information is subject to both fixed and variable costs. If it pays
a high fixed cost, the firm can obtain extensive information about the state of the world
and redesign its policy. In each period between policy reviews, the firm can monitor
market conditions, subject to an additional variable cost of information. The firm uses
this information to decide which price to charge in each period from the current policy,
and also to decide if its current policy has become obsolete, relative to market conditions,
such that a new policy needs to be chosen. Both the stickiness and the coarseness of the
pricing policy are a result of the firm’s need to economize on information costs.
Because it chooses a coarse pricing policy, prices are weakly tied to market conditions.
Nevertheless, prices change frequently, and often by large amounts, thereby endogenously
generating transitory volatility. The theory breaks the tight link between frequency of
price adjustment and responsiveness to disturbances that exists in other models of price
setting. Consequently, it has the potential to reconcile conflicting evidence regarding
the apparent flexibility of prices at the micro level and the non-neutrality of monetary
policy. In this model, rigidity arises not because individual prices change infrequently,
but because prices are always drawn from a small set over the life of the policy, and
are chosen based on imperfect information about market conditions. The theory brings
together different features of the growing literature on imperfect information in price
setting. However, it departs from existing work by generating simple pricing policies
that consist of a small set of prices. The chapter also provides a novel solution method
for problems with rationally inattentive agents.
The third chapter, coauthored with Ryan Chahrour, addresses the literature on de-
viations from the law of one price in open economies. We propose a model of imperfect
information in which buyers, rather than sellers, must pay a cost to acquire information.
We develop a model of equilibrium price dispersion via retailer search, and we target
well-known empirical facts about the failure of the law of one price across countries. In
our model, retailers engage in costly sequential search for the best price among produc-
5ers in the economy. Retailers know only the distribution of prices, and search in a world
of two countries, each with two regions. Segmentation across regions and countries is
determined by the extent to which retailers located in a particular region are more likely
to sample prices posted by producers located in their home region or home country.
In contrast to recent work, which has underscored segmentation across countries, we
show that our model can match the empirical evidence on cross-country price differences
with regional segmentation alone. Our findings hold qualitatively whenever there are
international differences in the realizations of aggregate shocks or differences in the
structural parameters, namely, when the two countries are simply different and not
necessarily segmented from each other. This finding implies that countries may not be
as segmented at the border as previously thought, which in turn has implications for
trade policy. Using data simulated from the model, we also demonstrate some of the
difficulties in using popular regression measures of the border cost to infer the degree of
market segmentation.
61 Pricing Regimes in Disaggregated Data
1.1 Introduction
This chapter introduces a new statistical method to characterize patterns in product-
level prices by identifying breaks in individual price series. I propose to test for changes
in the distribution of prices over time using a method that is based on the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test, which determines if two samples are likely to have been drawn from the
same distribution. Building on tests that estimate the location of a single break in a
series (Carlstein, 1988 and Deshayes and Picard, 1986), I adapt the test to identify an
unknown number of breaks at unknown locations. I use simulations to determine the
appropriate critical value. An advantage of this approach is its generality, and hence
robustness across different data generating processes. This feature is important given
the high degree of heterogeneity documented in product-level price series. Moreover,
in contrast to recently developed empirical methods, the test sidesteps the need for
a priori definitions of transitory versus permanent price changes. This is a desirable
feature, since, as will be shown below, important statistics, crucial for informing models
of pricing, vary significantly depending on the definition of transitory price changes and
the filter implemented to identify such price changes.
I first demonstrate the robustness of the method in simulations. The break test
correctly rejects the null of no break 91% of the time across a mixture of different data
generating processes; it yields false positives less than 2% of the time. Upon rejection of
the null, it finds the true location of the break exactly 94% of the time; in the remaining
cases, it is off by two periods, on average. The break test is less likely to reject the null
of no break when one of the two samples to be compared is particularly short, thereby
providing a less precise estimate of the true distribution. If I restrict the simulated series
to contain regimes of at least five periods, the test finds virtually all the breaks.
I apply the break test to weekly prices at the barcode level from Dominick’s Finer
7Foods, a chain of grocery stores operating in the Chicago area. I find that breaks reflect
changes in the set of prices charged. I call such sets “pricing regimes.” Pricing regimes
typically consist of a small set of prices relative to both the duration of regimes and the
frequency of price changes inside regimes. For approximately 90% of all regimes, five
or fewer unique price quotes account for more than 90% of the prices inside the regime.
The typical regime lasts 31 weeks and contains only four distinct prices despite the fact
that in this data prices change at least every four weeks. Figure 1 plots the weekly price
of frozen juice, illustrating the pricing regimes identified by the test: within regimes,
prices change frequently and by large amounts, yet they alternate among a small set of
distinct values.
Based on the finding that regimes typically consist of a small set of prices, I next
categorize products in terms of the rigidity of the set of prices observed in each regime.
I find that only 5% of all products consist entirely of single-price regimes that would be
consistent with sticky price models such as time-dependent models using Taylor (1980) or
Calvo (1983) staggered price-setting, or state-dependent models (Sheshinski and Weiss,
1977, Golosov and Lucas, 2007). Regimes last a long time for these products (the median
implied regime duration is 45 weeks), and volatility across regimes is low relative to the
average (the average price change across regimes for this group of products has a median
of less than 6%). These statistics suggest that these products face fairly low volatility
in their desired price.
I also uncover evidence against the one-to-flex hypothesis that price series are char-
acterized by flexible deviations from a rigid mode. This pattern has been generated in
the recent theoretical work of Kehoe and Midrigan (2010) and Guimaraes and Sheedy
(2010). I find that 18% of product series are characterized by regimes in which a sin-
gle rigid price is revisited over the life of the regime. However, these one-to-flex series
are not nearly as volatile as the overall sample: for products in this category, 50% of
the regimes contain a single price, and the remainder typically only exhibit three price
8changes. Moreover, the average price change within regimes is typically less than 6%.
Hence, large transitory price changes do not appear to be an important part of the
pricing policy for these products.
The volatility of the dataset is concentrated in products for which rigidity extends
to the set of price charged. Specifically, 77% of products contain regimes in which at
least two distinct prices are revisited over the life of the regime, as illustrated in figure
1. For these products, the typical regime lasts 31 weeks, and it contains four distinct
prices. These products are characterized by high within-regime volatility: prices inside
regimes change with a frequency of 29%, and the average size of price changes within
regimes is 11%.
Next, I investigate the extent to which the structure of regimes in the data is consis-
tent with the notion of prices being drawn from the same distribution within a regime. I
compare the data to artificial series generated in two ways, replacing the observed real-
izations of prices inside each regime with (1) i.i.d. draws from the realized distribution
within each regime, and (2) draws in which all within-regime price changes are clustered
at the edges of regimes. Each of these two simulations implies a different approach to
modeling product-level price volatility. If different prices are equally likely to be observed
over the life of a regime (as in the first simulation), then it would point to a theory of
pricing in which the firm chooses a single multiple-price policy that applies over the life
of the regime. At the other extreme, if the volatility of prices is confined to relatively
short transitional periods between single-price regimes (as in the second simulation),
then it would suggest a theory of pricing that adapts the existing single-price theories to
include a period of experimentation before the firm settles on a new price. I re-run the
break test on the artificial series generated in this way, and then compare the location
of breaks and the properties of the regimes found in the data with those found in the
artificial series. I find strong synchronization between the data and the artificial i.i.d.
regimes. Conversely, I find weak evidence in support of the clustering of price changes
9at the edges of the regimes. Hence, I conclude that the data is best described by regimes
in which the volatility of prices is interior rather than transitional.
This pattern of infrequently updated regimes that consist of a discrete set of prices
is difficult to reconcile with most models of price-setting, which cannot generate dis-
creteness in the set of prices charged, unless the underlying shocks are themselves drawn
from distributions with mass points. Alternatively, these findings suggest a theory in
which the firm chooses a policy that consists of set of discrete prices among which it
alternates over the life of the policy, and which it updates relatively infrequently. Such
a theory is proposed in the next chapter, where both the infrequent regime changes and
the discreteness of prices within regimes are due to imperfect information.
Finally, I compare the break test with three popular filtering methods: a v-shaped
sales filter similar to those employed by Nakamura and Steinsson (2008), the reference
price filter of Eichenbaum, Jaimovich and Rebelo (2011), and the rolling mode filter
proposed by Kehoe and Midrigan (2010). These filters have been proposed as a way
to uncover stickiness in product-level pricing data once one filters out transitory price
changes that may be orthogonal to aggregate conditions and hence not of direct interest
to macroeconomists. One advantage of the break test relative to these filters is that it
can identify breaks without the need to specify a priori what aspects of the distribution
change over time. This generality allows me to first identify breaks in price series and
then investigate what aspects of the distribution change across regimes. In contrast, v-
shaped filters, such as those proposed by Nakamura and Steinsson (2008), identify breaks
based on changes in the maximum price, while the reference price/rolling mode filters
identify breaks based on changes in the modal price over time. Simulations suggest
that the break test is preferable: while each filter does particularly well on specific
data generating processes, the break test does well across different processes: firstly, a
non-parametric method is likely to outperform the parameterized filters in data that
appears to be characterized by random variation in the duration of both regular and
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transitory prices; secondly, a method that uses information about the entire distribution
of prices is likely to have more accuracy in detecting the timing of breaks compared with
a method that focuses on a single statistic, such as the modal price or the maximum
price. While the existing literature has focused more on the duration of regular prices,
accurately identifying the timing of breaks is particularly important for characterizing
within-regime volatility. Statistics such as the number of distinct prices charged, the
prevalence of the highest price as the most frequently charged price, or the existence of
time-trends within regimes are sensitive to the estimated location of breaks.
Since the break test is robust across different data generating processes, it provides
a direct test of the assumptions made by the filters. To the extent that the true data
generating process is indeed consistent with the assumptions made by a particular filter,
one would expect to find a high degree of alignment between results obtained by the
break test and those obtained by the filter. Hence, I apply all methods to price series
from Dominick’s data. I find that the v-shaped filter is highly synchronized with the
break test in terms of the timing of breaks; however, it finds many more breaks in the
data, reflecting the fact that the maximum price per regime does not always coincide
with the mode. Moreover, adjusting the parameters of the v-shaped filter to reduce the
number of breaks (and hence increase the duration of regimes) substantially reduces the
synchronization between the two methods. Therefore, it is not the case that the break
test identifies the same breaks as a v-shaped filter with a given set of parameters. Alter-
natively, the reference filter is hampered by the use of a fixed window, which essentially
assumes away the question of identifying the timing of breaks. Given the heterogeneity
of regime lengths identified using the break test, the estimated change points of the two
approaches are found to coincide largely by chance. The Kehoe and Midrigan (2010)
rolling mode filter is the filter most closely aligned with the break test: when parame-
terized to match the frequency of breaks identified by the break test, it has higher exact
synchronization than the reference price filter, and differences in the timing of breaks
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are quite small (two periods on average).
Section 1.2 details the statistical method employed to identify multiple potential
break points in a given series, building on the basic two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov
test. Section 1.3 presents the properties of pricing regimes identified by the break test
in the Dominick’s data. Section 1.4 compares the performance of the break test to that
of three different filtering methods. Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 The Break Test
The break test uses the Kolmogorov-Smirnov distance between two sample distribu-
tions3. In order to identify multiple breaks at unknown locations, I build on tests that
estimate the location of a single break in a series, specifically, those proposed by Carl-
stein (1988) and Deshayes and Picard (1986). I implement an iterative procedure that
identifies breaks sequentially: first, I test the null hypothesis of no break in a given sam-
ple; upon rejection, I estimate the location of the break. For series that have more than
one break, iterations of the test on the resulting sub-samples identify all change points.
This approach is similar to that proposed by Bai and Perron (1998) for sequentially
estimating multiple breaks in a linear regression model.
To my knowledge, the existing literature on estimating breaks using Kolmogorov-
Smirnov focuses on the identification of a single break. Moreover, derivations of the
exact critical values for discrete distributions are restricted to the one-sample goodness
of fit Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.4 Finally, I wish to apply the test to potentially discrete
data: Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) document the importance of rigid regular prices
in the micro data underlying the US CPI, and Klenow and Malin (2010) document the
3See, for example, Brodsky and Darkhovsky (1993), who provide a discussion of the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test and other non-parametric change point methods.
4See Conover (1972) and Wood and Altavela (1978).
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“disproportionate importance” of a few price levels over the life of a price series. Hence,
based on results from the existing empirical literature on pricing patterns, we can expect
that many regimes will contain at least one mass point. Using critical values derived
for continuous distributions would render the test conservative. For these reasons, I
determine the critical value using simulated data.
The first part of this section defines the test statistic used to test the null hypothesis
of no break on a sample of size n, Sn, and, upon rejection, the statistic used to estimate
the location of a break, τn. The second subsection determines the appropriate critical
value for Sn, using simulations of different processes that generate patterns similar to
those expected to approximate product-level price series. The last subsection evaluates
the overall performance of the test in simulated data, namely its ability to correctly
reject the null and to correctly identify the timing of a break given a rejection (the joint
performance of the statistics Sn and τn).
1.2.1 Test Statistic
Let {pn1 , pn2 , ..., pnn} be a sequence of n observations and define Tn as the set of all
possible break points, Tn ≡ {t|1 ≤ t ≤ n − 1}. For every hypothetical break point










Dn (t) ≡ sup
p
|F̂ t1(p)− Ĝnt+1(p)| (1.1)















Figure 2 plots the CDFs of two consecutive sub-samples of the price series plotted in
13
figure 1. The distance between the two empirical CDFs is zero at the edges of the [0, 1]
interval; under the null hypothesis of no break, it has only random sampling variation
in between, and hence the Kolmogorov-Smirnov distance, Dn (t), is not expected to be
too large.
I collect the Kolmogorov-Smirnov distances for all potential break points t ∈ Tn,
















The normalization factor depends on the sample size and on the relative sizes of the
two sub-samples, ensuring that the test is less likely to reject the null when one of the
two sub-samples is particularly short relative to the other sub-sample, and thus provides
a less precise estimate of the population CDF for that sample.
If the null is rejected (Sn > K, where K is the critical value determined in the next
subsection), the next step is to estimate the location of the break. The change point
estimate τn is given by:






Carlstein (1988) provides the strong consistency proof for τn/n in the case of inde-
pendent observations.
To apply this to series that may have multiple breaks at unknown locations, I first
test for the existence of a break and estimate its location, following the method described
above. I then apply the same process to each of the two resulting sub-series, or branches,
and continue until there are no more Sk statistics greater than the critical value.
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1.2.2 Critical Value
In theory, the identification method presented above is robust to a wide variety of
data generating processes. The only aspect of the algorithm that remains to be specified
is the critical value used to reject the null of no break. The critical value (and the
test statistics themselves) can be tailored to individual processes. However, good-level
price series are notoriously heterogeneous, hence the specification of the test should be
robust across different types of processes. With this in mind, I assume that the true
data generating process for product-level prices is a mixture of different processes, and I
use simulations to determine a single critical value to be used across all of the simulated
processes.
It is important to note that given the iterative nature of the test and the fact that at
each step, the test statistic is a measure of themaximum distance between the two sample
CDFs (equation (1.3)), the critical value determines only how soon the algorithm stops in
its search for breaks: across different potential critical values, the path taken by the test
will be the same, stopping sooner given higher critical values, and continuing to shorter
sub-samples for lower critical values. Hence varying the critical value iteratively adds
new regimes inside the existing regimes, without affecting the location of the existing
breaks, which makes it easier to interpret changes in the pricing statistics resulting from
variations in the parameter of the test. This gives the break test a degree of robustness
relative to existing filtering methods, which do not have this “nesting” property when
varying the parameters of each filter.
Simulated Processes
I simulate processes that represent both recent theoretical models of price-setting and
the most commonly observed price patterns in micro data. Specifically, I assume that the
data is a mixture of the following four processes: 1) sequences of infrequently updated
single prices, such as those generated by Calvo pricing or simple menu cost models;
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2) sequences of one-to-flex plans, defined as sticky prices accompanied by frequent,
flexible deviations from these rigid modes, which are consistent with the assumptions
of a reference price/rolling mode filter and with the price-setting model of Kehoe and
Midrigan (2010); 3) sequences of downward-flex plans, which consist of sticky prices
accompanied by frequent, flexible downward deviations, and which are consistent with
the assumptions of a v-shaped sales filter and with models such as the dynamic version
of Guimaraes and Sheedy (2011); and 4) sequences similar to the frozen juice series
shown in the introduction, labeled rigid multiple-price plans, each consisting of a small
number of distinct prices that are revisited over the life of the pricing plan, which are
consistent with the theory proposed in the next chapter. For simplicity, I assume that
the data is an equally-weighted mixture of these processes. Figure 3 shows sample series
with multiple regime breaks for each of the four simulated processes.
For process I, the simulated price series is given by:
pt+1 = Bt+1 exp {εt+1}+ (1−Bt+1) pt (1.5)
where the sequence {Bt} is a Bernoulli trial with probability of success β marking the
transition to a new price level, and εt is a normally distributed i.i.d. innovation. This
series also corresponds to the regular price series, pRt+1, for the multiple-price processes
II, III and IV. In each case, the transition to a new regime is marked by Bt = 1.
For process II, the simulated price series is given by:











where the sequence {Dt} is a Bernoulli trial with probability of success δ, marking the
transition to a new transitory price, which is given by an i.i.d. innovation, εTt . I assume
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that in each period, either a regular price change or a transitory price change can occur,
as in the model of Kehoe and Midrigan (2010). For process II, I further assume that the
mean of the transitory innovations is zero.
For process III, in addition to imposing that essentially all transitory price changes
are price cuts, by assuming that the mean of the transitory deviations is far below that
of the permanent innovations, I allow transitory prices to last up to three periods, with
the maximum length of a transitory price parameterized by lδ, with 0 ≤ lδ ≤ 3.
Process IV is generated by collapsing the simulated values from (1.6) inside each
regime to three bins, each corresponding to a unique price quote, such that each regime
consists of only three distinct prices. Table 1 summarizes the specification of the four
processes.
The processes used to determine the critical value are parameterized to roughly match
the volatility of the Dominick’s dataset. I target a mean absolute size of price changes
of 10− 12%, with a frequency of price changes of 18− 20%. Prices in the single sticky
price process change with a frequency of 3%. However, the performance of the test is
robust to variations in volatility.
Break Test Critical Values
For the test of a single break at an unknown location, on observations that are
drawn independently from a continuous distribution, Deshayes and Picard (1986) show
that under the null hypothesis of no breaks at any t ∈ Tn,





where B(·, ·) is the two-dimensional Brownian bridge on [0, 1].5 Hence equation (1.7)
provides asymptotic critical values for the test of a single break at an unknown location:
5For the test of a single change point at a known location, the normalized Kolmogorov-Smirnov
statistic converges to a Brownian bridge on [0, 1].
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the null is rejected at level α if Sn > K˜α, where K˜α is found from P(K˜ ≤ K˜α) = 1− α.
Deshayes and Picard (1986) provide tables for the single-break test critical values, and
they find that these values provide a reasonable approximation for sample sizes of at
least 50 observations.
I start from the critical values provided by Deshayes and Picard (1986), and, as
noted above, I determine the appropriate critical value using simulations in which I
compare the results of the break test with the true location of breaks. For simplicity,
I use a single critical value across all sample sizes. The critical value is determined
using two statistics: good_reject and bad_reject. The statistic good_reject counts the
number of times that the test rejects the null of no change point on a sample that does
in fact contain a break; it is reported as a fraction of the number of true breaks in the
simulation. Obtaining a low value for good_reject implies that the test is not sensitive
enough, such that many breaks are not identified. Correcting this requires reducing the
critical value used. Conversely, bad_reject counts the number of times the test rejects
the null of no change point on a sample that does not contain a break; it is reported as
a fraction of the number of breaks estimated by the test. A high bad_reject implies that
the test yields too many false positives, hence the critical value needs to be increased.
The first finding is that the asymptotic critical values provided by Deshayes and
Picard are too conservative. This is a result of the discrete nature of the data: given two
pairs of samples of equal size, the pair drawn from discrete distributions contains more
information about the population CDFs compared with the pair drawn from continuous
distributions. I gradually reduce the critical value, balancing the values of good_reject
and bad_reject.
The tension in choosing the appropriate critical value is between process I and the
multiple-price processes: for the single sticky price process, a positive critical value
arbitrarily close to zero ensures that all the breaks are perfectly identified, since in this
case the test statistic Sk is either zero in the case of no change, or greater than zero
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when there is a change. But using too low of a critical value generates false positives in
the multiple-price processes: for process III, in the case when transitory prices can last
more than one period, too low of a critical value leads to mislabeling such transitory
prices as new regimes; similarly, in process IV, rigidity in all price levels can generate
within-regime sequences that look like sequences of single sticky prices but are in fact
part of the same regime.
Using the critical value associated with the asymptotic 1% significance level (0.874)
provided by Deshayes and Picard (1986) for continuously distributed data, the break
test correctly finds 84% of the simulated breaks. The test fails to identify relatively
short regimes, underestimating the average regime length by seven periods. Reducing
the critical value improves the test’s performance: the critical value associated with
the asymptotic 5% significance level (0.772) correctly finds nearly 87% of the simulated
breaks, with only a marginal increase in the fraction of false positives. The test correctly
identifies an increasing fraction of the short regimes in the simulation. I gradually reduce
the critical value until the test finds at least 90% of the simulated breaks, but stop before
bad_reject exceeds 5% for any of the simulated processes.
Table 2 reports average statistics across all processes: K = 0.61 (in bold) is the
lowest critical value for which the average good_reject rate exceeds 90%, while keeping
the maximum false positive rate for all four data generating processes below 5%. Further
reducing the critical value generates false positives at an increasing rate, relative to
the gain in good_reject. For instance, increasing the power to 95% also increases the
incidence of false positives to 12%.
At the chosen critical value, the average length of the regimes identified by the break
test is longer than the true average length by three periods, reflecting the weak power in
identifying regimes that last between two and four periods. Restricting the simulations
to regimes lasting at least five periods would ensure the identification of virtually all
regimes. It is important to note that the critical value only determines how soon the
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algorithm stops in its search of break points. As the critical value is reduced, the test
finds additional breaks that are added to the set of breaks found by the test with a
higher critical value, such that for two critical values K2 > K1, the corresponding sets
of estimated break points satisfy T2 ⊂ T1.
1.2.3 Performance
The strength of the break test depends on its ability to correctly reject the null of
no break and to correctly identify the timing of a change given a rejection (the joint
performance of the statistics Sk and τk). As shown in the previous subsection, the break
test correctly rejects the null of no break 91% of the time. As a result, it overestimates
the average regime length by three periods.
Upon rejection of the null, I find that the change point estimate τk coincides exactly
with the true change point 94% of the time, and it is otherwise off by two periods, on
average. Table 3 shows the performance of the test for each of the four processes, for the
critical value selected in the previous subsection: for single sticky price series (process
I), 100% of the breaks found by the test are exactly synchronized with the simulated
breaks; for the multi-price processes, accuracy is lower, with 91 − 94% of the breaks
exactly synchronized with the simulated breaks.
In the case of the one-to-flex process III, if transitory sales were restricted to last
only one period, false positives would decline to less than 1%, exact synchronization
would improve to 95% from 91%, and the mean distance between the estimated breaks
and the true breaks among non-synchronized breaks would decline to 1.5 periods.
These statistics are almost entirely driven by the presence of very short regimes in
the simulations. For example, for process II, the test identifies virtually none of the
regimes that last only two periods; it finds 65% of the regimes that last four periods,
and 94% of the regimes that last eight periods. The presence of weakly identified short
regimes in turn affects the timing of breaks, reducing the exact synchronization between
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the estimated breaks and the true breaks. Constraining the simulations to generate
only regimes of at least five periods results in the identification of virtually all regimes
(thus eliminating the bias in the estimated average regime length), and further improves
the degree of exact synchronization between the test breaks and the simulated breaks.
Hence, to the extent that regimes in actual pricing data last at least four-to-five weeks,
and to the extent that the data is well approximated by the processes simulated above,
we can expect the break test to perform even better than shown in table 2.
1.3 Regimes in the Data
This section documents a set of new statistics on price adjustment that are computed
at the regime level once the break test is applied to product-level price series.
1.3.1 Description of the Data
I apply the break test to price series from Dominick’s Finer Foods. Dominick’s is
a large chain of grocery stores operating in the Chicago area, whose pricing practices
are representative of many large US grocery chains. The dataset was built as part of a
series of randomized pricing experiments conducted by Dominick’s in cooperation with
the University of Chicago’s Graduate School of Business, and is available online.6
The data include weekly prices from September 1989 until May 1997, at 86 store
locations, for thousands of barcode-level products, in 29 categories, including various
household supplies and non-perishable food items. The prices are the actual transaction
prices as recorded by the stores’ scanners. Many price series have missing observations.
I use only price series that have at least 52 observations and on average at most one
missing observation per year. After cleaning the data in this way, I further restrict the
sample to the store with the largest number of observations from the group of stores
6See Hoch et al (1994) for a description of the experiments.
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whose prices were not randomized. Preliminary work suggests virtually identical results
across the different stores in the control group, reflecting the fact that Dominick’s policy
is to set prices at the chain level, such that price changes are very strongly correlated
across stores. The final sample contains more than 700, 000 observations for 4, 275 unique
universal product codes (UPCs), in 28 product categories.
This dataset has been used quite extensively in work on price-setting, including
in papers by Dutta, Bergen and Levy (2002), Chevalier, Kashyap and Rossi (2003),
Burstein and Hellwig (2007), Midrigan (2009), and Kehoe and Midrigan (2010), among
others. The wide use of this dataset, despite its fairly narrow product coverage, can
be attributed to at least three characteristics. First, Dominick’s policy is to change
prices only once a week (on Wednesdays), hence we are not missing any intra-week price
changes. In contrast, other datasets are built by sampling at some fixed intervals, such
as the monthly-sampled BLS data. Second, the dataset has relatively long time series
per product compared with other datasets: in my sample, median (average) length of
the series is 142 (177) weeks per UPC and the maximum is 400 weeks. While the issue
of truncated series is still important, the qualitative implications of my findings are not
affected when statistics of interest are computed using interior regimes only. Finally,
another advantage of this data is the fact that it contains products whose prices are
highly volatile and exhibit precisely the sharp, yet transitory, price swings that have
recently come to the forefront of the price dynamics literature. The median implied
price duration7 across all products in the sample is less than four weeks; the median
average size of non-zero price changes is 11.9% in absolute value; and the standard
deviation of non-zero price changes is 16.3%.
Table 4 documents summary statistics across the different product categories. As is
typical with pricing data, there is a significant amount of heterogeneity even within this
7I follow the convention in the literature and compute the frequency of regime changes. Assuming a
constant hazard rate, the implied duration is computed as d = −1/ ln(1− freq).
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relatively narrowly defined group of products. The implied duration of prices ranges
from less than two weeks for soft drinks to more than 17 weeks for cigarettes, with most
products in the range of two to seven weeks. Excluding cigarettes, the size of price
changes ranges from 6% for canned tuna to 22% for frozen entrees. Additionally, there
is a positive correlation between the size and frequency of price changes.
1.3.2 Regime Changes versus Price Changes
Regime changes are estimated to occur infrequently. While the implied price duration
for the median product is less than four weeks, the median implied duration of regimes
is 31 weeks. There is considerable underlying heterogeneity, both within and across
categories, with most regimes lasting anywhere between four months and one year and
a half. Figure 4 shows the median implied regime duration for each category, ordered
from lowest to highest, as well as the interquartile range.
In principle, the break test can identify any salient changes in both the support and
the shape of the distribution of prices over time. In practice, I find that most breaks
reflect changes in the set of prices charged: in 50% of consecutive regime pairs, there is
no overlap between the sets of prices charged; in 82% of consecutive pairs, at most one
price occurs in both regimes; in 94% of pairs, at most two prices occur in both regimes;
and in 99% of regimes, at most three prices occur in both regimes.
In terms of within-regime volatility, 18.9% of regimes are single-price regimes, while
the remaining 81.1% of regimes contain at least two distinct prices. Despite their rel-
atively long duration, regimes are characterized by a small number of distinct prices:
among regimes that contain at least two prices, the median (mean) number of distinct
prices per regime is 5 (6), with an interquartile range of [3, 8]. Moreover, for approx-
imately 90% of all regimes, five or fewer unique price quotes account for more than
90% of the regime. Nevertheless, inside these regimes, prices change often and by large
amounts. The median weekly frequency of within-regime price changes is 29%, and the
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median size of price changes is 11%. The frequency of price changes per regime is large
relative to both the duration of regimes and the number of unique price quotes observed
within a regime. This can be viewed as a first indication of rigidity beyond the modal
price, which I explore further below.
1.3.3 Within-Regime Pricing Strategies
All products can be grouped into three categories: products characterized exclusively
by single sticky price regimes, products consisting entirely of one-to-flex regimes, in
which a single sticky price is occasionally accompanied by transitory price changes to
and from it, and in which none of the transitory price levels are revisited over the life
of the regime, and finally, multi-rigid-price products, which contain regimes in which at
least two prices are revisited over the life of the regime. Table 5 summarizes the three
strategies, and figure 5 shows a sample price series for each category.
At the product level, products characterized exclusively by single-price regimes rep-
resent only 4.9% of series. In this category, I also include products that contain regimes
in which I observe a single deviation from the modal price, suggesting that transitory
price changes are not a consistent aspect of the firm’s pricing policy. For these products,
the median regime duration is 45 weeks (versus 31 weeks for all products), and the av-
erage size of price changes across regimes has a median of 5.8% across categories (versus
7.5% overall), suggesting that these products face a relatively low volatility of costs and
demand.
Motivated by empirical studies that highlight the importance of transitory price
changes, recent theoretical work has sought to develop models in which firms have an
incentive to temporarily (and flexibly) deviate from a rigid regular price, thereby gen-
erating a one-to-flex pattern similar to those simulated by processes II and III above.
Kehoe and Midrigan (2010) and the dynamic extension of Guimaraes and Sheedy (2011)
generate such one-to-flex patterns in which transitory prices last one period. I find that
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the one-to-flex pattern accounts for 18.3% of products, of which, for 4.2% of products,
transitory prices last only one period, while for the remaining 13.9% of products, tran-
sitory price changes last more than one week. For these products, the median implied
regime duration is 30 weeks. One-to-flex products have relatively low price volatility
both within and across regimes: across all products in this category, 50% of regimes
are single-price regimes. As shown in the second column of table 6, for the remaining
regimes, within-regime prices change with a frequency of 12.0% and the within-regime
absolute size of price changes is 5.6%. Across regimes, the change in the average price
per regime has a median of 6.3%. This degree of volatility suggests that for these prod-
ucts, temporary deviations from the rigid mode are not an important aspect of the firm’s
policy, and it makes these products very similar to the single price products.
Underscoring the presence of rigidity beyond the modal price within each regime,
76.8% of products contain regimes in which at least two prices are revisited over the
life of the regime. The median implied duration of regimes for these products is 31
weeks. In contrast to one-to-flex products, multi-rigid products are highly volatile: the
median frequency of within-regime price changes across regimes with at least two distinct
prices is 28.6%, almost two and a half times that of one-to-flex products. The absolute
size of of price changes within regimes is 10.6%, nearly double that of one-to-flex series.
Across regimes, all categories show comparable volatility in the average price charged per
regime, although multi-rigid products again have somewhat higher volatility: the change
in the average price per regime is 7.8% for multi-rigid products, 6.3% for one-to-flex
products, and 5.8% for single-sticky products.
In allocating products to different categories, I assume that the determinants of a
firm’s choice of whether to pursue a single-price, one-to-flex, or rigid multi-price plans
are not likely to change from one regime to another. Hence, all product series that
have at least one multi-rigid regime are labeled as pursuing a multi-rigid strategy. All
product series that have no multi-rigid regimes, but have at least one one-to-flex regime
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are counted in the one-to-flex category. Finally, all products that consist entirely of
single price regimes (where I also include regimes in which I observe a single deviation
from the modal price) are counted in the single-sticky category.
The assumption that the firm’s type does not change over time implies that single-
price and one-to-flex regimes that are part of multi-rigid series should be relatively
short-lived, reflecting the fact that a regime change occurred before the full distribution
of prices could be realized. Indeed, while the duration of single-price regimes in the
purely single-price series is 45 weeks, the average length of all single-price regimes is 18
weeks, indicating that single-price regimes included in the one-to-flex and rigid multi-
price series are at least half as long as those that are part of the purely single-price
series. Finally, rigid multi-price regimes are significantly longer, on average lasting 49
weeks. The fact that rigid multi-price regimes last significantly longer than single-price
regimes may be indicative of the fact that the seller uses these multiple prices to adjust
to market conditions and can therefore afford to conduct a revision of the entire strategy
less frequently.
1.3.4 Distribution of Within-Regime Prices for Rigid Multi-Price Products
How much rigidity is there in the price series belonging to the rigid multi-price
group relative to the one-to-flex group, and, along with the differences in within-regime
volatility, does it warrant partitioning the data in this way? To investigate this question,
I compute the distribution of prices inside each regime that contains multiple rigid prices.
The first thing to note is that the raw repetition of multiple price quotes within regimes
is quite high. Figure 6 shows the frequency with which the second, third and fourth
most common prices are observed in regimes belonging to rigid multi-price products: the
second most quoted price occurs at least three times in 75% of regimes; the third most
quoted price occurs at least three times in 33% of regimes; and the fourth most quoted
price occurs at least three times in 22% of regimes. Repeated values are substantially less
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common beyond the fourth most commonly quoted price, with the fifth most common
price being observed at least three times in only 6% of regimes. Hence a model of multi-
rigid price plans would seek to generate up to four-to-five rigid prices for the typical
regime.
The frequency with which prices are charged is steeply declining, and this pattern
holds across cardinalities, as shown in the panels in figure 7, which plot the frequency
with which each top price is observed, as a function of the number of distinct prices
observed within the regime, for multi-rigid products: as more prices are added, the
frequency of the top price falls, but the pattern of one price dominating holds even for
regimes in which there are a relatively large number of distinct prices.
The panels in figure 8 show histograms for the frequency with which top prices are
charged across all regimes for all products. The histograms go beyond the medians
reported above in illustrating the fact that the data is not aligned with either the single
sticky price model or the one-to-flex model: the former would generate a vertical bar
reaching (1, 1) in the top left panel; the latter could generate the pattern in that panel
given enough heterogeneity in the frequency of the modal price; however, it would not
generate meaningful increases in the height of the bars across panels and it would be
expected to approach (1, 1) so decisively after only five prices. Conversely, figure 8 shows
that while the modal price is indeed important, each subsequent price adds significant
mass to the cumulative distribution.
Table 7 reports the median cumulative frequencies for the top five prices, similar
to table 8 of Klenow and Malin (2010). I compare the within-regime numbers with the
numbers obtained across an entire series, which essentially pick up the "number 1" prices
across regimes. For reference, I also include the numbers reported by Klenow and Malin
(2010), though these are based on monthly data, and they are computed using a rolling
mode filter.
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1.3.5 Correlation of Regime Length and Regime Cardinality
A strong empirical regularity suggestive of the possibility that prices within a regime
are at least partial responses to market conditions is the positive relationship between
the length of regimes and the number of unique prices per regime: for rigid multi-price
products, the average length of regimes containing two distinct prices is 18.1 weeks.
Conversely, rigid multi-price regimes that contain seven or more distinct prices last 44
weeks on average. Table 8 reports the average regime length as a function of the number
of distinct prices per regime for both rigid multi-price and one-to-flex series, indicating
the relatively wider dispersion in regime lengths for rigid multi-price products.
1.3.6 The Nature of Within-Regime Volatility
What patterns best describe the volatility of prices inside regimes? Are all prices
equally likely to be observed over the life of a regime? Or are price series predominantly
sequences of single prices interrupted by occasional volatility? The answers to these
questions point to different types of theories of pricing. Hence, in this section, I construct
artificial series with which to compare the actual data, in order to determine the nature
of within-regime volatility.
I compare the location of the breaks and the properties of the regimes found in
the data with those found in artificial series generated in two ways, replacing the ob-
served realizations of prices inside each regime with (1) i.i.d. draws from the realized
distribution and (2) draws in which all within-regime price changes are clustered at the
edges of regimes. Each of these two simulations implies a different approach to modeling
product-level price volatility. If different prices are equally likely to be observed over the
life of a regime (as in the first simulation), then it would point to a theory of pricing
in which the firm chooses a single multiple-price policy that applies over the life of the
regime. At the other extreme, if the volatility of prices is confined to relatively short
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“transitional” periods between single-price regimes (as in the second simulation), then it
would suggest a theory of pricing that adapts the existing single-price theories to include
a period of experimentation before the firm settles on a new price. Figure 9 contrasts
the i.i.d version of two regimes with this single-sticky emphplus volatility version.
First, I explore if the patterns of price changes inside regimes can be approximated by
independent draws from the distribution of prices inside each regime. Let rj, j = 1, ..., J ,
denote the J regimes identified for a particular product series, {pt}. For each regime
rj, I sample without replacement from the distribution of prices inside the regime. I
concatenate all the simulated regimes into a new artificial series, {p˜t}. I do this for
each product series in the data and build an artificial dataset. I rerun the break test on
the artificial dataset to identify the new regimes, r˜j, j = 1, ..., J˜ , for each price series.
Finally, I repeat the process to generate a second artificial dataset. I compare datasets
in terms of the timing of breaks and the resulting statistics at the regime level: I first
compare the actual dataset to each artificial dataset, and the compare two artificial
datasets, as a measure of how close results should be expected to be if within-regime
prices were indeed i.i.d.
I find that the i.i.d. simulations are very close to the actual data in terms of identi-
fication and location of the breaks: as shown in the first entry of table 9, the test finds
essentially the same number of breaks in both datasets. Moreover, 80% of the breaks in
the data are found in exactly the same location in the simulation; for 88% of the breaks
in the data, the breaks in the simulation are within one week of the breaks in the data.
Synchronization in the timing of breaks is slightly lower in the second column of table
9, which reports the comparison between two simulations. This reflects the fact that
within-regime volatility is mostly interior, rather than near the edges of each regime,
which would affect the timing of breaks. Given the high degree of alignment between the
actual data and the i.i.d. data in terms of both the frequency and the timing of breaks,
all statistics regarding the types and properties of regimes are largely unchanged.
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Next, I expand on the discussion of Klenow and Malin (2010), by directly testing
if series are characterized by a sticky (reference) price followed by short-lived volatility
before the firm transitions to a new sticky price. As an example of a model that might
generate this pattern of singletons alternating with periods of volatility, consider the
following adaptation of a menu cost model: suppose that in each period, the firm receives
a signal about the value of adjusting its price and compares it to its menu cost. Upon
receiving a signal that an adjustment is desirable, the firm enters an experimentation
period, during which it “tries out” different prices, and uses them to learn more about
the true state, until it settles on its best estimate of the optimal price to be charged
until the next time a price review is deemed desirable.
I find that single sticky price regimes alternating with periods of volatility in which
the firm experiments with prices before settling on a new price is also a poor fit of the
data: as shown in table 10, the break test would identify 54% more breaks, since it would
break out the tranquil periods of single sticky prices from the volatile, “experimental”
periods.
To measure the distance between the actual and the artificial data, I consider two
additional statistics, the share of uninterrupted observations and the share of comeback
prices, with definitions similar to those employed by Klenow and Malin (2010). Consider
price ptr in regime r. This price is counted as an uninterrupted observation if ptr = pt−1,r.
This statistic is related to the simulations conducted above: a high rate of uninterrupted
price observations could suggest that the volatility of prices does not in fact reflect the
existence of multi-price plans. In the data, if there were no multi-price plans, the share of
uninterrupted prices would be 93%. At the other extreme, if all regimes were generated
via i.i.d. draws from multi-price plans, the share of uninterrupted prices would be 70%.
As shown in table 11, the actual data is in the middle, at 80%.
I also consider the number of comeback prices as a share of the number of unique
prices, where ptr is counted as a comeback price in regime r if 1) it has already occurred
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inside this regime and 2) ptr 6= pt−1,r. For example, in the sequence {1; 3; 1; 1}, the
comeback count would be one and the fraction would be 1/2 (out of two distinct price
quotes, one "comes back"). Under the singleton simulation, the comeback share is zero.
Again, actual regimes lie in between the single sticky price series and the multi-price
i.i.d. series.
In terms of other statistics, such as implied regime durations and break down of
regimes by type, the i.i.d. simulation is exactly aligned with the actual data.
1.3.7 Implications for Theories of Pricing
The statistics at the regime level are difficult to reconcile with the most commonly
used models of pricing. Full information flexible price models, in which prices are contin-
uously re-optimized, do not generate regimes except to the extent that there are regimes
in the underlying shocks, and do not generate mass points in the distribution of prices
observed over time, except to the extent that the underlying shocks are themselves drawn
from distributions with mass points. By disregarding the substantial rigidity in price
levels apparent in figure 1, and documented more broadly in above, this approach may
overstate the degree of flexibility in the pricing data.
Conversely, sticky price models, such as time-dependent models using Taylor (1980)
or Calvo (1983) staggered price-setting or state-dependent models (Sheshinski andWeiss,
1977, Golosov and Lucas, 2007), generate single-price regimes. As in the case of flexible
price models, there is no reason for past prices to be revisited once the firm re-optimizes
its policy, hence these models cannot explain the discreteness of prices observed in
the data. Moreover, sticky price models that abstract from transitory price changes
within regimes may overstate the degree of rigidity in the pricing data. As others have
documented, a significant portion of firms’ revenues is derived from sales at the non-
modal prices, which suggests that firms should have a strong incentive to tie transitory
prices to concurrent market conditions, at least partially. Klenow and Willis (2007)
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further document that transitory prices have macro content that does not wash out
with aggregation.
The pricing patterns documented in this chapter also suggest that models which
assume that only the mode price is rigid, with all other prices being adjusted flexibly,
such as the theories proposed by Kehoe and Midrigan (2010) and Guimaraes and Sheedy
(2011), may miss an additional source of rigidity in terms of price levels.
The evidence presented is instead consistent with the proposed price plans of Eichen-
baum, Jaimovich and Rebelo (2011), according to which firms are assumed to choose
from a small set of prices that is updated relatively infrequently, subject to a cost. The
theory presented in the next chapter generates such plans endogenously, using fixed and
variable costs of information acquisition.
1.4 Break Test versus Filters
I compare the regimes-based method of analyzing price series to existing filtering
methods: a v-shaped sales filter similar to those employed by Nakamura and Steinsson
(2008), the reference price filter of Eichenbaum, Jaimovich and Rebelo (2011), and the
running mode filter of Kehoe and Midrigan (2010), which is similar to that of Chahrour
(2011). These filters have been proposed as a way to uncover stickiness in product-level
pricing data once one filters out transitory price changes that may be orthogonal to
aggregate conditions and hence not of direct interest to macroeconomists.
First, I apply the three filters to product level pricing data from Dominick’s Finer
Foods stores. I find that standard statistics of interest used to inform theories of price-
setting vary significantly across specifications of the different price filters: the estimated
median duration of regular prices varies from 10 weeks to 32 weeks across different v-
shaped filters and from 26 weeks to 53 weeks for different parametrizations of the rolling
mode filter. Hence, although intuitive, filters present an implementation challenge in
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that they allow for substantial discretion in both setting up the algorithm and choosing
the parameters that determine what defines a transitory price change and how it is
identified.
Next, I compute the synchronization of the regime test with the different filters.
Given the robustness of the break test across different data generating processes, il-
lustrated in section 1.2, the break test offers a direct way to evaluate the assumptions
invoked by various filtering methods against the data. For example, to the extent that
the true data generating process is indeed consistent with the assumptions made by the
v-shaped filter, one would expect to see a high degree of alignment between results ob-
tained by the break test and those obtained by an appropriately parameterized v-shaped
filter. Conversely, if results diverge even under the best parameterization of the filter,
one can conclude that the data too diverges from the assumptions of the filter.
I find varying degrees of synchronization between the filters and the break test.
To understand the sources of discrepancy, I apply the different filters to the simulated
processes described in section 1.2.
1.4.1 V-shaped Sales Filters
The application of v-shaped sales filters to product-level pricing data is motivated by
the observation that many retailers enact temporary price cuts that may reflect different
forms of price discrimination rather than responses to concurrent market conditions. The
filters eliminate price cuts that are followed, within a pre-specified window of time, by
a price increase to the existing regular price or to a new sticky regular price.
I implement a v-shaped sales filter based on a slight modification of the filter proposed
by Nakamura and Steinsson (2008). The algorithm requires choosing four parameters:
J,K, L, F . The parameter J is the period of time within which a price cut must return
to the regular price in order to be considered a transitory sale. For asymmetric v-shaped
sales, in which a price cut is not followed by a return to the existing regular price, several
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options arise regarding how to determine the new regular price. The parameters K and
L capture different potential choices about when to transition to a new regular price. In
the case of asymmetric sales, the parameter F determines whether to associate the sale
with the existing regular price or with the new one.
I apply the filter with different parametrizations to Dominick’s data, varying the sale
window J from three weeks to 12 weeks, K and L from one week (corresponding to
the symmetric v-shaped filter) to 12 weeks, and F ∈ {0, 1}. The parameter J is the
most important determinant of the frequency of regular price changes, hence in table
12 I report statistics for each J , averaged across various values of K,L, F . I find that
statistics vary significantly with the parameterization, with the median implied duration
of regular prices increasing from 13 to 30 weeks as I increase the length of the sale
window, J . Increasing J beyond 12 weeks no longer significantly impacts statistics (for
example, for J = 20 weeks, the median implied duration is 32 weeks). This sensitivity to
the parameterization of the filter is quite strong, but not entirely specific to Dominick’s
data: Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) report that for the goods underlying the US CPI,
one can obtain different values for the median frequency of price changes in monthly data.
For the range of parameters they test, they find median durations ranging between 6
and 8.3 months.
The filter alone cannot provide a measure of accuracy, and hence enable us to pick
the best parameterization. However, the break test is expected to have at least 90%
accuracy in identifying breaks in the data, if the data is a mixture of the types of
processes simulated in section 1.2. Hence, I compute the synchronization of the dif-
ferent parametrizations of the v-shaped filter with the regime test: a high degree of
synchronization between the two methods would imply robustness of the v-shaped filter.
Conversely, if the two methods are not aligned in the data, then we can conclude that
the assumptions underlying the implementation of the v-shaped filter are not borne out
by the data.
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For most parametrizations, the v-shaped method yields shorter regimes compared
with the regime test, which yields a median implied duration of 31 weeks. Divergence is
primarily driven by the presence of the type II process in the data and by the assumption
of a fixed sale window. Moreover, adjusting parameters of the v-shaped filter yields a
trade-off in performance: setting a small sales window ensures that the timing of regime
breaks is accurately identified, but generates three times more regime breaks in the
data. Even a large increase in the sales window still generates 55% more breaks, but
substantially reduces the method’s ability to estimate the timing of regime changes:
synchronization between the filter and the break test falls from 80% to 58%. Hence,
it is not the case that the regime test is similar to a v-shaped filter with a longer sale
window: the two methods are simply finding different breaks.
Table 13 reports the synchronization between the two methods in Dominick’s data
as a function of the sale window, J . The first row reports the total number of regime
changes found by the break test across all series, while the second row reports the number
of change points of the regular price found by the different parametrizations of the v-
shaped filter. The filter finds many more breaks, thereby implying a shorter duration of
regimes, ranging from 12 weeks to 29 weeks, depending on the sale window. The number
of breaks exactly synchronized between the two methods as a fraction of the number of
breaks found by the regime test, reported in the fifth row, shows that as the sale window
is increased to generate longer regimes, the synchronization between the two methods
falls, illustrating the fact that the two methods are finding different break points in
the data. The last row of the table reports the median minimum distance between the
change points estimated by the two methods, excluding exact synchronizations8.
For each value of J , the reported results are those for parametrizations ofK,L, F that
yield the highest degree of synchronization between the v-shaped filter and the regime
8I compute the minimum distance between two sets of change points using a standard nearest-
neighbor method. For example, for two sets of breaks at locations {2; 5; 19} and {1; 6; 12; 13; 16}, the
minimum-distance vector is {1; 1; 3} and the resulting mean distance is 1.67.
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test. While these parameters do not significantly affect the median implied duration
of the regular price, they do affect the timing of breaks, thus affecting synchronization.
For example, fixing J = 3 while varying the remaining parameters of the v-shaped filter
results in a range of exact synchronization from 65% to 80%.
In summary, the v-shaped filter presents a trade-off: a short sale window captures
most of the change points identified by the break test with a relatively high degree of
precision, but also generates many more additional breaks, leading to an under-estimate
of the rigidity of regular prices relative to the break test; a long sale window matches
the median duration of regular prices, but misses the timing of breaks.
To pinpoint the source of discrepancy between the two methods, I apply the v-
shaped filter to the four simulated processes defined in section 1.2. As expected, the
filter performs well for series generated from processes I, III and IV, although for the
multi-price series it consistently over-estimates the number of breaks. Table 14 reports
the results for the parameterization of the v-shaped filter that does the best job of
identifying the true change points.
As in Dominick’s data, changing the parametrization of the filter to reduce the num-
ber of breaks reduces synchronization of the breaks found by the filter with the true
breaks from more than 95% to as low as 50%. Since the break test allows the window
to vary endogenously, it is likely to outperform a constant-window filter in data that is
characterized by random variation in both the duration of regimes and the duration of
sales within these regimes.
1.4.2 Reference Price Filters
I next implement the reference price filter proposed by Eichenbaum et al (2011).
They split the data into calendar-based quarters and define the reference price for each
quarter as the most frequently quoted price in that quarter. I experiment with both a
six-week window and a 13−week window. In theory, this method should perform well
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overall, and should outperform the v-shaped filter for process III. However, the fixed
window assumption is quite limiting, and leads to low power and synchronization.
As shown in table 15, only 16% of the breaks identified by the regime-based method
are also identified by the reference price method. This low ratio is entirely due to the
reference price filter imposing a fixed minimum cutoff for regime lengths, which largely
assumes away the question of identifying the timing of changes in the reference price
series. Since I find that the length of regimes is highly variable over time, the two
methods are likely to overlap exactly only by chance.
The same pattern, namely very low synchronization, emerges when applying the
reference price filter to the simulated data, as shown in table 16.
1.4.3 Rolling Mode Filters
I implement the rolling mode filter proposed by Kehoe and Midrigan (2010), which
categorizes price changes as either temporary or regular, without requiring that all tem-
porary price changes occur from a rigid high price, as does the v-shaped filter, and
without imposing a fixed reference window, as does the reference price filter. For each
product, they define an artificial series called the regular price series, which is a rigid
rolling mode of the series. Every price change that is a deviation from the regular price
series is defined as temporary, and every price change that coincides with a change in
the rigid rolling mode price is defined as a regular price change. In this context, I define
a regime change as a change in the regular price.
The algorithm has two key parameters: A, which determines the size of the window
over which to compute the modal price (= 2A), and C, which is a cutoff used to determine
if a change in the regular price has occurred (specifically, if within a certain window,
the fraction of periods in which the price is equal to the modal price is greater than C,
then the regular price is updated to be equal to the current modal price; otherwise, the
regular price remains unchanged).
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When parameterized to match the number of breaks found by the break test in Do-
minick’s data, Kehoe and Midrigan’s (2010) rolling mode filter improves on the synchro-
nization of regime changes found by the reference price filter, and is largely in agreement
with the break test, with small differences in the timing of breaks: while exact synchro-
nization with the break test is fairly low, at 55%, the median distance between the breaks
found by the filter and those found by the break test is mostly two weeks, indicating
that the two methods appear fairly close.
This alignment is confirmed when applying the rolling mode to the simulated pro-
cesses from section 1.2, as shown in table 17. Overall, the rolling mode filter finds 94%
of breaks, with exact synchronization between the filter breaks and the simulated breaks
ranging from 100% for the single sticky price series (process I) to 85.4% for the rigid
multi-price series (process IV).
1.5 Conclusion
This chapter presents new facts about price adjustment at the micro level using
a new statistical method that tests for breaks in the distribution of prices over time.
Using weekly grocery store data, I find that regime changes are robustly estimated, with
regimes typically lasting 31 weeks. I find strong evidence against both the single-price
and the one-to-flex model, and document rigidity in price levels that extends beyond the
modal price. Existing models of pricing are at odds with this finding. I also find some
evidence that pricing regimes can be viewed as sequences of i.i.d. multi-price plans,
with statistics not meaningfully different from simulation-based statistics. Products
characterized by multiple rigid prices per regime are also highly volatile, compared with
one-to-flex series.
The regime-based approach suggests a new theoretical avenue for modeling pricing
behavior, one that is based on infrequently updated multi-price strategies consisting
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of a small set of prices. A potential interpretation of the findings documented in this
chapter is that for products for which frequent transitory adjustment is desirable, the
seller finds it optimal to design a pricing strategy that consists of a small number of
prices, among which to alternate over the course of the regime. It is conceivable that
the resulting persistence of such a model would depend not simply on the frequency
with which individual prices change, but rather on the frequency with which strategies
are updated, and on the information content of prices inside a regime. Such a theory is
presented in the next chapter.
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Table 1: Specification of simulated processes.
I II III IV
Proba(regular ∆p) β ∈ (0, 1) β ∈ (0, 1) β ∈ (0, 1) β ∈ (0, 1)
Regular shock N (µ, σ2) N (µ, σ2) N (µ, σ2) N (µ, σ2)
Proba(transitory ∆p) δ = 0 δ ∈ (0, 1) δ ∈ (0, 1) δ ∈ (0, 1)
Transitory shock 0 N (µT , σ2T ) N (µT , σ2T ) N (µT , σ2T )
Additional constraint - µT = 0 µ− 3σ > µT + 3σT µ− 3σ > µT + 3σT
Additional setting - - 0 ≤ lδ ≤ 3 nd = 3
Initial regular price exp (ε0) exp (ε0) exp (ε0) exp (ε0)








Table 2: Determining the critical value for the break test.
Critical value, K 0.874 0.772 0.70 0.61 0.60 0.50 0.40
Mean good_reject, % true count 83.9 86.5 88.5 90.8 90.9 93.2 95.0
Mean bad_reject, % test count 0.1 0.3 0.7 1.3 1.4 4.9 12.2
Max bad_reject, % test count 0.2 0.8 1.8 4.7 5.1 10.2 24.1
Mean regime length overshoot +7 +6 +5 +3 +3 −0.2 −5
Table 3: Break test performance for each simulated process (K = 0.61).
Process I II III IV Average
Good_reject, % true count 90.1 91.4 91.2 90.4 90.8
Bad_reject, % test count 0 0.2 4.7 0.3 1.3
Exact_synch, % good_reject 100 93.8 90.5 91.1 93.9
Mean distance if not exact 0 1.6 3.7 1.6 1.7
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Table 4: Summary statistics for Dominick’s data.
Category Code # Obs Median # Median Median Median Median
obs/UPC freq(dp) implied avg abs std(dp)
duration size(dp)
Full sample - 690, 578 142 22% 3.9 12% 16%
Analgesics ana 11,292 133 14% 6.8 11% 14%
Beer ber 11,310 138 32% 2.5 16% 18%
Bottled Juices bjc 41,760 132 19% 4.8 9% 13%
Cereals cer 45,128 192 15% 6.0 14% 23%
Cheeses che 67,706 190 25% 3.4 9% 14%
Cigarettes cig 11,532 181 6% 17.6 4% 5%
Cookies coo 56,327 137 23% 3.8 12% 16%
Crackers cra 16,960 114 23% 3.9 10% 13%
Canned Soup cso 47,480 196 16% 5.8 10% 14%
Dish Detergent did 18,236 98 19% 4.8 9% 13%
Front-end-candies fec 46,635 164 10% 8.7 16% 21%
Frozen Dinners frd 12,316 132 37% 2.1 17% 24%
Frozen Entrees fre 68,580 157 29% 2.9 22% 30%
Frozen Juices frj 27,316 274 27% 3.2 12% 18%
Fabric Softeners fsf 18,555 134 17% 5.4 7% 10%
Grooming Products gro 10,589 107 25% 3.5 11% 13%
Laundry Detergents lnd 24,236 96 14% 6.2 8% 12%
Oatmeal oat 9,650 301 17% 5.6 16% 26%
Paper Towels ptw 7,800 167 23% 3.8 8% 10%
Refrigerated Juices rfj 23,049 163 32% 2.5 11% 17%
Soft Drinks sdr 89,117 158 50% 1.4 19% 25%
Shampoos sha 4,056 66 25% 3.5 21% 26%
Snack Crackers sna 30,543 177 28% 3.1 11% 15%
Soaps soa 13,904 112 18% 5.0 7% 9%
Toothbrushes tbr 5,406 113 19% 4.7 17% 21%
Canned Tuna tna 14,035 131 17% 5.5 6% 8%
Toothpastes tpa 16,770 112 26% 3.4 12% 16%
Bathroom Tissues tti 7,996 185 28% 3.0 9% 13%
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Table 5: Breakdown of data by pricing strategy.
Single-price One-to-flex Rigid multi-price
% of productsa 4.9 18.3 76.8
% of regimesb 18.9 30.1 49.6
Regime duration at product level 45 30 31
Avg regime length across all products 18 29 49
a The numbers in this row add up to 100% because all the products exhibit some
form of rigidity in prices, thereby falling in one of the three categories.
b The numbers in this row do not add up to 100% because 1% of regimes are purely
flexible in the sense that all price observations in that regime are unique.
Table 6: Breakdown of price volatility by pricing strategy.
Single-price One-to-flex Rigid multi-price
Frequency of within-regime ∆p − 12.0% 28.6%
Abs. size of within-regime ∆p − 5.6% 10.6%
Abs. size of change in avg price per regime 5.8% 6.3% 7.8%
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Table 7: Frequency of “top” prices for rigid multi-price regimes.
Median % Top Top 2 Top 3 Top 4 Top 5 Distinct
(Mean %) price prices prices prices prices prices
Rigid multi-price 71.4 84.6 90.7 94.2 97.0 4
(67.9) (81.8) (88.0) (91.6) (94.0) (4.7)
Dominick’s Series 43.3 66.3 78.2 84.8 88.7 14
(47.5) (66.5) (76.5) (82.6) (86.6) (17.4)
Klenow & Malin Fooda 42.4 66.7 79.2 85.5 n.a. n.a.
(47.0) (66.7) (76.3) (81.3) (n.a.) (n.a.)
Klenow & Malin Alla 31.4 50.9 62.7 70.1 n.a. n.a.
(37.6) (53.2) (61.3) (66.2) (n.a.) (n.a.)
a Klenow & Malin (2010) numbers are for monthly data.
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Table 8: Relationship between regime length and regime cardinality.









Table 9: Simulation results for i.i.d. rigid multi-price plans.
1 = data 1 = simulation
2 = simulation 2 = simulation
Number of breaks (% of sample 1) 99.6 99.9
Synch’d breaks, exact (% of sample 1) 80.4 70.6
Synch’d breaks,+/-1 week (% of sample 1) 88.2 83.7
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Table 10: Simulation results for experimental rigid multi-price plans.
1 = data
2 = simulation
Number of breaks (% of sample 1) 153.8
Synch’d breaks, exact (% of sample 1) 75.3
Synch’d breaks,+/-1 week (% of sample 1) 85.0
Table 11: Comparison of data with i.i.d. and experimental simulations.
(Inside regimes) Multi-price Data Experimental
plans (iid) volatility
% Uninterrupted prices 69.5 80.0 93.1
% Comeback prices 66.7 33.3 0.0
Median implied regime duration (weeks) 31 31 19
Single-price regimes (% of all regimes)a 19.0 19.0 35.6
Rigid multi-price regimes (% of all regimes)b 49.8 49.6 1.2
a Single-price regimes are defined as regimes consisting of exactly one price.
b Multi-price regimes are all regimes with more than two distinct prices.
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Table 12: Different parametrizations of the v-shaped filter on Dominick’s data.
J 3 5 7 9 12
Mean frequency 0.083 0.053 0.043 0.039 0.037
Median frequency 0.076 0.050 0.040 0.035 0.033
Duration(mean) 11.6 18.3 22.6 25.3 26.8
Duration(median) 12.7 19.6 24.8 28.4 29.9
Table 13: Synchronization of v-shaped filter with break test in Dominick’s data.
J 3 5 7 9 12
Number of breaks, break test 18, 412 18, 412 18, 412 18, 412 18, 412
Number of breaks, v-shaped 66, 424 39, 659 32, 138 28, 852 26, 596
Median duration, v-shaped 12.4 19.0 23.9 27.5 28.5
Average v-shaped breaks fraction 360 214 177 164 155
Average exact synch fraction 80 68 64 61 58
Median distance b/w breaks 4.0 5.0 6.0 8.0 9.0
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Table 14: Simulation results for the v-shaped filter versus the break test.
# breaks/# true breaks V-shaped Break Test
I Single sticky price process 100% 90%
II Flexible deviations from rigid mode 450% 94%
III Fexible downward deviations from rigid mode 115% 96%
IV Rigid multi-price process 122% 91%
Table 15: Synchronization of reference price filter with break test in Dominick’s data.
W a 6 13
Regime duration 21 weeks 41 weeks
Synch’d, exact 2, 883 (16%) 1, 170 (7%)
Regimes breaks only 15, 529 (84%) 17, 242 (93%)
Filter breaks only 26, 943 (146%) 12, 813 (70%)
a W is the length of the fixed window in the reference
price filter.
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Table 16: Simulation results for the reference price filter versus the break test.
Reference Price Break Test
# breaks/# true breaks 93% 93%
Exact synch with true breaks 17% 94%
Table 17: Simulation results for the rolling mode filter versus the break test.
Rolling Mode Break Test
(W = 10)
# breaks/# true breaks 94% 93%
Exact synch with true breaks 94% 94%
Mean distance if not synch’d 2 2
Overshoot of median reg length +2.3 +3
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Figure 1: Sample price series (frozen juice) from Dominick’s data. The shading marks
the identified pricing regimes.
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Figure 2: The Kolmogorov-Smirnov distance (maximum marked by vertical line).
51













FLEXIBLE DEVIATIONS FROM RIGID HIGH PRICE






FLEXIBLE DEVIATIONS FROM RIGID MODE






RIGID DEVIATIONS FROM RIGID HIGH PRICE





































































Figure 4: Regime durations in Dominick’s data (medians and interquartile ranges by
product category).
Figure 5: Sample pricing policies in Dominick’s data.
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Frequency of the five most common prices
Figure 7: Frequency of top prices across policies.
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Freq(4th most quoted price)
Figure 8: Frequency of top prices by regime cardinality.


























Figure 9: Simulations of i.i.d. and experimental regimes.
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2 Discrete Price Adjustment in a Model with
Multiple-Price Policies
2.1 Introduction
This chapter develops a theory of price setting based on imperfect information that
yields pricing policies that are sticky and simple, namely, they are updated infrequently
and consist of a small set of prices. Both the stickiness and the coarseness of the pricing
policy are a result of the firm’s need to economize on information costs.
I consider the problem of a monopolistically competitive firm that sets prices subject
to uncertainty in its demand and its production technology. Obtaining any information
about the state of the world is costly in two ways. First, both the firm’s prices and its
acquisition of information are determined by a policy that can be reviewed subject to a
fixed cost. As in Reis (2006), payment of this cost enables the firm to collect complete
information about the state of the world at the time of the review. Second, in every
period between policy reviews, the firm acquires additional information, based on which
it makes two decisions: whether or not to review its policy and, if the policy consists of
a menu of prices, which price to charge. The additional information acquired between
policy reviews is subject to a cost per unit of information, which captures the cost of
monitoring market conditions. The measurement of the amount of information acquired
for each decision follows the rational inattention literature (Sims, 2003). The signals that
the firm chooses to receive compress the state into a simpler representation, given the
firm’s objective, the fixed and variable costs of information, and the market conditions
that the firm expects to encounter under the current policy, until the next review. For
each decision, the firm has access to no other information except that received through
the corresponding signal: the review signal and the price signal act as the only interface
between the firm and its environment at the time of each decision.
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I first show that the firm’s optimal policy consists of three elements: 1) a single
hazard function that specifies the probability of conducting a policy review conditional
on the current state, for all states and periods between reviews, 2) a set of prices,
and 3) a single conditional distribution that specifies which price to charge conditional
on the current state, for all states and periods between reviews. Together with the
evolution of market conditions, these elements determine the frequency with which the
firm undertakes reviews and the frequency with which it charges different prices between
reviews. The optimal policy has the same form for all periods until the next review.
Moreover, each review generates a shift in the optimal distribution of prices. Hence,
every policy review starts a new regime, and every regime is identified by a shift in the
distribution of prices.
Prices vary stochastically with the state, as in other rational inattention pricing
models (e.g., Matejka, 2011), and policy reviews are stochastically state-dependent and
independent of the time elapsed since the last review, as in Woodford (2009). The
random relationship between each of the two decisions and the current state is a result
of the firm’s need to economize on information. Obtaining more precise signals requires
purchasing a larger quantity of information in each period. Hence, the firm faces a trade-
off between economizing on information expenditure and pricing accuracy. The degree
to which prices respond to concurrent market conditions depends on this trade-off.
For a given review policy, I characterize how the firm’s pricing policy depends on the
cost of the price signal. I present conditions that can be used to determine the optimal
support of the distribution of prices charged between reviews, and I use these conditions
to determine numerically if the optimal pricing policy is discrete. I show that depending
on parameter values, either a single-price or a multiple-price policy may be optimal. In
particular, I establish a positive bound on the unit cost of the price signal such that, for
any cost below this bound, the optimal policy necessarily involves more than one price.
Numerical examples illustrate the optimality of a single-price policy for high enough
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(though still finite) information costs. For lower information costs, I illustrate how the
number of prices in the support increases as the cost of information is decreased. These
results are generated with an efficient algorithm that builds on existing work in the
information theory literature.
Calibrations of the model qualitatively match the features of price series in the Do-
minick’s data set, documented in Stevens (2011). Depending on parameter values, and
consistent with the empirical evidence, the model can generate both single-price and
multiple-price regimes that are updated relatively infrequently. For the case of multiple-
price policies, regimes consist of a small number of distinct prices, but are nevertheless
characterized by frequent and large within-regime price changes. Hence, the model en-
dogenously generates transitory volatility to and from discrete price levels. Figure 11
shows a sample price series simulated from the model. The shading marks the timing of
policy reviews.
Relation to the Literature
This theory contributes to the existing literature by providing a framework that
generates pricing regimes that consist of a small set of prices. Moreover, consistent with
the data, prices within regimes deviate frequently and by large amounts from seemingly
sticky levels. Hence, the model can reconcile large transitory volatility with apparent
rigidity in price levels.
Full information flexible price models, in which prices are continuously re-optimized,
do not generate regimes except to the extent that there are regimes in the underlying
shocks, and do not generate mass points in the distribution of prices observed over time,
except to the extent that the underlying shocks are themselves drawn from distributions
with mass points. By disregarding the substantial rigidity in price levels documented in
Stevens (2011), these models may overstate the degree of flexibility in the pricing data.
Sticky price models, such as time-dependent models (Taylor, 1980 or Calvo, 1983) or
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state-dependent models (Sheshinski andWeiss, 1977, Golosov and Lucas, 2007), generate
single-price regimes. As in the case of flexible price models, there is no reason for past
prices to be revisited once the firm re-optimizes its policy, hence these models cannot
explain the discreteness of prices observed in the data. Moreover, sticky price models
that abstract from transitory price changes within regimes may overstate the degree of
rigidity in the pricing data. As others have documented, a significant portion of firms’
revenues is derived from sales at the non-modal prices, which suggests that firms should
have a strong incentive to tie transitory prices to concurrent market conditions, at least
partially. Klenow and Willis (2007) further document that transitory prices have macro
content that does not wash out with aggregation.
It is important to note that in the model proposed here there are no physical costs
of price adjustment; in fact, prices can change all the time in this model. Rigidity
arises because they are always drawn from a fixed set of prices over the life of the
regime, and are based on noisy information about market conditions. There are also no
a priori constraints on the firm’s ability to change “regular” versus “temporary” prices,
thus distinguishing this model from those proposed by Kehoe and Midrigan (2010) and
Guimaraes and Sheedy (2011).
The model brings together different features of the growing literature on imperfect
information in price setting. In particular, the introduction of both fixed and variable
costs of information combines two competing approaches to modeling information acqui-
sition. However, the model departs from both literatures by generating simple pricing
policies that consist of a small set of prices.
First, as in the inattentiveness model of Reis (2006), the strategy that is used to
decide when to conduct the next review is itself part of the policy that is chosen at the
time of a review. In the model of Reis (2006), the policy specifies the path of prices to
be charged until the next review, and the date of the next review. Between reviews, the
firm cannot obtain any information about market conditions, other than information
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regarding the passage of time, which is available for free. In contrast, I allow the firm
to acquire information between reviews, but all information, including knowledge about
the number of periods since the last review, is subject to the same cost per unit of
information. The resulting timing of reviews and the price charged in each period are
stochastically state-dependent rather than time-dependent. In this model, a perfectly
precise review signal would generate the triggers in an Ss model of policy reviews, as in
the model of Burstein (2006). Conversely, if the firm acquired no information through
its review signal, the timing of policy reviews would be completely random, as in the
model of Mankiw and Reis (2002).
Second, as in the rational inattention literature, the acquisition of information be-
tween reviews is subject to a cost per unit of information, using entropy as a measure
of information. Allowing the firm to occasionally review its policy, subject to a cost,
generates regime changes, distinguishing this setup from other rational inattention pa-
pers, such as those of Sims (2003, 2006), Mackowiak and Wiederholt (2009), or Matejka
(2011). In those models, the firm specifies the optimal policy once and for all at some
initial date, and then receives signals in accordance with that policy. In contrast, I model
both the decision to change the price and the decision to change the overall policy, and
hence to move to a new regime. The fact that the firm can occasionally review its policy
means that it can implement simple policies between reviews.
Moreover, other rational inattention models assume that the cost per unit of infor-
mation applies to current market conditions, while the full history of past signals is
available for free. In contrast, I assume that all information, including memory of past
events and knowledge of the number of periods elapsed since the last review, is subject
to the same cost per unit of information. This assumption identifies the information
friction directly with the limited attention of the decision-maker processing the infor-
mation from a particular signal. This assumption is critical in generating regimes that
are identified by a single distribution of prices: without it, the firm would charge prices
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from a different pricing policy in every period; moreover, the optimal policy would not
generate a discrete distribution of prices, except in the special case of i.i.d. variations in
market conditions, as assumed in Matejka (2011).
This treatment of time and memory is the same as in Woodford (2009), who also
models policy reviews that are subject to a fixed cost and whose timing is determined
by a stochastically state-dependent hazard function. The present model differs from
Woodford (2009) along two dimensions. Firstly, I relax that model’s assumption that
between policy reviews the firm charges a single price. Introducing the price signal
generates price volatility between policy reviews, consistent with the empirical evidence
of multiple-price regimes documented in Stevens (2011). Secondly, I allow the firm to
redesign its signals at each review, whereas in Woodford (2009), the firm’s information
acquisition policy is chosen once and for all at some initial date.
Section 2.2 presents the setup and introduces the information costs, starting from the
full-information frictionless benchmark. Section 2.3 presents the acquisition of informa-
tion between reviews and defines the firm’s problem. Section 2.4 derives and discusses
the optimal policy. Section 2.5 discusses the model’s ability to generate price patterns
that match the empirical evidence. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Setup
A monopolistic firm producing a non-durable good must choose the price to charge
for its output in every period, subject to a demand function and a production technology
that vary stochastically. The firm’s per-period profit in units of marginal utility, pi(p−x),
is a function of the firm’s actual log-price, p, and its target log-price, x. The profit
function is a smooth real-valued function with a unique global maximum at p = x.
All the information about firm-specific and aggregate market conditions that the
firm needs in order to choose its optimal price is summarized in the target price, xt.
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This target is a linear combination of the exogenous disturbances in the economy, both
transitory and permanent. It evolves over time according to:
xt = x˜t + υt, (2.1)
x˜t = x˜t−1 + υ˜t, (2.2)
where the permanent and transitory innovations, υ˜t and υt, are drawn independently
from known distributions hυ˜ and hυ. After both υ˜t and υt have been realized, the period
t price is set and orders are fulfilled.
Section 2.5 maps a standard monopolistic competition model with Dixit-Stiglitz pref-
erences into this specification.
2.2.1 Full Information
In the frictionless benchmark, the firm chooses a pricing policy that specifies what





βtpi(pt − xt), (2.3)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor.
In the absence of information costs, the firm perfectly observes the realization of xt
in each period. If there are no other frictions, such as physical costs of price adjustment,
the firm’s optimal policy is to charge
pt = xt, ∀t. (2.4)
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2.2.2 Costly Information
I depart from the frictionless benchmark by assuming that although complete infor-
mation about the state of the economy is available in principle, the firm must expend
resources to receive any information in order to make its pricing decision in each period.
The measurement of information is based on the literature on rational inattention (Sims,
1998, 2003, 2006). In this setting, acquiring a larger quantity of information leads to
higher precision in tracking market conditions. Higher precision in turn implies that the
information-constrained firm sets a price that is closer to the frictionless optimal price.
Hence, the firm faces a trade-off between economizing on information costs and setting
prices that are close to the frictionless optimum.
As in other dynamic models of rational inattention (e.g. Sims, 2003, or Mackowiak
and Wiederholt, 2009), both the firm’s prices and its acquisition of information are
determined by an endogenously chosen policy. The quantity and type of information
that the firm chooses to acquire depend on the distribution of shocks in the economy,
how sensitive profits are to deviations of the price from the frictionless optimum, and
how costly it is for the firm to acquire and process information.
In an important departure from these models, I assume that the firm’s policy can
be occasionally reviewed, subject to a cost, as in Woodford (2009). The firm chooses to
review its policy when it receives information that suggests its current policy has become
obsolete relative to the evolution of market conditions since the last review. Therefore,
in every period, the firm must acquire information not only to decide what price to
charge, but also to decide whether or not it should review its policy.
When conducting a review, the firm chooses 1) a review policy that specifies the
acquisition of information for the review decision, and the rule for deciding, in each
period, whether or not to conduct a review, based on this information; and 2) a pricing
policy that specifies the acquisition of information for the pricing decision, and the rule
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for setting prices, in each period, based on this information.
The acquisition of information for each of the two decisions is subject to a variable
cost of monitoring market conditions. Letting Irt denote the quantity of information
acquired for the review decision in period t, the information expenditure associated with
this decision is θrIrt . Similarly, the expenditure on acquiring information for the pricing
decision in period t is θpIpt . The two monitoring costs, θr and θp, are not necessarily
equal. For instance, it may be the case that two individuals with different costs of
acquiring information make the two decisions within the firm. For each decision-maker,
the unit cost determines the information processing capacity that the decision-maker
allocates to this problem. The quantities of information acquired for each of the two
decisions are defined in the next section.
The fixed cost of conducting a policy review, denoted by κ, is a different type of
information cost. It represents the managerial resources associated with acquisition
of the information necessary to design a new policy, and with the decision-making and
communication of the new policy. As documented by Zbaracki et al (2004), firms spend a
significant amount of resources acquiring information and deciding what type of policy to
implement. Payment of this cost allows the firm to acquire extensive information about
the state of the world, on the basis of which it designs its new policy. For simplicity, I
assume that it enables the firm to receive complete information about the state of the
world at the time of the review. The assumption that the cost is fixed can be rationalized
via economies of scale in the review technology. This assumption follows Reis (2006).9




βt [pi(pt − xt)− θrIrt − κδrt − θpIpt ] , (2.5)
9The assumption of a fixed cost of policy reviews is also similar to that of Burstein (2006), except
for the fact that in that model, the firm has full information at all times for free, and the fixed cost
represents only the resources required to design and communicate the new policy.
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where θrIrt is the cost expended to make the review decision in period t, κ is the fixed
cost of a policy review, δrt is an indicator function that is equal to 1 if the firm reviews
its policy in period t and 0 otherwise, and θpIpt is the cost expended to make the pricing
decision in period t.
A key assumption embedded in the objective defined in equation (2.5) is that for
each decision-maker, the quantity of information required for this particular problem is
small relative to that decision-maker’s total information processing capacity. As a result,
the two costs per unit of information may be taken as fixed. Hence, this same unit cost
applies to all types of information that may be relevant10 for that manager’s problem,
regardless of their degrees of complexity. This assumption follows Woodford (2009).
It is important to underscore that in this setting, as in Woodford (2009), no poten-
tially relevant information is available for free. In particular, information that might be
stored in memory (such as the history of past signals and decisions) is equally costly to
access as is information available externally. Hence, the unit costs may be interpreted as
the effort on the part of the decision-maker expended to process one unit of information,
regardless of where that information may be stored when not in use.
In contrast, in the model of Sims (2003) and in other dynamic rational inattention
papers, the entire history of past signals is available to the decision-maker for free in
each period, prior to acquiring the information for that period.11 The availability of
that side information makes those models stationary. However, it is not required in the
current setup, given the firm’s ability to occasionally review its policy.
10The types of information that are potentially relevant to each decision, and are therefore included in
the state variable in each period, include information about the current market conditions, the history
of signals previously received and prices charged, and the number of periods that have elapsed since
the last review.
11Note that if given this side information, the decision-maker can track market conditions more
precisely, for a given level of expenditure on information.
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2.2.3 Sequence of Events
The firm’s policy specifies the acquisition of information in the form of signals that
compress the state of the world into a simpler representation. The sequence of events
that occur in each period t is as follows:
1. The value of the permanent innovation, υ˜t, is realized.
2. The firm receives the review signal, based on which it decides whether or not to
undertake a review, in accordance with its current policy:
(a) if it decides to undertake a review, it pays κ, obtains complete information
about the current state of the world, and chooses a new policy that consists of
a strategy for its review decision, to be implemented starting in period t+ 1,
and a strategy for its pricing decision, to be used starting in period t;
(b) otherwise, the existing policy is maintained.
3. The value of the transitory innovation, υt, is realized.
4. The firm receives the price signal, based on which it decides what price to charge
in the current period, in accordance with its current policy.
5. Period-t demand is met and profits are realized.
The assumption that in each period the firm makes its review decision before that pe-
riod’s transitory shock is realized is a simplification that reduces the state space relevant
for this decision, while only having small quantitative implications. If, instead, all shocks
were realized at the beginning of the period, the review decision would depend on both
types of shocks. However, the extent to which the transitory shock would impact the
review decision would be small: only particularly large transitory shocks would justify
triggering a review, despite the transient character of the shock. The timing assumption
abstracts from this complication by eliminating the possibility of such an effect.
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2.3 The Firm’s Problem
This section reformulates the firm’s objective in terms of the choices that the firm
makes each time it undertakes a review, and it defines the firm’s complete optimization
problem.
First, I define the signals that inform the firm’s two decisions, and the quantities of
information required by each signal, starting from general definitions for each signal. A
crucial determinant of the optimal signals is the way in which one measures the quantity
of information conveyed by each signal, Irt and I
p
t . Following the rational inattention
literature, I use a measure derived from information theory (Shannon, 1948), which
quantifies the reduction in the agent’s uncertainty about the state of the world at the
time of the receipt of the signal.12 The cost of information is linear in this quantity.
I then simplify the definition of each policy, using some preliminary results that
exploit the information theoretic framework. In particular, the most efficient policy for
each of the two decisions is shown to generate signals that directly specify the decision
that the firm should make. In the case of the review decision, the review signal directly
indicates whether or not the firm should undertake a review in the current state. In the
case of the pricing decision, the price signal directly tells the firm what price to charge
conditional on the current state.
These results ensure that the firm implements the most efficient signal structure,
namely one that does not entail acquiring any superfluous information. Moreover, they
allow me to abstract from any implementation details: it is not necessary to specify what
data the firm monitors in order to make each of its two decisions. All that is needed is
a mapping between the state and the final decision. Finally, these results allow me to
redefine the firm’s objective in terms of a tractable set of firm choices.
12See Cover and Thomas (2006) for an introduction to information theory.
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2.3.1 The Review Policy
Let ω˜t denote the complete state of the world at the time of the receipt of the review
signal in period t. It includes the realization of the permanent shock in the current
period, υ˜t, and the full history of shocks, signals, and decisions through the end of
period t − 1. Suppose that the firm reviews its policy in this period. The new review
policy is implemented starting in period t + 1. I begin with a general definition of
the review policy, which specifies the set of possible review signals, the probability of
receiving each signal in each period and in each state of the world until the next review,
and an action rule that maps each signal into the firm’s decision of whether or not to
undertake a new review.
Definition 1. A general review policy, implemented following a policy review in an
arbitrary state ω˜t in period t, is defined by
1. Rt, the set of possible review signals that will be received until the next review;
2. {ρt+τ (r|ω˜t+τ )}τ , the sequence of conditional probabilities of receiving the review
signal r, for all r ∈ Rt, all τ > 0, and all ω˜t+τ that follow the policy review, until
the next review;
3. ρt (r), the overall frequency with which the decision-maker anticipates receiving
each review signal, until the next review, for all r ∈ Rt;
4. λt (r) : Rt → [0, 1], the decision rule for conducting a policy review, which specifies
the probability of conducting a policy review when the review signal r is received,
for all r ∈ Rt.
The first three elements of the review policy can be thought of as the interface
between the decision-maker and his environment, while the last element maps the in-
formation received through this interface into the decision-maker’s actions. The first
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element of the review policy, the set of possible signals, Rt, can be arbitrarily large. It
can include any type of indicator that may be useful for determining whether or not the
policy currently in effect has become obsolete, relative to the evolution of the state, ω˜t.
The second element, the conditional probability of receiving a particular signal, can be
related in an arbitrary way to the complete state, or to any part of the state in each pe-
riod, and this relationship can vary with each future period, t+ τ , until the next review.
Before discussing the specification and role of the final two elements in the design of the
policy, it is necessary to derive the quantity of information that is acquired and used by
the policy.
The Cost of the Review Policy
The quantity of information transmitted by an optimally-designed policy plays a
dual role in this setup. On the one hand, it measures the amount of information that
is acquired by the decision-maker, quantifying how much of the decision-maker’s uncer-
tainty about the state has been removed upon receipt of the signal. Given the unit cost,
θr, it yields the cost of the given signalling mechanism. On the other hand, it measures
the amount of information that is used by the decision-maker, quantifying the reduction
in uncertainty that is reflected in his actions.
I begin by deriving the quantity of information acquired by a decision-maker who uses
the policy specified in definition 1 using the definition of mutual information between
the signal and the state. Following Shannon (1948), the entropy of a random variable
represents the amount of information that the decision-maker would have to receive in
order to eliminate all uncertainty about that random variable. The residual uncertainty,
conditional on receipt of a signal, is given by the conditional entropy. Hence, the quantity
of information acquired through the signal is the relative entropy, namely, the difference
between entropy and conditional entropy.
For convenience, for both the review signal and the price signal specified in the
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next section, I employ an equivalent definition, namely the average amount by which
uncertainty about the optimal signal would be reduced if the firm could observe the state.
These two definitions are equivalent since the information about the state contained in
the signal is equal to the information about the signal contained in the state. Exploiting
this symmetry simplifies the exposition.








For expository purposes, R is a countable set, though the definition can be modified to
allow for continuous signal distributions. It will be established below that the optimal
set of review signals is not only countable, but finite.
Let the entropy of the signal conditional on the state be denoted by Hω˜ (ρ), with
Hω˜ (ρ) ≡ E
{∑
r∈R




This leads to a generic definition for the quantity of acquired information as the difference
between entropy and conditional entropy.
Definition 2. The quantity of information that is acquired in order to implement a
signalling mechanism defined by {R, ρ (r|ω˜), ρ (r)} is E {Ir (ρ (r|ω˜) , ρ (r))}, where
Ir (ρ, ρ) ≡
∑
r∈R
ρ (r|ω˜) [log ρ (r|ω˜)− log ρ (r)] . (2.8)
The quantity of information that is expected to be acquired in a particular state
ω˜, Ir (ρ (r|ω˜) , ρ (r)), is a function of the frequency ρ (r) that the firm anticipates prior
to receiving the signal. More precise information about ω˜ implies a bigger difference
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between the conditional and the unconditional distributions.13
Using this definition, I now define the quantity of information acquired through the
review policy specified in definition 1.
Definition 3. The quantity of information expected, at the time of the review in an
arbitrary state ω˜t and period t, to be acquired in the implementation of the review policy
specified in definition 1, in each period t+ τ , τ > 0, over all states ω˜t+τ that follow the
policy review, until the next review, is given by
Irt+τ ≡ Et {Ir (ρt+τ (r|ω˜t+τ ) , ρt (r))} , (2.9)
where Ir (ρt+τ (r|ω˜t+τ ) , ρt (r)) is defined in equation (2.8), and Et {·} denotes expecta-
tions conditional on the state ω˜t, on a policy review having taken place in that state, and
on the policy implemented at that time.
Each conditional distribution, ρt+τ (r|ω˜t+τ ), together with the distribution of the
state in that period under the chosen review policy, implies a period-specific frequency
of reviews, ρt+τ (r). However, the sequence of these marginal distributions is not relevant
for the design of the policy at review time. Prior to receiving the signal in each period,
the decision-maker has no side information, including no knowledge of τ or of past
signals. Hence, he does not know which frequency ρt+τ (r) to anticipate. He only knows
that over the life of the policy he can anticipate review signals to occur with a frequency
ρt (r). As a result, the quantity of information acquired in each period is measured as the
reduction in uncertainty relative to this common marginal, ρt (r). Therefore, the firm
designs a single information structure that generates signals from multiple potential
13The quantity of information can also be seen to be equal to the Kullback-Leibler distance between
the probabilies of r and ω˜: a low quantity of information means that the joint distribution of r and
ω˜ is close to the product of the marginals. If the two random variables are independent, the joint
distribution is equal to the product of the marginals, and the quantity of information conveyed by the
signal is zero.
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sources, without the decision-maker knowing which source is “active” at any point in
time.14 If the sources are not identical, this information structure will necessarily entail
acquiring a larger quantity of information, relative to the case in which a separate
signalling mechanism is designed specifically for each source.
The Precision of the Review Policy
The amount of information that is used by the decision-maker employing the policy
specified by definition 1 measures the reduction in uncertainty that is reflected in the
final binary decision (review or do not review), given the state. I begin by defining this
quantity for a static review policy, {R, ρ (r|ω˜) , ρ (r) , λ (r)}. Under such a policy, the




λ (r) ρ (r|ω˜) , (2.10)
and expects to retain the existing policy with probability 1 − Λ (ω˜). The probability





λ (r) ρ (r) . (2.11)
This leads to the definition of the quantity of information that is used by the decision-
maker employing this policy.
Definition 4. The quantity of information that is used by a review policy defined by




) ≡ Λ [log Λ− log Λ]+ (1− Λ) [log (1− Λ)− log (1− Λ)] , (2.12)
14Thank you to Mike Woodford for this insight.
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is the relative entropy between two binary random variables for which the probabilities of
observing the signal r = 1 are Λ (ω˜) and Λ, respectively, where Λ (ω˜) and Λ are defined
in equations (2.10) and (2.11), respectively.
Using this definition, I now define the quantity of information expected, at the time
of the review, to be used by decision-maker employing the policy given in definition 1.
Definition 5. The quantity of information that the decision-maker expects to use when
implementing the review policy given in definition 1, in each period t + τ , τ > 0, over









Λt+τ (ω˜t+τ ) ≡
∑
r∈R




λt (r) ρt (r) , (2.15)
Ir
(
Λt+τ (ω˜t+τ ) ,Λt
)
is defined in equation (2.12).
Here, as above, Et {·} denotes expectations conditional on the state ω˜t, on a policy
review having taken place in that state, and on the review policy implemented at that
time.
Recall that before the receipt of the review signal in each period, the firm has no
additional information (including knowledge of τ), except for knowledge of the state at
the last review, ω˜t, and of the policy chosen at that review. Therefore, at the time of
the review, the firm must choose a single decision rule, λt (r), which it can then use in
every subsequent period, t+ τ , to convert the signal into a review decision.
Conversely, if the firm had independent knowledge of τ before receiving the signal in
each period, in principle, it could design a policy that specified a different decision rule
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λt+τ (r) for each τ > 0.
As noted above, the optimal review policy is one in which the quantity of information
acquired is equal to the quantity of information used by the decision-maker, lest the
decision-maker purchases superfluous information. This leads to a preliminary result
from Woodford (2008).
Lemma 1 (Woodford, 2008). In the implementation of the policy specified in definition
1, the quantity of information acquired is weakly greater than the quantity of information
used,
Jrt+τ ≤ Irt+τ (2.16)
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
The quantity of information Jrt+τ is the lowest quantity that the decision-maker can
acquire and still make exactly the same decisions as when acquiring Irt+τ . This lemma
leads immediately to a redefinition of the review policy.
Corollary 1. The most efficient review policy, implemented following a policy review
in an arbitrary state ω˜t in period t, defines {0, 1} as the set of possible review signals r,
and specifies
1. {Λt+τ (ω˜t+τ )}τ , the sequence of conditional probabilities of receiving the review sig-
nal r = 1 (conducting a policy review) for all τ > 0 and all ω˜t+τ that follow the
policy review, until the next review;
2. Λt, the overall frequency with which the decision-maker anticipates receiving the
review signal r = 1, until the next review.
The quantity of information Irt+τ acquired through this signalling mechanism in each
period t+ τ , τ > 0, until the next review is equal to the quantity of information used by
the decision-maker in each period, which is given in equation (2.13).
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Proof. See Appendix B.1.
Hence, the optimal review signal directly specifies whether or not the firm should
review its policy, conditional on the state. This result is not only intuitive, but also
formally defines the cheapest review policy that the firm can employ in order to make
its review decision. Any other signal structure would require a quantity of information
weakly greater than the quantity defined in equation (2.13). Reformulating the signalling
mechanism in this way also leads to a simplification in solving for the firm’s review
decision: rather than choosing the four objects defined in definition 1, the firm chooses
the sequence of hazard functions, {Λt+τ (ω˜t+τ )}τ , and the anticipated frequency of policy
reviews, Λt.
Critical to this result is the assumption that the decision-maker can arrange to receive
any type of signals from a completely unrestricted set. It may be reasonable to argue that
the set of possible signals available to economic agents is at least partially restricted.
Hence, the signal structure specified in corollary 1 implies a conservative estimate of
the frictions generated by imperfect information. In practice, if agents are constrained
in their ability to arrange signals on the state of the economy, they will obtain lower
precision for a given level of expenditure on information acquisition than the precision
implied by the unconstrained signalling mechanism.
2.3.2 The Pricing Policy
In each period, the price signal is received after the review signal and the associated
review decision, and after the realization of the transitory shock, υt. As above, suppose
that the firm conducts a policy review in an arbitrary state ω˜t in period t. The pricing
policy applies starting in the same period. For any τ ≥ 0, let ωt+τ ≡ {ω˜t+τ , rt+τ , υt+τ}
denote the state of the world at the time of the receipt of the price signal in period t+τ .
As in the case of the review policy, I begin with a general definition of the pricing
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policy, which specifies the set of possible price signals, the probability of receiving each
signal in each period and each state of the world until the next review, and an action rule
that maps each signal into the price to be charged. The firm’s choices for the optimal
pricing policy are then simplified by showing that the most efficient price signal directly
specifies the price that the firm should charge in each period. The derivation parallels
that of the optimal review signal.
Definition 6. A general pricing policy, implemented following a policy review in an
arbitrary state ω˜t in period t, is defined by
1. St, the set of possible price signals that will be received until the next review;
2. {φt+τ (s|ωt+τ )}τ , the sequence of conditional probabilities of receiving the price sig-
nal s, for all s ∈ St, all τ ≥ 0, and all ωt+τ that follow the policy review, until the
next review;
3. φt (s), the overall frequency with which the decision-maker anticipates receiving
each price signal, until the next review, for all s ∈ St;
4. αt (p|s) : St × R→ [0, 1], the decision rule for price-setting, which specifies the
probability of charging price p ∈ R when the price signal s is received, for all
s ∈ St.
The set of possible price signals, St, can also be arbitrarily large, including any
variable that may be useful for determining the price to be charged conditional on the
state ωt+τ . For generality, I allow the decision rule for price-setting, αt (p|s), to be a
potentially random function of the signal. As in the case of the review signal discussed
above, a single decision rule is chosen to apply across all periods; and the frequency with
which the decision-maker anticipates receiving each price signal until the next review,
φt (s), is the relevant density that determines the quantity of information processed in
every period under this policy.
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The Cost of the Pricing Policy
The definition for the quantity of information that is acquired in order to implement
a particular pricing policy emulates the definition in the previous section.
Definition 7. The quantity of information that is acquired in order to implement a
signalling mechanism defined by






φ (s|ω) [log φ (s|ω)− log φ (s)] . (2.17)
For expository purposes, S is a countable set, although the definition can be extended
to allow for continuous signal distributions.
Using this generic definition, I next define the quantity of information that is acquired
through the pricing policy specified in definition 6.
Definition 8. The quantity of information expected, at the time of the review in an
arbitrary state ω˜t and period t, to be acquired in the implementation of the pricing
policy specified in definition 6, in each period t + τ , τ ≥ 0, over all states ωt+τ that










φt+τ (s|ωt+τ ) , φt (s)
)
is defined in equation (2.17).
Here, as above, Et {·} denotes expectations conditional on the state ω˜t, on a policy
review having taken place in that state, and on the review policy implemented at that
time.
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The Precision of the Pricing Policy
The amount of information that is used by the decision-maker employing the pricing
policy specified above measures the reduction in uncertainty that is reflected in the
firm’s prices. As in the case of the review policy, I begin by defining this quantity for a
static policy,
{S, φ (s|ω) , φ (s) , α (p|s)}. Let the set of prices implied by this policy be




α (p|s)φ (s|ω) , (2.19)
for each p ∈ P .
The probability with which the firm anticipates charging price p across all states ω




α (p|s) φ (s) , (2.20)
for each p ∈ P . These definitions lead to the quantity of information that is used by the
decision-maker employing this pricing policy.
Definition 9. The quantity of information that is used by a pricing policy defined by
{S, φ (s|ω), φ (s), α (p|s)} is E {Ip (f (p|ω) , f (p))}, where
Ip
(
f (p|ω) , f (p)) ≡∑
p∈P
f (p|ω) [log f (p|ω)− log f (p)] (2.21)
is the relative entropy between f (p|ω) and f (p), which are defined in equations (2.19)
and (2.20), respectively.
Using this definition, I now define the quantity of information expected, at the time
of the review, to be used by decision-maker employing the policy given in definition 6.
Definition 10. The quantity of information that the decision-maker expects to use when
implementing the pricing policy given in definition 6, in each period t + τ , τ ≥ 0, over
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ft+τ (p|ωt+τ ) ≡
∑
s∈S




αt (p|s)φt (s) , (2.24)
and Ip
(
ft+τ (p|ωt+τ ) , ft (p)
)
is defined in equation (2.21).
Here, as above, Et {·} denotes expectations conditional on the state ω˜t, on a policy
review having taken place in that state ω˜t, and on the review policy implemented at
that time.
The requirement that the quantity of information acquired is equal to the quantity of
information used results in a new specification of the pricing policy. First, note that, as
in the case of the review policy, the general policy specified in definition 6 is suboptimal.
Lemma 2. In the implementation of the pricing policy specified in definition 6, the
quantity of information acquired is weakly greater than the quantity of information used,
Jpt+τ ≤ Ipt+τ . (2.25)
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
The quantity of information Jpt+τ is the lowest quantity that the decision-maker
can acquire and still choose prices according to the same rule and based on the same
information as when acquiring Ipt+τ . As in the case of the review signal, lemma 2 leads
immediately to a redefinition of the pricing policy.
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Corollary 2. The most efficient pricing policy, implemented following a policy review
in an arbitrary state ω˜t in period t, specifies
1. Pt, the set of prices charged until the next review;
2. {ft+τ (p|ωt+τ )}τ , the sequence of conditional probabilities of charging price p for all
p ∈ Pt, all τ ≥ 0, and all ωt+τ that follow the policy review, until the next review;
3. f t (p), the anticipated frequency with which each price is charged over all states
and periods until the next review, for all p ∈ Pt.
The quantity of information Ipt+τ acquired through this signalling mechanism in each
period t + τ , τ ≥ 0, is equal to the quantity of information used by the decision-maker
in each period, which is given in equation (2.22).
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
Hence, the firm’s optimal pricing policy directly specifies which price the firm should
charge, conditional on the state.
Following a policy review in period t, the firm’s choices when solving for the optimal
policy are therefore reduced to choosing five objects: the sequence of hazard functions,
{Λt+τ (ω˜t+τ )}τ , which govern the probability of a policy review in each state and in
each period; the overall anticipated probability of a review, Λt, the set of prices Pt,
the sequence of conditional probabilities,{ft+τ (p|ωt+τ )}, which govern the probability of
charging each price in each state and period, and the overall anticipated frequency of
prices, f t (p). Any other signal structures would entail acquiring quantities of informa-
tion weakly greater than the quantities given in equations (2.13) and (2.22).
2.3.3 The Firm’s Problem
The choices defined above provide a concrete formulation of the firm’s policy. Using
these choices, the continuation value of the objective defined in equation (2.5), looking
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p∈Pt+τ pi(p− xt+τ )ft+τ (p|ωt+τ )
−βθrIr (Λt+τ+1 (ω˜t+τ+1) ,Λt+τ+1)− βκΛt+τ+1 (ω˜t+τ+1)
−θpIp (ft+τ (p|ωt+τ ) , f t+τ (p))

 , (2.26)
where, as above, Et {·} denotes expectations conditional on state ω˜t, on a review having
taken place in that state, and on the review policy implemented at that time. Here,
Λt+τ , Λt+τ (ω˜t+τ ), Pt+τ , f t+τ (p), and ft+τ (p|ωt+τ ) are the policy choices that are in
effect in each future period t + τ and in each state of the world, regardless of whether
they were adopted at the time of the review in period t or in some subsequent policy
review. Hence, in this equation, I make no explicit reference to the period and state in
which the policy that applies in each t+ τ was chosen.
It is convenient to collect all of the terms in the objective that depend on the pricing
policy in effect in a particular period. Let Πt (ωt) denote the firm’s per-period profit in
an arbitrary state ωt (hence after that period’s transitory shock, but before receipt of
the price signal), expected under the pricing policy in effect in that state, net of the cost








log ft (p|ωt)− log f t (p)
]}
. (2.27)






Πt+τ (ωt+τ )− βθrIr
(
Λt+τ (ω˜t+τ ) ,Λt+τ
)− βκΛt+τ (ω˜t+τ )]} . (2.28)
This formulation will prove helpful later on, since it separates the firm’s optimal pricing
policy, which only depends on the first term.
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The Recursive Formulation
The firm’s review policy determines the probability that the policy chosen in period
t continues to apply in period t+ τ , as a function of the history of states. Redefining the
continuation value in terms of this survival probability is a first step towards formulating
the firm’s objective recursively.
Let Γt+τ (ω˜t+τ−1) denote the probability, expected at the time of the review, that the
review policy chosen in period t, continues to apply τ periods later, when the history of
states is given by ω˜t+τ−1. Since there can only be one review per period, Γt+1 (ω˜t) ≡ 1




[1− Λt+k (ω˜t+k)] , (2.29)
for τ > 1.
Let V t (ω˜t) denote the maximum attainable value of the firm’s continuation value
defined in equation (2.28). Under the assumption that an optimal policy will be chosen
in all future policy reviews, this continuation value can be expressed in terms of the







(1− Λt+τ (ω˜t+τ )) Πt+τ (ωt+τ )
+Λt+τ (ω˜t+τ )
[
V t+τ (ω˜t+τ )− κ
]
−θrIr (Λt+τ (ω˜t+τ ) ,Λt)

 . (2.30)
where the continuation value now explicitly incorporates the firm’s review policy, and
hence Et {·} now denotes expectations conditional on state ω˜t and on a review having
taken place in that state. Conditional on the current policy surviving all the review
decisions leading to a particular state ω˜t+τ , τ > 0, the firm pays the cost of the review
signal, θrIr
(
Λt+τ (ω˜t+τ ) ,Λt
)
. It then continues to apply the current policy with prob-
ability 1 − Λt+τ (ω˜t+τ ), and it undertakes a policy review with probability Λt+τ (ω˜t+τ ),
in which case it pays the review cost κ and expects the maximum attainable value from
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that state onward, V t+τ (ω˜t+τ ).
Problem 1. If the firm undertakes a policy review in an arbitrary state ω˜t and period
t, it chooses
1. a review policy that specifies Λt and {Λt+τ (ω˜t+τ )}τ for all τ > 0 and all ω˜t+τ that
follow the policy review, until the next review, and
2. a pricing policy that specifies Pt, f t (p), and {ft+τ (p|ωt+τ )}τ for all p ∈ Pt, all
τ ≥ 0, and all ωt+τ that follow the policy review, until the next review.
The two policies are chosen to maximize the objective defined in equation (2.30).
The Stationary Formulation
At the time of a policy review in period t, the firm learns the complete state, ω˜t.
Hence, the firm’s problem can be expressed in terms of the innovations to the state since
the last review. Using this normalization, I formulate the firm’s objective independent
of the time and state in which a policy review is conducted.
First, for any state ω˜t+τ , occurring before the review decision in each period, let $˜τ
denote the innovations in ω˜t+τ since ω˜t. Recall that the complete state ω˜t+τ contains
the history of prior signals and decisions, through period t + τ − 1, and the history
of permanent pre-review states, x˜t+τ , that occur before each review decision, through
period t+ τ .
Similarly, for any state ωt+τ , let $τ denote the part of the state that is news since ω˜t.
The state ωt+τ contains ω˜t+τ , the review decision in period t + τ , and the post-review
state, xt+τ .
Let y˜τ denote the normalized pre-review state, and let yτ denote the normalized
83
post-review state,
y˜τ ≡ x˜t+τ − x˜t, (2.31)
yτ ≡ xt+τ − x˜t. (2.32)
Given the laws of motion in equations (2.1) and (2.2), the normalized variables y˜τ , yτ ,
and hence $˜τ , $τ are distributed independently of the state ω˜t at the time of the policy
review in period t. Hence, we can express the firm’s problem in terms of these normalized
variables, without any reference to either the date t or the state ω˜t in which the review
takes place.
Letting q denote the normalized price,
q ≡ p− x˜t, (2.33)
the firm’s optimal pricing policy is expressed in terms of the set of normalized prices
q ∈ Q, anticipated to occur with frequencies f (q), and the sequence of conditional
distributions {fτ (q|$τ )}τ . The firm’s profit function becomes pi(q − yτ ), and yτ is the
normalized target price that the firm would charge in a frictionless environment. And
Πt+τ (ωt+τ ), the expected per-period profit under the current pricing policy, net of the
cost of the price signal, is replaced by its normalized counterpart Πτ ($τ ),





pi(q − yτ )− θp
[
log fτ (q|$τ )− log f (q)
]}
. (2.34)
The optimal review policy can also be written in normalized terms as the choice of
a sequence of hazard functions {Λτ ($˜τ )}τ and an anticipated frequency of reviews Λ.
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The survival probability becomes
Γτ+1 ($˜τ ) ≡
τ∏
k=1
[1− Λk ($˜k)] , (2.35)
for τ > 0, with Γ1 (·) ≡ 1.
These steps lead to the stationary formulation of the firm’s problem, defined below.
Problem 2. If the firm undertakes a policy review in any arbitrary state and period, it
chooses
1. a review policy that specifies Λ and {Λτ ($˜τ )}τ for all τ > 0 and all news states
$˜τ until the next review, and
2. a pricing policy that specifies Q, f (q), and {fτ (q|$τ )}τ for all normalized prices
q ∈ Q, all τ ≥ 0, and all news states $τ until the next review.











−θrIr (Λτ ($˜τ ) ,Λ)

 , (2.36)
where V is the maximized value of the objective defined in (2.36).
2.4 Optimal Policy
I obtain the solution to Problem 2 in steps, deriving each element of the optimal
policy taking the other elements as given.
Proposition 1. The policy that maximizes the objective defined in equation (2.36) spec-
ifies
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1. a review policy given by a scalar, Λ, that denotes the frequency of reviews, and
a single real-valued function, Λ (y˜), that is defined for all possible normalized pre-
review target prices y˜, and that determines the probability of a policy review in
each state and period τ , and
2. a pricing policy given by the set of normalized prices Q, the distribution f (q),
for all q ∈ Q, and a single conditional distribution, f (q|y), that is defined for all
possible normalized post-review target prices y, and that determines the probability
of charging the normalized price q in each state and period τ .
The hazard function for policy reviews, Λ (y˜), is given by
Λ (y˜)







V − κ− V (y˜)]} , (2.37)
for each y˜, where V (y˜) is the firm’s continuation value under the firm’s current policy,
and V = V (0) is the firm’s continuation value upon conducting a policy review.
The frequency of policy reviews, Λ, implied by the hazard function, is given by
Λ =
E {∑∞τ=1 βτΓτ (y˜τ−1) Λ (y˜τ )}
E {∑∞τ=1 βτΓτ (y˜τ−1)} . (2.38)
The conditional distribution of prices, f (q|y), is given by




pi (q − y)}∑




pi (q̂ − y)} , (2.39)
for each y.
The unconditional distribution of prices, f (q), is given by
f (q) =
E {∑∞τ=0 βτΓτ+1 (y˜τ ) f (q|y)}
E {∑∞τ=0 βτΓτ+1 (y˜τ )} , (2.40)
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) ≡ ∫ exp{ 1θppi (q − y)}∑




pi (q̂ − y)}G (y) dy. (2.43)
Here, G (y) is the distribution of normalized target prices, y, under the firm’s review
policy, and given the laws of motion in equations (2.31) and (2.32). This distribution
will be derived explicitly below.
The first thing to note is that the optimal policy specifies both a review policy and a
pricing policy that condition only on the normalized target prices y˜τ and yτ . Although I
allow the firm to condition each component of its policy on the complete state ($˜τ , for the
review decision, and $τ , for the pricing decision), the firm allocates all the information
capacity to learning about changes in market conditions since the last review, rather
than paying any attention to past events, past signals, or the passage of time. This
outcome is a result of the setup that implies that all types of information have equal
cost. Given this fixed cost, and since the firm would like to have information regarding
past events or regarding the passage of time only insofar as it is informative about the
current normalized state, the firm chooses to learn directly about the target price that
directly affects its profit function.
The second thing to note is that the optimal policy specifies time invariant functions
for both the review policy and the pricing policy, even though I allow the firm to choose
hazard functions and conditional price distributions that are indexed by time. This
outcome is a direct consequence of the first point discussed above. Since the firm chooses
to directly learn about the normalized target price (y˜τ , for the review decision, and yτ ,
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for the pricing decision), its signal extraction problem for each decision is the same in
every period, subject to the requirement that across periods, it must be consistent with
the anticipated frequency with which each decision is expected to be made over the life
of the policy.
The firm’s complete policy is derived in the following subsections, which present the
optimization problem that each element of the policy solves.
2.4.1 The Conditional Distribution of Prices
For the purposes of showing that the firm allocates its entire attention to monitoring
only innovations in target price, it convenient to begin by discussing the firm’s pricing
policy, taking the review policy as given.
The firm’s choice of an optimal pricing policy for a given review policy is reduced to
the maximization of the term that directly depends on the pricing policy in the firm’s
objective. Inspection of equation (2.36) reveals that, excluding the terms that depend




βτΓτ+1 ($˜τ ) Πτ ($τ )
}
. (2.44)
Consider the subproblem of choosing the optimal sequence of conditional price dis-
tributions, {fτ (q|$τ )}τ , for a given review policy, and further taking as given the set of
normalized prices, Q, and the anticipated frequency with which each price is charged,
f (q) > 0 for all q ∈ Q. The objective specified in equation (2.44) is additively separable
across dates and states. Hence, for each τ and each possible news state $τ under the
current review policy, the firm chooses the conditional distribution of normalized prices
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fτ (q|$τ ) that solves
max
fτ (q|$τ )




fτ (q|$τ ) = 1, (2.46)
fτ (q|$τ ) ≥ 0, ∀q ∈ Q. (2.47)
Lemma 3. Let the review policy, the set of normalized prices Q, and the frequency with
which the firm anticipates charging each price until the next review, f (q) for all q ∈ Q,
be fixed. If θp > 0, the optimal conditional price distribution fτ (q|$τ ) that solves the
objective defined in equation (2.45) subject to the constraints specified in equations (2.46)
and (2.47), has the same form for all τ ≥ 0, and depends only on the normalized target
price, yτ , for each $τ . Letting Y denote the set of all possible values of yτ under the
current review policy, the optimal conditional price distribution is given by




pi (q − y)}∑




pi (q̂ − y)} , (2.48)
for all y ∈ Y, and all q ∈ Q.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
Note that since the expected profit in each period Πτ ($τ ) depends on $τ and τ only
through the dependence of the profit function pi(q− yτ ) on the target price yτ , the opti-
mal pricing policy conditions prices only on yτ . The resulting conditional distribution,
f (q|yτ ), indicates the probability of charging a normalized price q when the target price
is yτ , and is otherwise independent of the number of periods elapsed since the last review
and of all other aspects of $τ . Intuitively, since the firm faces the same unit cost of
processing information about all aspects of the complete state $τ , it chooses to allocate
its entire attention to monitoring changes in its target price directly, and it does so in
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the same way in each period until the next review. Furthermore, note that the formula
for the optimal conditional distribution in this dynamic setting is of the same form as
that first derived by Shannon (1959) for a static rate-distortion function.
The resulting expected profit net of the cost of the price signal is also a time-invariant




f (q|y){pi(q − y)− θp [log f (q|y)− log f (q)]} . (2.49)
Equation (2.48) illustrates the sense in which the price signal is optimally designed,
given the firm’s objective function. For a given target price y, the conditional probability
of charging a particular price q that is closer to the target is relatively higher, since the
profit under that price is high relative to the average profit that the firm can expect in
this state across all normalized prices in the set Q. However, the relationship between
the state and the price signal is noisy: the signal places positive mass on all prices in the
support of the distribution, for each target price y. This randomness reflects the need
to economize on the information cost associated with receiving the price signal in each
period.
If, before receiving the price signal in each period, the firm had independent knowl-
edge of the number of periods elapsed since the last review, it would have more precise
information about the states of the world that are more likely in a particular period. For
example, it would have less uncertainty about the state soon after a review. It would
use this knowledge to design a signalling mechanism that specified different anticipated
frequencies for the normalized prices for each period, f τ (q), and hence different condi-
tional distributions, fτ (q|y). Similarly, if the firm had access to the sequence of past
price signals for free, a separate signalling mechanism would also be chosen for each his-
tory of prior signals. Here, instead, the only information that the firm has, prior to the
receipt of the price signal, is the information obtained at the last policy review. Hence,
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the optimal pricing policy is characterized by a single conditional distribution that is
optimal across all states and periods in which the current policy is expected to apply.
2.4.2 The Hazard Function for Reviews
I consider next the firm’s choice of an optimal sequence of hazard functions for a
given pricing policy, and further taking Λ as given. This problem can be given a recursive
formulation by noting that the choice of the sequence {Λτ ′ ($˜τ ′)}τ ′ for all τ ′ > τ , looking
forward from an arbitrary state $˜τ , is independent of the choices made for periods prior
to τ , or for news states $˜τ ′ that are not successors of $˜τ .
Let Vτ ($˜τ ) be the maximum attainable value of the firm’s objective, defined in
equation (2.36), from some period τ onwards,
Eτ




′−τΓτ,τ ′ ($˜τ ′−1)

(1− Λτ ′ ($˜τ ′)) Πτ ′ ($τ ′)
+Λτ ′ ($˜τ ′)
[
V − κ]
−θrIr (Λτ ′ ($˜τ ′) ,Λ)

 , (2.50)
where Eτ {·} denotes expectations over all possible histories for dates τ ′ ≥ τ , conditional
on reaching state $˜τ , and, using equation (2.35), the survival probability between periods
τ and τ ′ is given by
Γτ,τ ′ ($˜τ ′−1) ≡
τ ′−1∏
k=τ+1
[1− Λk ($˜k)] , (2.51)
for τ ′ > τ + 1 , with Γτ,τ+1 (·) ≡ 1.
The optimal sequence of hazard functions {Λτ ′ ($˜τ ′)}τ ′ maximizes the continuation
value defined in equation (2.50), given Λ and the firm’s pricing policy.
Lemma 4. Let the pricing policy be fixed, and let the conditional price distribution in
each period be of the form specified in equation (2.48). Let the anticipated frequency of
reviews be fixed at some Λ ∈ (0, 1). For θr > 0, the hazard functions in the optimal
sequence that maximizes equation (2.50) have the same form for all τ > 0 and depend
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only on the target price at the time of receipt of the review signal, y˜τ , for each $˜τ .
Furthermore, the maximum attainable value of the objective defined in equation (2.50)
is also a time-invariant function, V (y˜).
Letting Y˜ denote the set of all possible values of y˜τ under the current review policy,
the optimal hazard function is given by
Λ (y˜)







V − κ− V (y˜)]} , (2.52)
for all y˜ ∈ Y˜, where the function V (y˜) satisfies the fixed point equation
V (y˜) = E
{
Π (y) + β
[
(1− Λ (y˜′))V (y˜′) + Λ (y˜′) (V − κ)− θrIr (Λ (y˜′) ,Λ)]} , (2.53)
and where the continuation value upon conducting a policy review satisfies V = V (0).
Here, E {·} denotes expectations over the possible values of yτ = y and y˜τ+1=y˜′ condi-
tional on y˜τ = y˜.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
The fact that the hazard function for a policy review only depends on the target
price results from the fact that, as derived in the previous section, the firm’s pricing
policy specifies a time-invariant conditional distribution that itself only conditions on
the target price. Lemmas 3 and 4 establish that for both the review decision and the
pricing decision, the firm chooses to acquire information only about the innovations to
the target price between the last review and the receipt of the signal for each decision,
and it allocates no capacity to learning about past events. Moreover, these lemmas show
that the optimal policy has the same form for all periods between reviews, with a single
conditional distribution of prices and a single hazard function characterizing the review
decision and the pricing decision in each state and period between reviews. Finally,
expressed in terms of the normalized variables, q and y, the same policy is chosen at
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each review. At each review, the distribution of actual prices charged, p, is shifted by
the innovation to the target price between reviews.
Expression (2.52) is of the same form as the optimal hazard function derived in
Woodford (2008) for the case in which the pricing policy is reduced to a single price.
The hazard function is monotonically increasing in the value of the exponent: a higher
value of adjustment relative to keeping the policy unchanged is associated with a higher
probability of receiving a signal that the policy should be reviewed. However, the rela-
tionship between the state and the review decision is noisy. For any overall frequency
of policy reviews, Λ ∈ (0, 1), the hazard function satisfies Λ (y˜) ∈ (0, 1). In order to
economize on information costs, the optimal review signal never indicates a review with
certainty.15
The hazard function implies a survival probability that depends only on the history








[1− Λ (y˜k)] , (2.54)
for τ > 1, with Γ1 (0) ≡ 1. I shall use this survival probability in the next section, to
determine the optimal frequency of reviews, Λ.
2.4.3 The Frequency of Reviews
For a given pricing policy, and a given hazard function for policy reviews, the optimal
frequency of reviews, Λ, is chosen to maximize the objective specified in equation (2.36).
Using the results of the previous two sections, and excluding the first term, which is
15See Woodford (2008) for a proof of the optimality of noise in the review signal in the case of a
single-price policy.
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−θrIr (Λ (y˜τ ) ,Λ)

 . (2.55)
Holding fixed the pricing policy, the value of V , and the hazard function Λ (y˜τ ), this
problem is reduced to minimizing the cost of the review signal over the expected life of












Λ (y˜τ ) ,Λ
)}
, (2.56)
where the quantity of information acquired in each period, Ir
(
Λ (y˜τ ) ,Λ
)
, is given by
the function defined in equation (2.12).
Lemma 5. Let the firm’s pricing policy be fixed. Let the hazard function for policy
reviews, Λ (y˜), be fixed and of the form given in lemma 4. The anticipated frequency of
policy reviews, Λ ∈ (0, 1), that minimizes the cost of the review policy, given in equation
(2.56), is
Λ =
E {∑∞τ=1 βτΓτ (y˜τ−1) Λ (y˜τ )}
E {∑∞τ=1 βτΓτ (y˜τ−1)} . (2.57)
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
Equation (2.57) shows that the optimal anticipated frequency of reviews is equal to
the (discounted) weighted average of the conditional probabilities of reviews across all the
pre-review target prices y˜τ that the firm expects to encounter over the life of the policy.
Recall that before the receipt of the review signal in each period, the firm anticipates
undertaking a review with this “default” probability. The amount of information acquired
in each period is the relative entropy between the conditional probability of a review,
Λ (y˜), and this anticipated probability, Λ.
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The hazard function Λ (y˜), together with the laws of motion for the innovations in the
pre-review state y˜τ , determine the distribution of pre-review states that the firm expects
to encounter under the current review policy, which yields the following additional result.
Lemma 6. Let the hazard function for policy reviews, Λ (y˜), be fixed and of the form
given in lemma 4. Let the distribution of pre-review target prices in period τ, under this
hazard function, be denoted by g˜τ (y˜), given by hν˜ (y˜) for τ = 1, and by
g˜τ (y˜) =
∫
[1− Λ (y˜ − ν˜)] g˜τ−1 (y˜ − ν˜)hν˜ (ν˜) dν˜, (2.58)
normalized to sum to one, for τ > 1, where hν˜ is the distribution of the permanent
innovation, ν˜. Let the discounted distribution of pre-review target prices over the life of
the policy, y˜ ∈ Y˜ , be denoted by G˜ (y˜) ,
G˜ (y˜) = (1− β)
∞∑
τ=1
βτ g˜τ (y˜) . (2.59)
Then, the optimal frequency with which the decision-maker anticipates undertaking




Λ (y˜) G˜ (y˜) dy˜. (2.60)
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
Lemmas 4 and 5 provide a complete characterization of the firm’s review policy,
for a given pricing policy. Lemma 6 establishes that the review signal thus specified is
rational in that the anticipated frequency of reviews coincides with the realized frequency
of reviews.
I next characterize the remaining elements of the firm’s policy, the anticipated fre-
quency of prices, f (q), for all q ∈ Q, and the optimal support Q.
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2.4.4 The Frequency of Prices






τ ) Π (y)
}
, (2.61)




f (q|y){pi(q − y)− θp [log f (q|y)− log f (q)]} , (2.62)
reproduced here from an earlier section, for clarity.
Holding fixed the review policy, the support of the price signal, Q, and the conditional
price distribution f (q|y), the problem of choosing the optimal anticipated frequency of
prices is reduced to minimizing the total cost of the price signal over the expected life














f (q) = 1, (2.64)
just as the frequency of reviews, Λ, was shown to minimize the cost of the review signal.
Lemma 7. Let the review policy and the set of normalized prices, Q, be fixed. Let the
conditional probability of charging each price, f (q|y), and the hazard function for policy
reviews, Λ (y˜), be of the form given in lemmas 3 and 4, respectively. The anticipated
frequency of normalized prices, f (q), that minimizes the cost of the pricing policy, given
in equation (2.63), subject to the constraint specified in equation (2.64) is
f (q) =
E {∑∞τ=0 βτΓτ+1 (y˜τ ) f (q|y)}
E {∑∞τ=0 βτΓτ+1 (y˜τ )} , (2.65)
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for each q ∈ Q.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
The optimal anticipated frequency of prices is equal to the (discounted) weighted
average of the conditional price distribution over all states that the firm expects to
encounter until the next review, given the firm’s review policy, which determines the
probability of surviving to a particular state. Before receiving the price signal in each
period, the firm anticipates a signal drawn from this default distribution. Hence, the
amount of information that is received in each period is equal to the relative entropy
between this distribution and the conditional distribution, f (q|y) .
As in the case of the review signal, the frequency with which the firm anticipates
to charge each price q ∈ Q is equal to the realized frequency, integrating over the
distribution of possible target prices that the firm can expect under its review policy.
Lemma 8. Let the hazard function for policy reviews, Λ (y˜), and the associated distri-
bution of pre-review target prices in each period, g˜τ (y˜), be fixed and of the form given in
lemmas 4 and 6. Let the distribution of post-review target prices in period τ be denoted
by gτ (y), given by hν (y) for τ = 0, and by
gτ (y) =
∫
[1− Λ (y − ν)] g˜τ (y − ν)hν (ν) dν, (2.66)
normalized to sum to one, for τ > 0, where hν is the distribution of the transitory
innovation, ν. Let the discounted distribution of post-review target prices over the life of
the policy, y ∈ Y, be denoted by G (y) ,
G (y) = (1− β)
∞∑
τ=0
βτgτ (y) . (2.67)
Then, the optimal frequency with which the decision-maker anticipates charging each
price over the life of the policy at the time of a policy review is the marginal distribution
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corresponding to f (q|y),
f (q) =
∫
f (q|y)G (y) dy, (2.68)
for each q ∈ Q.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
Hence, before the receipt of the price signal in any period and state of the world, the
firm anticipates receiving a signal from this “default” distribution, and this distribution
coincides with the realized distribution of prices over the life of the policy.
2.4.5 The Support of the Price Distribution
In this section, I consider the choice of the optimal support, given the form of the
pricing policy obtained above. I first establish the necessary and sufficient conditions
that determine if a given support is optimal. I then show how to find the support using
1) sufficient conditions for the points of support for a given cardinality, and 2) necessary
and sufficient conditions that determine the cardinality. In the derivations that follow,
I refer to results from the information theory literature, in particular, Shannon (1959),
Blahut (1972), Fix (1978), and Rose (1994).
Using lemma 8, the part of the objective that depends on the firm’s pricing policy
can be written directly in terms of the distribution of normalized target prices, G (y), as
∫
G (y) Π (y) dy. (2.69)
Note that through this formulation, the dynamic problem presented in equation (2.44)
has been transformed into a static rational inattention problem for a distribution of states
given by G (y). Equations (2.48) and (2.68), which characterize f (q|y) and f (q) for a
given support, have the same form as the equations that characterize the solution to the
static rate distortion problem for a memoryless source (Shannon, 1959).
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Given the definition of Π (y), the pricing objective specified in equation (2.69) is
strictly concave in both f (q|y) and f (q). Therefore, equations (2.48) and (2.68) describe
the optimal policy on a fixed support, Q.
Lemma 9. Let the distribution of states, G (y), and the set Q be fixed. Then if f (q|y)
and f (q) are probability distributions such that f (q) > 0 for all q ∈ Q, and such that
equations (2.48) and (2.68) are satisfied for all y ∈ Y and q ∈ Q, these distributions
specify the unique optimal pricing policy among all pricing policies with support Q.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
Conditions (2.48) and (2.68) cannot rule out the existence of some other price, q̂ /∈ Q,
that would be charged with positive probability under the optimal policy. This is because
in order to derive these conditions, it has been convenient thus far to temporarily ignore
the constraint f (q) ≥ 0.
In order to derive the set of necessary and sufficient conditions for the optimal sup-
port, consider the firm’s pricing objective after substituting in the optimal conditional
distribution, f (q|y), for a given marginal, f (q) . Using the solution given in equation
(2.48), this objective becomes a function of f (q),






pi (q − y)
}]
dy. (2.70)
The distribution f (q) must then maximize this objective subject to
∑
q∈Q
f (q) = 1, (2.71)
f (q) ≥ 0, ∀q. (2.72)
This maximization problem yields the following result (see also results for the static rate
distortion problem in the information theory literature, e.g., Blahut, 1972).
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Lemma 10. Let the distribution of states, G (y), be fixed, and let the probability dis-









) ≡ ∫ G (y) exp{ 1θppi (q − y)}∑




pi (q̂ − y)}dy. (2.73)





= 1 if q ∈ Q,
≤ 1 if q /∈ Q.
(2.74)
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
If one can find a set of prices Q that satisfy the conditions of lemma 10, then this set
characterizes the uniquely optimal solution at the information cost θp. Before discussing
how to find Q, it is useful to consider what type of solution one might expect from
lemma 10. Here I present a result from Fix (1978), extended to apply to the setup in
this paper.
Lemma 11 (Fix, 1978). The optimal support Q is either the entire real line or a discrete
set of prices.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.




= 1 for all q ∈ R, namely, Q = R.
In this case, equations (2.48) and (2.68) are necessary and sufficient to fully characterize
the unique optimal pricing policy for a given review policy.
On the other hand, the solution is necessarily discrete if one can find a set of prices






for any point in this set. This is the key insight that will allow me to prove that for
certain parametrizations, the solution is discrete.
Finally, note that the solution cannot consist of disjoint intervals. Intuitively, there
cannot be “holes” in the support of the signal unless the support is discrete, because the
firm’s average profits could be increased by employing an alternative signalling mecha-
nism in which precision from the continuous part of the support is moved to the sparse
part of the support. Matejka and Sims (2010) independently prove a similar result
through a slightly different approach. 16
Following Rose (1994), one can establish a pair of useful necessary conditions.
Lemma 12 (necessary conditions). Let f (q|y) and f (q) satisfy the optimality conditions
in equations (2.48) and (2.68). The points of support must satisfy
∫
G (y|q) ∂pi(q − y)
∂q













dy ≤ 0, (2.76)
for all q ∈ Q.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
The interpretation of the first condition is that the price signal q received in any pe-
riod must maximize the expected single-period profit under the conditional distribution
for y implied by the signal that is received. I use this condition to determine the values
of q for a given pair of distributions, f (q|y) and f (q), and a given cardinality of the set
Q.
16Note that if G (y) is a distribution with bounded support, then the support Q will necessarily be
bounded as well (it is not efficient to arrange to receive a signal outside the support of the state). Fix’s
result then implies that the support Q is discrete. Fix draws out this implication, and Matejka and
Sims (2010) also show the discreteness of the solution for problems with bounded support.
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The second order condition implies that if a set Q of a given cardinality is such that
prices in this set satisfy the optimality conditions for f (q|y), f (q) , and q, but do not
satisfy equation (2.76), then the size of the set Q must be increased. In practice, I shall
use the necessary and sufficient condition in lemma 10 directly in order to determine
the optimal cardinality of the solution. However, equation (2.76) does provide a way to
verify if, for a given information cost, the solution must necessarily involve more than
one price, as discussed further below.
The method for finding the optimal pricing policy can be summarized in three steps:
1. Initialize the cardinality of Q;
2. Iterate to convergence between equation (2.75), given f (q|y) , and equations (2.48),
(2.68), given Q;




< 1 for any q ∈ Q,
decrease the cardinality of Q and return to step 2; otherwise, if Z (q; f) = 1 for all
q ∈ Q and Z (q; f) > 1 for some q /∈ Q, increase the cardinality of Q and return
to step 2.
Appendix B.2 discusses the numerical implementation in detail.
2.4.6 Evolution of the Optimal Support
In this section, I illustrate how the firm’s pricing policy evolves as a function of
the cost of the price signal, θp, keeping the review policy fixed. Specifically, I show
the optimality of single-price and multiple-price policies for different ranges of θp, and
illustrate how the cardinality of the solution increases as the cost of information is
decreased. The approach echoes the discussions in Fix (1978) and Rose (1994).
The numerical results are generated for a profit function and a distribution G (y)
that are discussed in section 2.5. Table 18 summarizes the different stages and types of
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pricing policies that are optimal for different values of θp, given the particular shape of
the profit function and the particular shape and dispersion of the distribution of possible
states.
Single-Price Policy
A single-price policy, if optimal, is defined by the price
q = arg max
q
∫
G (y) pi (q − y) dy. (2.77)
The threshold cost of the price signal that is sufficiently low such that the single-price



















where the derivatives are evaluated at q.







[pi (q − y)− pi (q − y)]
}
dy ≤ 1 (2.79)
for all q 6= q.17 The function Z (q) is decreasing in θp, therefore, if the inequality is
satisfied for some θ̂p, it is satisfied for any θp ≥ θ̂p.
Since both q and θp are determined by the shape of the firm’s profit function and
the distribution G (y), which are both given for now, I shall take these values as fixed,
and discuss the firm’s pricing policy in terms of prices and information costs that are
expressed relative to these values.
17Note that Z (q) = 1 is trivially satisfied.
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Solution (SPP). For the profit function pi (q − y) and the distribution of states G (y)
specified in section 2.5, the single-price policy Q = {q} is optimal for all θp ≥ 1.66 θp. At
θp = 1.65 θ
p
a single new mass point has reached critical mass such that the single-price
policy is no longer optimal.
Consider first the optimal pricing policy for an arbitrary high value of the information
cost, θp = 2 θp. Solving equations (2.75),(2.48) and (2.68) for an arbitrary set of prices
around q, the solution converges to Q = {q}. The first panel in figure 12 plots the
function Z (q) − 1 for a range of values of q at this high level of the cost of the price
signal. The function is below zero everywhere except at q. Hence at θp = 2 θp not only
is the solution discrete, but it is in fact a single-price solution. The single-price policy
is verified to remain optimal until θp = 1.66 θp.
At θp = 1.65 θp, a new mass point has reached critical mass, such that condition
(2.79) is no longer satisfied. The panels in figure 12 show the growth of this new mass
point between θp = 2 θp and θp = 1.65 θp. Note how as the information cost falls, the
function Z (q)−1 increases for all points around q. However, the growth occurs at a much
faster rate in the range that will contain the new mass point. Moreover, I verify that
there is no other fast-growing area over the entire possible range of q, so the transition
from the single-price policy to the multiple-price policy occurs with the growth a single
new mass point.
Multiple-Price Policies
A two-price policy, if it exists, is characterized by the set Q = {q1, q2}, with the
associated distributions determined in equations (2.48) and (2.68), f (qi|y), f (qi), for
i = 1, 2. Each price is given by
qi = arg max
q
∫
G (y|qi) pi (q − y) dy. (2.80)
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The threshold cost of the price signal that is sufficiently low such that a policy
consisting of only two prices is no longer optimal is given by
θ



















with the derivatives evaluated at qi, for each i = 1, 2.








) ≤ 1 for all q 6= qi.
Solution (2PP). For the profit function pi (q − y) and the distribution of states G (y)
specified in section 2.5, the two-price policy Q = {q1, q2} is optimal for all 1.65 θp ≤ θp ≤
0.87 θ
p
. For θp ≥ 1.66 θp, no two-price policy price can be found that satisfies condition
(1). For θp ≤ 0.865 θp, no two-price policy can be found that satisfies condition (2); at
θp = 0.865 θ
p
, a new mass point has reached critical mass.
Similar to the transition from the one-price policy to the two-price policy, there is
a range of values for θp, over which a third mass point grows. The panels in figure 13
show the evolution of the two-price policy and the growth of this new mass point as the
cost of the price signal is reduced.
Solution (3PP). For the profit function pi (q − y) and the distribution of states G (y)
specified in section 2.5, the three-price policy Q = {q1, q2, q3} is optimal for all 0.86 θp ≤
θp ≤ 0.75 θp. For θp ≥ 0.87 θp, no three-price policy price can be found that satisfies
condition (1); for θp ≤ 0.74 θp, no three-price policy can be found that satisfies condition
(2); at θp = 0.74 θ
p
, a new mass point has reached critical mass.
The optimal solution can be traced in this manner for lower and lower values of θp.
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2.5 A Model of Price Setting
I explore the implications for price adjustment of the information structure developed
thus far in a standard model of price-setting under monopolistic competition. I assume
that all aggregate variables evolve according to the full-information, flexible price equi-
librium, and focus on the price adjustment of a set of information-constrained firms of
measure zero.18 Appendix B.3 maps a standard monopolistic competition model with
Dixit-Stiglitz preferences into the generic setup introduced in section 2.2.
I show that the model can generate pricing regimes that qualitatively match the
features of the Dominick’s data documented in Stevens (2011). In particular, depending
on parameter values, and consistent with empirical evidence, the model can generate
both single-price and multiple-price regimes that are updated relatively infrequently. For
the case of multiple-price policies, regimes consist of a small number of distinct prices,
but are nevertheless characterized by frequent and large within-regime price changes.
Hence, the model endogenously generates transitory volatility to and from discrete price
levels.
2.5.1 The Objective Function
The profit of an information-constrained firm is proportional to19
pi(q − y) = e(1−ε)(q−y) − ε− 1
εη
e−εη(q−y), (2.83)
where q is the log-normalized price charged by the information-constrained firm, y is
the optimal full-information log-normalized price, ε > 1 is the elasticity of substitution,
18The treatment of price adjustment in a general equilibrium framework in which all firms are
information-constrained requires that each firm track not only an exogenous target price, but also
the distribution of prices in the economy. I leave the general equilibrium results for future work.
19I omit a term that does not affect optimization.
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and η ≡ γ (1 + ν) , where γ ≥ 1 captures decreasing returns to scale in production and
ν ≥ 0 is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply.
Equation (2.83) defines the profit function introduced in section 2.2. Note that this
profit function is maximized at q = y, hence y is also the current profit-maximizing
price for the information-constrained firm in the static problem, excluding information
costs. Therefore, the rationally inattentive firm would like to set a price that is as
close as possible to the target full-information price, subject to the costs of acquiring
information about the evolution of this target.
2.5.2 The Shocks
The economy is subject to three kinds of shocks: (1) µt, permanent monetary shocks,
which are the only source of aggregate disturbances in the economy, are generally small,
and are summarized in the exogenous evolution of money supply; (2) ξt (i), permanent
idiosyncratic quality shocks, which affect both the demand for an individual product
and the cost of producing it; and (3) ζt (i), i.i.d. idiosyncratic productivity shocks.
The log of money supply is assumed to follow a random walk process,
mt = mt−1 + µt, (2.84)
µt
i.i.d.∼ hµ, (2.85)
where µt is independent over time and from any other disturbances in the economy.
The permanent quality shock also follows a random walk,




while ζt (i) is a purely transitory shock,
ζt (i)
i.i.d.∼ hζ . (2.88)
The law of motion for the normalized pre-review state, y˜τ (i), following a review τ
periods ago, is
y˜τ (i) = y˜τ−1 (i) + µτ + ξτ (i) , (2.89)
for τ > 0, with y˜0 (i) = 0. This law of motion is embedded in G˜ (y˜), the discounted
distribution of pre-review target prices that the firm expects to encounter over the life
of the policy, determined in lemma 6.
The law of motion for the normalized target price that enters the firm’s period profit
function, yτ (i), is
yτ (i) = y˜τ (i) + ζτ (i) , (2.90)
for τ ≥ 0. This law of motion is embedded in G (y), the discounted distribution of target
prices after the review decision, and after the realization of the transitory shock in each
period, determined in lemma 8.
2.5.3 Parameter Values
The model is parameterized at the weekly frequency. The parameters that specify the
firm’s objective, shown in table 19, are set to commonly used values used in the literature.
I set the weekly discount factor, β, to 0.9994, which implies an annual discount rate of
3%. The inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, ν, is set to 0, and the decreasing
returns to scale parameter, γ, is set to 1.5. Variations in these two parameters change the
steepness and asymmetry of the profit function: higher values imply larger losses from
charging a price that is different from the optimal full information price, especially in the
case of prices that are too low relative to the optimum. The elasticity of substitution,
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ε, is set to 6. Variation in ε also changes the asymmetry of the profit function: a higher
elasticity implies larger losses from setting a price that is too low relative to the optimal
full information price. The profit function is shown in figure 15. Losses from charging
a price that is below the current target price are significantly larger than those from
charging a price that is above the target price. This asymmetry will affect the resulting
shape of the optimal policy, as further discussed below.
Table 20 shows the parametrization of the shocks and table 21 shows the parametriza-
tion of the costs of information. The volatility of the permanent monetary shock, µ, is
relatively standard. The distribution of µ is triangular with a mean equal to 0.0004 and
standard deviation of 0.0015. These values imply an annualized inflation rate of 2.1%,
and an annualized standard deviation of 1.1%, which are comparable with the volatility
of the U.S. inflation rate over the last thirty years. The calibration of the idiosyncratic
shocks is chosen jointly with the information costs to separately match the pricing statis-
tics for products with single-price regimes and multiple-price regimes. The parameters
used for each type of pricing policy are discussed in the next two sections.
2.5.4 Single-Price Regimes
I begin by determining the optimal policy when the cost of the price signal, θp, is
high enough (relative to the volatility of the shocks that affect the firm’s profits) such
that the firm chooses to acquire no information through its price signal. In this case,
the optimal pricing policy always involves a single normalized price, q, and the model
endogenously generates the single-price regimes of Woodford (2009).
In the Dominick’s data set, for products with single-price regimes, the frequency of
regime changes is 2.2%, and the average size of price changes across regimes is 5.8%. In
order to match these statistics, the managerial cost of conducting a policy review, κ, is
set to 0.76; the monitoring cost for the review decision, θr, is set equal to 1.6; and, to
ensure the optimality of the single-price policy, the cost of the price signal is θp ≥ 0.1087.
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The permanent quality shock, ξ, is drawn from a symmetric triangular distribution with
mean zero and standard deviation σξ = 0.0104; and the transitory shock, ς, is set to
zero.
At the model-implied weekly frequency of reviews of 2.2%, the managerial cost κ
implies that the firm spends 4.2% of its profits on conducting policy reviews. The cost
of the review signal implies that 4.2% of the firm’s profits are spent on monitoring
market conditions in order to make the review decision. The cost of the price signal is
high enough, relative to the volatility of the shocks, that the firm acquires no information
through the price signal. Hence, the total expenditure on information acquisition is 8.4%
of profits. Under this policy, the firm’s profits, net of information costs, are 84.7% of the
full-information profits that it would achieve if information could be costlessly processed.
The first part of table 22 compares the empirical statistics for products characterized by
single-price regimes with the moments implied by the model.
Figure 16 plots the hazard function Λ (y˜) implied by a single-price pricing policy, as
a function of the normalized pre-review state, y˜. The asymmetry evident in the figure,
and highlighted in Woodford (2009), is the result of the asymmetry in the firm’s profit
function, such that the firm’s review policy is much more likely to trigger a review when
the target price at the time of receipt of the review signal, y˜, is relatively high.
Figure 17 plots the distribution of normalized states, G (y), implied by this review
policy. Since the firm reviews its policy with higher probability when the target price is
relatively high, the resulting distribution of states that survive the review decision has
strong negative skew.
2.5.5 Multiple-Price Regimes
In Dominick’s data, products with multiple-price regimes are characterized by a
higher frequency of regime changes (3.2% versus 2.2% for products with single-price
regimes) and a larger shift in the average price across regimes (7.8% versus 5.8% for
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products with single-price regimes). Hence, I adjust the calibration, by increasing the
standard deviation of the idiosyncratic permanent shock, setting σξ = 0.017, while also
slightly increasing the cost of a policy review, setting κ = 0.81. This parametrization
yields a frequency of reviews of 3.2% and an average shift in the distribution of prices
across regimes of 7.7%.
The targets for within-regime price volatility are the median number of distinct prices
per regime (equal to four in the data), and the size of price changes within regimes (equal
to 10.6% in the data).
As in the case of single-price policies, I begin by determining the optimal review
policy when the cost of the price signal, θp, is high enough such that the optimal pricing
policy always involves a single price, q. Treating the review policy as fixed, and assuming
the same hazard function as in the case of this single-price policy, I then reduce the cost
of the price signal, θp, such that the optimal policy involves multiple prices. Section
2.4.6 traces out the evolution of the optimal support of the pricing policy.
The columns labeled “MPP” in table 22 compare the empirical statistics for products
characterized by regimes with multiple rigid prices with the moments implied by the
model calibrated to generate four distinct price per regime. For this calibration, the
monitoring cost for the pricing decision, θp, is set equal to 0.04, which implies that 3.5%
of the firm’s profits are spent on acquiring information regarding which price to charge
in each week. In total, the firm spends 17.7% of its profits on acquiring information.
Net of information costs, the firm’s profit is 74.5% of the profit that would be obtained
in the full-information, flexible price setting, with no costs of processing information.
Within regimes, prices change with a frequency of 39.7%, versus 28.6% in the data. The
average size of within-regime price changes is 7.5% versus 10.6% in the data.
In order to generate price changes that are larger within regimes than across regimes,
I now introduce transitory shocks, ς. To match the within-regime volatility, these
shocks are drawn from a triangular distribution with mean zero and standard devia-
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tion σς = 0.0965. However, the higher within-regime volatility increases both the size
and frequency of price changes between policy reviews, as shown in the last column of
table 22.
Together with the shape of the firm’s profit function, the shape of G (y) determines
the shape of the firm’s pricing policy. In simulations, the price often remains sticky for
considerable periods of periods of time. Figure 18 plots the firm’s realized price and
the full-information optimal target price. The review signal and the price signal jointly
ensure that the firm’s price tracks the target price relatively well. Since the firm now has
added flexibility to respond to shocks inside the regime, the weighted average price per
regime is lower compared with the optimal price that would be implied by the single-
price policy. Nonetheless, the firm continues to typically charge a price that is above the
target price, reflecting the relatively larger losses from “falling behind.” Moreover, since
the review signal is noisy, the firm can be seen to occasionally review its policy with a
lag.
2.6 Conclusion
This paper presents a theory of price-setting in which firms design simple pricing
policies that they update infrequently. The key friction in the model is that all informa-
tion that is relevant to the firm’s pricing decision is costly. Both the decision of which
price to charge from the current policy and the decision of whether or not to conduct
a review and design a new policy are based on costly, noisy signals about market con-
ditions. The precision of these signals is chosen endogenously, at the time of the policy
review, subject to a cost per unit of information.
The theory generates pricing patterns consistent with the evidence on discrete multiple-
price regimes documented in Stevens (2011). In contrast to existing theories of price
setting, it generates pricing regimes that are identified by discrete jumps when the pol-
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icy is reviewed, and are furthermore characterized by within-regime discreteness, due
to the coarseness of the pricing policy implemented between reviews. In this model,
neither the frequency of regime changes, nor the frequency of price changes are enough,
by themselves, to establish how rapidly prices incorporate changes in market conditions.
Nevertheless, price statistics can be used to identify the key model parameters that de-
termine the speed of adjustment. Specifically, price statistics pin down the quantity of
information acquired by firms, which in turn determines the degree to which prices are
tied to market conditions in each period.
Prices in this model change frequently, yet they are always only partially related to
concurrent market conditions. Due to the noisy nature of the firm’s information, the
speed of adjustment in this model depends far less on the frequency with which prices
are changed than on the quantity of information acquired. I leave for future work the
computation of a general equilibrium version of the model, and the resulting magnitude
of the real effects of monetary policy. Nevertheless, non-neutrality in this model will
necessarily be higher than that implied by a model with the same frequency of price
adjustment, but in which price changes are based on full information regarding market
conditions at the time of adjustment.
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Table 18: Evolution of the firm’s pricing policy as a function of the unit cost of infor-
mation.
Stage Information cost, θp/ θp
SPP is optimal ≥ 1.66
2PP is optimal [1.65, 0.87]
3PP is optimal [0.865, 0.75]
≥ 4PP is optimal ≤ 0.74
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Table 19: Parametrization of the firm’s objective.
Parameter β ν γ ε
Value 0.9994 0 1.5 6
Table 20: Parametrization of the shocks.
Parameter µ σµ ξ σξ ς σς
SPPa 0.0004 0.0015 0 0.0104 0 0
MPPb 0.0004 0.0015 0 0.0170 0 0.0965
a SPP: Parametrization for single-price policies.
b MPP: Parametrization for multiple-price policies.
Table 21: Parametrization of the costs of information.
Parametera κ θr θp
Single-price policies 0.76 1.6 ≥0.11
Multiple-price policies 0.81 1.6 0.04
a All costs of information are expressed as
100 x percent of weekly profits.
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Table 22: Price statistics for single-price and multiple-price policies.
Statistica Data Model Data Model Model
SPPb SPP MPPc MPP MPP-Td
Across regimes
Freq. of reviews 2.2% 2.2% 3.2% 3.2% 3.2%
Mean ∆p 5.8% 5.8% 7.8% 7.7% 7.7%
Within regimes
Number of prices 1 1 4 4 4
Freq. of ∆p - - 28.6% 39.7% 70.2%
Mean ∆p - - 10.6% 7.5% 10.8%
Freq. of modal price - - 71.4% 64.5% 43.7%
Information expenditure
(% of profits)
Cost of reviews - 4.2% - 6.5% 7.8%
Cost of review signal - 4.2% - 7.7% 9.3%
Cost of price signal - 0 - 3.5% 2.3%
Total expenditure - 8.4% - 17.7% 19.3%
a Data statistics are medians across products.
b SPP: Statistics for products with single-price regimes.
c MPP: Statistics for products with multiple-rigid-price regimes.
d MPP-T: Statistics for multiple-price policies, with transitory
shocks.
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Figure 10: Sample frozen juice price series from Dominick’s.
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Figure 12: Optimality of the single-price policy and growth of a new mass point
as the cost of information is reduced from θp = 2 θp to θp = 1.65 θp. At θp = 1.65 θp, the
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Figure 13: Evolution of two-price policy and growth of a new mass point as the cost of
information is reduced from θp = 1.65 θp to θp = 0.865 θp. At θp = 0.865 θp, no two-price
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Figure 14: Sample three-price policies.
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Figure 15: The asymmetric profit function.
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Figure 16: The optimal hazard function for single-price policies.
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Figure 17: The firm’s prior under the hazard function implied by the single-price policy.
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Figure 18: The target price and the actual price.
125
3 Equilibrium Price Dispersion and the Border Effect
3.1 Introduction
Increasing availability of price data at the product level has led to a resurgence of
research into the failure of purchasing power parity and the law of one price across coun-
tries. The key feature of the recent literature, compared to the foundational work of
Engel and Rogers (1996) and its immediate successors, is that the recent work explicitly
considers price dispersion of individual, identical products sold in particular cities or
stores, rather than the behavior of aggregate price indices. This distinction is important
because, as illustrated by Broda and Weinstein (2008), using price indices may overstate
relative cross-country dispersion by collapsing large within-country idiosyncratic volatil-
ity in relative prices while preserving the variation due to macro-level cross-country
differences. Moreover, the use of disaggregated data has enabled researchers to provide
a richer set of empirical regularities against which potential theories may be tested.
Specifically, recent empirical work20 has shown that (1) the average (aggregate) real
exchange rate closely follows the nominal exchange rate; (2) good-level real exchange
rates are widely dispersed within countries, but more so across borders; (3) the volatility
of good-level real exchange rates is much greater than the volatility of the nominal ex-
change rate; and (4) changes in good-level prices are more correlated within than across
countries. The new empirical evidence has been accompanied by theoretical models that
stress the importance of cross-country segmentation, defined as the complete (Gopinath
et al, 2011) or partial (Burstein and Jaimovich, 2009) non-responsiveness of the prices
posted by firms in one country to changes in market conditions in another country.
This paper demonstrates that, as hypothesized by Broda and Weinstein (2008), the
20We focus on the work of Broda and Weinstein (2008), Gopinath et al (2011), and Burstein and
Jaimovich (2009).
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existing empirical evidence on price dispersion can be matched by a model in which
segmentation across countries is no stronger than segmentation across markets within
countries. In light of our results, attributing all cross-country dispersion to segmentation
at the border may overstate the magnitude of the border effect.
We define segmentation as the degree to which buyers’ access to one market (namely,
their ability to sample prices from firms operating in that market) is lower than their
access to another market. In our model, retailers engage in costly sequential search
for the best price among producers in the economy. This search friction, combined
with a distribution of producer-specific productivity shocks, gives rise to endogenous
equilibrium price dispersion, consistent with empirical evidence. Retailers search in a
world of two countries, each with two regions. Retailers located in a particular region
are more likely to sample prices posted by producers located in their home region than
in any of the other three regions. However, conditional on not sampling a price from
their own region, retailers are equally likely to sample a price from any of the other
three regions. Hence, their access to one of the markets located in the foreign country
is no more limited than their access to the "away" market within their own country.
In this sense, there is no difference between segmentation across and within countries.
Our model also allows for cross-country shocks to relative unit labor costs and aggregate
productivity, as well as differences in the distributions of producer-specific productivity.
Our approach is similar to Gopinath et al (2011) and Burstein and Jaimovich (2009)
in that we consider a model with a real friction in goods markets, coupled with country
heterogeneity in the distribution of firm costs.21 However, unlike these authors, we
employ a model with no additional segmentation across borders.
We show that the basic facts about cross-border price dispersion can be matched
using this framework, without any additional impediments to international trade: these
21In our model, heterogeneity in costs is supported by nominally fixed wages with monetary shocks.
Although we find this an appealing way to link labor costs and exchange rate shocks, the mechanics of
the model are not affected by this choice.
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facts hold qualitatively whenever there are international differences in the realizations
of aggregate shocks or differences in the structural parameters, namely, when the two
countries are simply different, and not necessarily isolated from each other. Moreover,
we show that price evidence alone is not sufficient to conclusively differentiate between a
parameterization with no additional impediments to international trade and one in which
we introduce additional segmentation across countries: any additional cross-country
segmentation (whereby retailers in one region are more likely to sample from the "away"
region in their own country than from one of the two foreign regions) cannot be separately
identified from the baseline specification (in which retailers are more likely to sample
from their own region than from any of the other three regions).
Although price-data alone cannot identify within-country versus across-country mar-
ket segmentation, we show that empirical trade quantities can be used to decompose the
relative importance of these two types of segmentation. Incorporating a notion of region
and country size, we examine the model’s implications for the quantity of trade. The
calibrated model demonstrates a tension between the US-Canadian price data, which
suggest that markets are highly segmented, and the level of US-Canadian trade, which
implies a lower degree of border segmentation.
After showing that the model without international barriers can match the basic
facts, we demonstrate some of the difficulties in using the standard empirical tools (e.g.
Engel and Rogers, 1996, Parsley and Wei, 2001, Gopinath et al, 2010) to measure the
degree of market segmentation across borders. We find that typical regressions may in-
dicate that international markets are segmented, even when this is not the case. In this
respect, we build on the result of Gorodnichenko and Tesar (2008) that cross-country
heterogeneity in price dispersion can lead to positive border coefficients, even without
barriers to international trade. We further argue that, according to our model, it is
possible to get “false negatives” in these regressions when there are not sufficiently large
aggregate shocks to relative productivity; perfectly symmetric economies will in fact gen-
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erate no evidence of a border effect on prices, regardless of how restricted international
trade is. Finally, we show that in the presence of both segmentation and cross-country
heterogeneity, standard regressions cannot be used to decompose the measured “border
effect” into these two components. Hence in our model, these regressions provide little
evidence on the degree of international market segmentation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the existing empir-
ical evidence. Section 3.3 outlines the search model we employ, extending Reinganum
(1979) to a multi-market, two-country setting. Section 3.4 presents our main results.
Section 3.5 discusses the identification of regional versus national segmentation, and il-
lustrates the challenges that arise from estimating national segmentation using popular
pricing regressions. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Facts on Prices
We evaluate the ability of our theory to match a set of facts that have emerged from
the recent empirical literature, concerning both the level and growth rates of relative
prices at the good level. For consistency, and reflecting the of availability of data, we
focus on papers that study pricing across the US-Canada border.
Let pn,t(i) be the log price, in local currency, of a particular good n, at time t, in
a particular location i. Depending on the context, i may index a region, a city, or a
specific store. Let et(i, j) be the log of the nominal exchange rate between locations i
and j. For location pairs within countries, et(i, j) is zero. For any two locations, the
good-level real exchange rate is defined as
dn,t(i, j) ≡ pn,t(i)− pn,t(j)− et(i, j). (3.1)
Statistics regarding relative prices are most typically pooled across goods, and so from
now on we drop the subscript n and assume that all price comparisons are for identical
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goods.
In its strongest form, the law of one price (LOP) posits that dt = 0 for all t. This
is referred to as the absolute law of one price and is the focus of Gopinath et al (2011).
A weaker hypothesis is the relative law of one price (RLOP), which holds that dt = a,
where a is a fixed constant for all t. Under the RLOP hypothesis, ∆dt = 0, and this is
the main object of study in Burstein and Jaimovich (2009). Broda and Weinstein (2008)
consider violations of both LOP and RLOP.
Fact 1: The aggregate real exchange rate closely follows the nominal exchange rate.
This well-known fact has been reconstructed from micro-level data in various forms.
Burstein and Jaimovich (2009) show a high correlation between changes in relative unit
labor costs and the expenditure weighted average of changes in good-level real exchange
rates, ∆dt, across the US-Canada border over the period from 2004 through 2006, when
variation in relative labor costs was almost entirely driven by the nominal exchange rate.
Using the same data source, Gopinath et al (2011) also show this relationship in levels:
the time series constructed by taking the median value of dt across products for each
period t follows the nominal exchange rate almost perfectly from 2004 through the middle
of 2007. Similarly, Broda and Weinstein (2008) provide evidence that, controlling for
the distance between markets, US-Canada price differences follow the nominal exchange
rate over the period 2001 through 2003.
Fact 2: Good-level real exchange rates are more volatile across countries than within.
Burstein and Jaimovich (2009) consider the quarterly growth, ∆dt, in wholesale costs of
a single retailer with stores in multiple locations in Canada and in the US. They find
a standard deviation of 6% in the US, 5% in Canada, and 13% across countries from
2004 through 2006. Using weekly retail price data from the same retailer, Gopinath et
al (2011) find that over the period from 2004 through the middle of 2007, the median
standard deviation of dt for matched goods, measured at the weekly frequency, is ap-
proximately 15% within the US, 6% within Canada, but 25% between the two countries.
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In contrast, using buyer scanner data aggregated to the city level for the fourth quarter
of 200322, Broda and Weinstein (2008) find standard deviations of 22% within the US,
19% within Canada, and 27% across the border. We view the two data sets as com-
plementary; the former characterizes the distribution of wholesale prices sampled by a
particular retailer across different markets as well as the distribution of prices posted
by this retailer; the latter characterizes the distribution of prices sampled by consumers
across different markets from all retailers.
Fact 3: Changes in cross-border good-level real exchange rates are significantly
more volatile than changes in the aggregate real exchange rate, and hence the nominal
exchange rate. In Burstein and Jaimovich (2009), this corresponds to a fact about
relative unit labor costs: they find that the standard deviation of ∆dt across borders is
at least three times the standard deviation of changes in relative unit labor costs, which
is virtually identical to the standard deviation of changes in the exchange rate over that
period.
Fact 4: Changes in good level prices (in a common currency) are more correlated
within countries than across. Burstein and Jaimovich (2009) find that, within countries,
US dollar denominated price changes have a correlation of 75% for the US and 84% for
Canada, while the correlation across countries is approximately 7%.
These facts have been taken as evidence that markets are segmented internationally,
either completely or partially. In the next section, we lay out a theory which matches
these facts without requiring any more segmentation across countries than within coun-
tries.
22Broda and Weinstein (2008) have scanner data on prices paid by households in different cities in
the US and Canada. Their results refer to the price at which a particular good was purchased by a
representative household in a given city, rather than the price at which that good was available in a
particular store in that city.
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3.3 Model
We develop a static model of internal and international price dispersion via search.
We follow the search model of Reinganum (1979), in which heterogeneous producer
costs and imperfectly elastic customer demand generate a non-degenerate distribution
of prices. Our model introduces retailers who search on behalf of consumers. We first
present the basic setup, in which producers, retailers, and consumers operate in a sin-
gle market, or region, and in which the only sources of uncertainty are aggregate and
idiosyncratic productivity shocks at the producer level. We then extend the model to
a two-region economy and then to a two-country world with two symmetric regions in
each country.
3.3.1 The Single-Region Economy
A single consumption good is produced by a continuum of firms with heterogeneous
marginal costs. Each producer observes his cost before posting his price. A continuum
of retailers purchase the good from the producers subject to a search friction. Retailers
know the distribution of prices posted by producers, but they do not know which pro-
ducer sells at what price. Instead, they pay a fixed cost each time they wish to draw a
random price from the distribution of producer prices. The mechanics of retailer search
are as follows: (1) producers observe their marginal costs and post their prices, which
form a distribution with density f(p̂); (2) retailers pay a fixed cost k to randomly sample
a producer price from the population of producers; (3) each retailer chooses either to
purchase all of her demand at the sampled price, or to continue searching by paying the
search cost and drawing a new price from f(p̂). Search continues until each retailer has
settled on a single supplier for their demand. Retailers then costlessly differentiate the
good before selling it in a monopolistically competitive consumer market. Consumers





u (C) s.t. PC ≤ PY, (3.2)
where the utility function is u (C) = log (C), C (·) is the CES consumption aggregator
over retailer goods, P is the retailer price index, and Y denotes real income (the sum
of exogenous labor income and profits from firms). For simplicity, consumers cannot
borrow or save.
Consumer demand for a particular retail good with price p is given by
y(p) = p−ηP ηY, (3.3)
where η > 1 is the constant elasticity of substitution among retailer varieties, P is the
retailer price index implied by the CES demand function, and Y is aggregate demand.
Each retailer seeks to maximize profits net of total search costs, which are defined as
piRj = (p− p̂)y(p)− kn, (3.4)
where p̂ is the producer price upon which the retailer settles after completing search
for the period, k is the cost of search per producer searched, and n is the number of
producers that the retailer samples in the period.
The sequential nature of search implies that a retailer’s choice to continue looking for
a better price is independent of the number of producers already visited in the period.
The value to a retailer of halting the search and purchasing the good from a producer
with price p̂ is given by
V ns(p̂; f) = max
p
piR(p; p̂; f). (3.5)
Since differentiation of the good at the retail level is costless, p̂ is the retailer’s marginal
cost, and the retailer maximizes expression (3.5) by charging the monopoly price p = µp̂,
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where µ ≡ η/ (η − 1).
Conversely, the value to the retailer of continuing to search upon observing p̂ is given
by
V s(p̂; f) = E[V (p̂; f)]− k, (3.6)
where expectations are taken with respect to the producer price density, f(p̂). The
overall value function for the retailer is given by
V (p̂; f) = max{V s(p̂; f), V ns(p̂; f)}. (3.7)
The retailer will continue to search so long as she benefits in expectation from con-
tinued search,
V s(p̂; f) ≥ V ns(p̂; f). (3.8)
As in Reinganum (1979), the optimal search strategy is a stopping rule described by
a unique reservation price p̂r that sets expression (3.8) to equality: all retailers sampling
a price less than or equal to p̂r stop search and purchase all their demand at the sampled
price, while all retailers sampling a price above p̂r continue to search for a better offer.
Since retailers pass on the demand from consumers to producers, the demand of a retailer
settling on a producer posting price p̂ is
D(p̂) = µ−ηp̂−ηP ηY. (3.9)
Hence, the demand faced by a producer with price p̂ is given by
x(p̂) =

D(p̂) if p̂ ≤ p̂r
0 if p̂ > p̂r.
(3.10)
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Finally, each producer i faces a production function that is linear in labor,
xi = Aihi, (3.11)
where hi is hours and Ai is productivity, which is the product of aggregate productivity,
, and an independent idiosyncratic productivity, ζi, distributed independently across
all producers:
log(Ai) = + ζi. (3.12)
Unit labor costs, w, are given exogenously, and consumers always satisfy labor demand
at the going wage. Thus, the marginal cost of producer i is mci = w/Ai. The implied
distribution of marginal costs is denoted by g(mc).
An equilibrium in the producer-retailer market is a retailer reservation price p̂r and a
distribution of producer prices f(p̂) such that (1) given f(p̂), retailers choose the optimal
stopping rule governed by p̂r and (2) given p̂r, producers maximizing profits generate
f(p̂). The optimal price set by producers and the resulting cumulative distribution of
producer prices are given by






) if p̂ ≤ p̂r
1 if p̂ > p̂r,
(3.14)
respectively.
The retailers’ stopping rule implies that there will be no search in equilibrium since
all producers will post prices that are weakly below the retailers’ reservation price.
However, because demand is elastic, producers with heterogeneous costs do not find it
optimal to generate a single price equilibrium at p̂r. Hence, consistent with empirical
evidence, the model generates equilibrium price dispersion within a single market. The
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degree of dispersion in prices is determined by the cross-sectional dispersion of producer
costs. Markups are constant for all producers with marginal costs less than p̂r/µ, and
are smaller for all those producers with costs larger than this threshold.
3.3.2 The Two-Region Economy
We now divide the economy into two equal-sized regions, a and b, separated by
a regional border. The wage rate, aggregate productivity, and the distribution of id-
iosyncratic shocks are the same in both regions.23 The only difference across the two
regions is that retailers from a particular region may be more likely to sample prices
from producers located within their own region than from those located in the other
region. Specifically, let fa(p̂) and fb(p̂) denote the distributions of producer prices in
each region. During her search, a retailer in region a has probability α of drawing a
price from the distribution of producer prices posted in her own region, fa(p̂), and a
probability 1 − α of drawing a price from the distribution of producer prices posted in
the neighboring region, fb(p̂). The degree of regional sampling bias for retailers from
region a implies a regional segmentation parameter
λ ≡ α
1− α. (3.15)
For simplicity, we take the segmentation parameter λ as exogenous. It captures all the
frictions and barriers to trade, either bilateral or unilateral, that may make transacting
across regions less likely. It may be motivated by informational advantages that ease
access to the chain of production in one’s own market, or by external barriers that make
transacting with firms located outside one’s own network more difficult. The exogeneity
assumption can be relaxed, as long as λ remains independent of relative prices in the
23The assumption that markets within the same country are symmetric is supported by the evidence
in Gopinath et al (2011) that, within countries, price differentials are centered around zero, and in
Burstein and Jaimovich (2009) that average changes in relative prices within countries are zero.
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two regions. In this environment, the price distribution faced by retailers in regions a is
given by
f reta (p̂) ≡ αfa(p̂) + (1− α)fb(p̂). (3.16)
Otherwise, each retailer’s problem is the same as in the single-region setting.
Retailers in market b face a similar tendency to over-sample prices from their own
region, although their search bias may be different from that of region a retailers. Hence,
it is important to note that there is no notion of segmentation at the border, but only
of segmentation of one retail market with respect to producers in another market. For
instance, it may be the case that producers in one region export easily to the other region,
while at the same time, retailers in this region encounter higher frictions in importing
from the other region.
The producers’ problem remains unchanged. Since we do not incorporate any region-
specific shocks and since producers across both regions draw their marginal costs in-
dependently from the same distribution, g(mc), their desired prices are given in ex-
pression (3.13) and retailers have the same reservation price across the two regions,
p̂r,a = p̂r,b. Hence, producers in both regions post prices drawn from the same distribu-
tion, fa(p̂) = fb(p̂).
Since there are no differences in the distributions of prices posted by producers,
retailers in the two regions also sample from identical distributions, f reta (p̂) = f retb (p̂),
regardless of the value of α. As before, retailers add a constant markup to the sampled
prices, hence the distributions of prices paid by the consumers of the two regions are
also identical: f consa (p) = f consb (p). As a consequence, the distributions of prices at the
producer, retailer, and consumer level are identical across the two regions, and cannot be
used to infer the degree of regional segmentation. This result foreshadows the challenge
of separately identifying regional versus national segmentation in the two-country model.
As shown below, pricing statistics generate an estimate of the overall segmentation be-
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tween countries. However, since in the absence of regional shocks, regional segmentation
cannot be identified using price data alone, any estimate of overall segmentation based
only on price data will confound regional and national barriers.
3.3.3 The Two-Country Model
We now extend the model to a two-country setup, in which there are two regions
in each country: a and b in the Home country, and c and d in the Foreign country.
Each region is of unit mass. The realizations of aggregate shocks differ across the two
countries and the distributions of idiosyncratic shocks are also country-specific.
Similar to the two-region case, a retailer in region a of the Home country samples
prices from the following distribution
f reta (p̂) ≡ α1fa(p̂) + α2fb(p̂) + α3fc(p̂) + α4fd(p̂), (3.17)
where
∑4
i=1 αi = 1, and where fr(p̂) is the density of prices posted by the producers of
region r, r ∈ {a, b, c, d}. We assume that retailers in region a have a regional search
bias, in that they are more likely to sample from their own region: α1 > αi, i ∈ {2, 3, 4}.
By assumption, the Home regions, a and b, are structurally identical, as are the
Foreign regions, c and d. Thus, the prices posted by producers in each country are
identically distributed,
fa (p̂) = fb (p̂)
fc(p̂) = fd(p̂).
Therefore, equation (3.17) becomes
f reta (p̂) = αfa(p̂) + (1− α) fc(p̂), (3.18)
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where we now redefine α, setting it equal to α1 + α2.
Retailers in region a have an apparent national sampling bias if they are more likely
to sample from their own country, namely, if α > 1/2. If, in addition to having a
regional sampling bias, retailers in region a are equally likely to sample prices from any
of the other three regions, as in Figure 19, specifically, if α2 = α3 = α4 = 1−α13 , then
the regional sampling bias embedded in α1 implies a national bias in α without any








This case is illustrated in figure 19.
Retailers in region b of the Home country face a similar tendency to over-sample prices
from their own region. Although the regional and national sampling biases could, in
principle, be different for the two Home regions, either because of relative size differences
or because of differences in segmentation, we assume, for now, that the two regions are of
equal size and symmetrically segmented. Hence, retailers in region b also sample prices
from the distribution given by equation (3.18).
Retailers in region c of the Foreign country samples prices from the distribution
specified by
f retc (p̂) ≡ γ1fa(p̂) + γ2fb(p̂) + γ3fc(p̂) + γ4fd(p̂), (3.20)
where
∑4
i=1 γi = 1, and where the regional sampling bias is captured by γ3 > γi,
i ∈ {1, 2, 4}. The equivalent of the sampling distribution (3.18) for retailers in region c
is given by
f retc (p̂) ≡ (1− γ) fa(p̂) + γfc(p̂), (3.21)
where the Foreign national bias, γ, is a function of Foreign regional bias, γ3, and may
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By symmetry, retailers from region d also sample prices from (3.21). The full derivations
for retailers in regions b, c and d are shown in the appendix.
Due to cross-country heterogeneity, producers in each country generate different pro-
ducer price distributions, fa(p̂) 6= fc(p̂), and retailers in each country may have different
reservation prices, p̂r,a 6= p̂r,c. Without loss of generality, let the Home country be
relatively less expensive, with p̂r,a < p̂r,c. Differences in reservation prices arise across
countries due to (1) aggregate productivity differences, (2) nominal wage differences, or
(3) differences in the distribution of idiosyncratic productivity shocks. In equilibrium,
all producers in both countries post prices that are weakly lower than the high reser-
vation price, p̂r,c. High-cost producers in either country who post prices between the
two reservation prices only sell to retailers in the Foreign regions c and d. Conversely,
producers charging prices weakly below p̂r,a sell to retailers in both countries at a single
monopoly price that takes into account the different price levels and relative demand in
the two countries.
In order to construct the demand functions faced by producers in the two-country
setup, we first consider the demand from retailers located in the Foreign regions c and
d. These retailers search only once, since they have the highest reservation price. From
the unit mass of retailers in region c, a fraction (1− γ) purchase from Home producers
and a fraction γ purchase from Foreign producers. The unit mass of retailers in region
d behave in the same way, such that the total mass of Foreign retailers buying from
Home producers is 2 (1− γ). This demand is evenly split between region-a and region-b
producers, since these two regions are symmetric from the perspective of all Foreign
retailers. The total mass of Foreign retailers that are matched with Foreign producers is
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2γ, and it is also, due to symmetry, evenly split between region-c and region-d producers.
Next, we consider the search process of the retailers located in the Home regions a
and b. These retailers have the low reservation price. Unlike in the two-region economy
in which there was no equilibrium search, they may search repeatedly, until they come
across a price that is below their reservation price. The measure of region-a retailers
who initially search in the Home country and settle on a Home producer is αFa(p̂r,a),
and the measure of region-a retailers who initially search in the Foreign country and
settle is (1− α)Fc(p̂r,a). Hence, the total mass of region-a retailers left to search again
is
La ≡ 1− αFa(p̂r,a)− (1− α)Fc(p̂r,a). (3.23)
Of these, a fraction La will again be left to search after the second round of search,
and (1− La) will find an acceptable price, either at home or abroad. Hence, after each
round n of search, the remaining mass of region-a retailers who continue to search is Lna .




The cumulative mass of region-a retailers matched to Home producers after round







αFa(p̂r,a) + (1− α)Fc(p̂r,a) > α. (3.25)
The remaining 1 − µHa of region-a retailers are matched to Foreign producers. Hence,
because of repeated search, more region-a retailers are matched with the (relatively
cheaper) Home producers than would be matched if there were no opportunity to search
again after the first round. Conversely, Foreign retailers do not benefit as much from
the cheaper Home prices, since they only search once.
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Due to regional symmetry, the cumulative mass of region-b retailers matched to
Home producers after round n, n → ∞, is also equal to µHa . Therefore, 2µHa retailers
from the Home country are eventually matched to Home producers (and are evenly




retailers from the Home
country are eventually matched to Foreign producers (and are also evenly split between
the producers from regions c and d).
In summary, the demand function faced by a producer in either region a or region b
is given by
xa(p̂) = xb (p̂) =

[
µHa + (1− γ)
]
D(p̂) if p̂ ≤ p̂r,a
(1− γ)D (p̂) if p̂r,a < p̂ ≤ p̂r,c
0 if p̂ > p̂r,c,
(3.26)
and the demand function faced by a producer in either region c or region d is given by







D(p̂) if p̂ ≤ p̂r,a
γD (p̂) if p̂r,a < p̂ ≤ p̂r,c
0 if p̂ > p̂r,c,
(3.27)
where the quantity demanded D(p̂) is given by (3.9). In equilibrium, the distribution of
prices may contain mass points at one or both reservation prices, p̂r,a and p̂r,c.
A similar derivation yields demand functions if p̂r,a > p̂r,c, in which case the Foreign
country retailers are the ones who may search repeatedly in equilibrium. Conversely, if
p̂r,a = p̂r,c, both the Home and the Foreign retailers settle on the first producer sampled,
and the model collapses to the two-region case discussed in the previous section.
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3.3.4 Exchange-Rate Determination
Although the model can be solved using an exogenous process for labor costs, we
instead make assumptions that permit a simple model of the link between exchange
rates and real labor costs. In particular, we assume that wages are fixed nominally in
the local currency and that money demand follows a standard velocity equation, with








where PiYi gives the common-currency value of total output in each country. Shocks to
relative money supply, which follows a persistent AR(1) process, generate differences in
real unit labor costs between countries, and therefore additional cross-country differences
in average costs of production beyond those generated by productivity shocks alone.
3.3.5 Model Intuition
We illustrate the properties of the model in three different settings in which the
distribution of prices posted by producers differs across countries. Despite this difference,
the distribution of prices sampled by retailers, and in turn the distribution of consumer
prices, differs only in the last case.
First, we consider the case in which the two countries differ only in the distribu-
tions of producer-specific productivity shocks. The countries are symmetric and there
is no bias in search, but σζ,H > σζ,F . Figure 20 shows the pricing function, p̂(mci),
and the cumulative distribution of producer prices in both the Home and Foreign coun-
tries. Both countries have the same pricing function, p̂(mci), and the same reservation
price. However, since the wider distribution of prices in the Home country puts more
mass on cost-price combinations below the reservation level, the average price posted by
producers in the Home country is lower than the average price of the Foreign produc-
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ers. Nevertheless, in the absence of any search bias, prices sampled by retailers in each
country are drawn from the same distribution.
Next, figure 21 illustrates the case in which the Home country experiences low relative
unit labor costs (wH < wF ). Once again, prices posted by producers differ across the two
countries. The Home and Foreign reservation prices are now slightly different because
the fixed search cost, k, represents a larger proportion of the Home retailers’ profits than
it does for the Foreign retailers, so that Foreign retailers are more willing to search for
a better price. The difference in labor costs across countries means that prices posted in
the Home country are lower on average. Nevertheless, since there is no bias in search,
the price distributions sampled by retailers in each country are identical.
Finally, figure 22 shows the case where the two countries have the same structural
parameters, but experience different unit labor costs (wH < wF ) and face regional bias
in search. In this case, the reservation price in the Foreign country is substantially higher
than in the Home country because producers with high costs attempt to capitalize on
“trapped” Foreign retailers, rather than set a lower price that appeals to retailers in
both regions. Under some parametrizations, this may even be true in the low cost
Home country to the extent that some retailers from the Foreign country sample first
in the Home country, and find it worthwhile to pay the higher reservation price rather
than search again. In this case, the prices sampled by retailers - and by extension, by
consumers - differ across the two countries.
Figures 20 through 22 demonstrate an important point: in order to observe pricing to
market (namely, firms with identical marginal costs charging different prices), markets
must be at least partially segmented, and also experience some asymmetry, in terms
of either their average productivities or the distributions of idiosyncratic productivities.
Without both segmentation and differences between markets, firms with the same cost
will charge same price regardless of their location. This basic intuition underlies our
later results regarding the identification of market segmentation using reduced form
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regressions.
Figure 23 breaks down the profit-maximizing policy for the Foreign producers in
the case of partial segmentation, showing profits as function of marginal costs, given
different pricing policies. As shown in panel (a), when marginal cost is less than p̂r,H/µ
- the threshold set by the low reservation price - producers charge the monopoly price
(indicated by the blue line) to retailers in both countries. At higher marginal costs,
once the desired monopoly price exceeds the Home reservation price, producers charge
the Home reservation price (green line, panel (b)), thereby maintaining market share
in the Home country. Under this policy, the producer more than makes up in volume
from Home retailers what he loses in pricing from Foreign retailers. Marginal costs
eventually reach a high enough critical point, c∗, where the producer no longer finds it
worthwhile to keep selling to Home retailers and forgo the profits of charging Foreign
retailers a higher price; instead, he starts charging the Foreign monopoly price (purple
line, in panel (c)). Finally, with high enough marginal costs, the producer simply charges
the Foreign reservation price (red line, panel (d)), or drops out of the market. In this
setting, retailer markups remain constant, while producer markups are heterogeneous,
with a mass point at the maximum producer markup, µ.
3.4 Results
In this section, we discuss the baseline calibration of the model as well as the implied
importance of pricing-to-market in generating the observed cross-border price dispersion.
3.4.1 Parameter Values
Table 23 shows the calibrated parameters values required to match the four pricing
facts presented above. On the retailer side of the model, we fix the elasticity of substi-
tution between retail goods at η = 5, a value standard in the literature, which yields
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retail markups of 20%. We set the retailers’ search cost parameter at k = 0.006, which,
given η, implies an unconditional producer markup of 15%.




, in order to match
the variance and high persistence of the US-Canada nominal exchange rate. We set the
persistence, ρM = 0.95 and the volatility of innovations, σεm = 0.029. These values
yields an exchange rate with the same persistence, ρe = 0.95, and a variance (in growth
rates), σ∆e = 0.03.
On the producers’ side, we assume that average relative productivity is distributed ac-
cording to t ∼ N (0, σ2 ), and that producer-specific productivity shocks are distributed
within each period according to ζi ∼ N (0, σ2ζ,c), with c ∈ {us, can}. We calibrate the cost
shock parameters to match the main moments of the cost data for the US and Canada
considered by Burstein and Jaimovich (2009). These data correspond most closely our
interpretation of the model as an interaction between retailers and wholesalers. We
choose the shock variances (σ2ζ,us, σ2ζ,can, σ2 ) to match the variability of good-level real
exchange rates: σ∆dt,us = 0.06, σ∆dt,can = 0.05, and σ∆dt,bord = 0.13. Generating higher
variability of good-level real exchange rates across the border requires a fairly large
variance of the shock to relative productivities, hence we set σ = 0.059. We generate
higher dispersion within the US versus Canada by assuming a higher variance of US
idiosyncratic shocks, setting σζ,us = 0.093 and σζ,can = 0.052.
The regional bias parameters are selected in order to match the correlation of ag-
gregate real exchange rates with the nominal exchange rate (fact 1). For the baseline
calibration, we assume symmetry, so that α1 = γ3. Since Burstein and Jaimovich (2009)
do not provide an numerical correlation, we target a correlation coefficient of 0.70. This
requires a very high regional bias (α1 = γ3 = 0.998), so that retailers in all regions are
extremely unlikely to search outside their own region.
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3.4.2 Implications for Price Dispersion
The first and second rows of table 24 show that the baseline calibration of the model
can almost perfectly match the targeted moments. In particular, the average relative
price for the search good is highly correlated with unit labor costs (fact 1), changes in real
relative prices are far more volatile across countries than within (fact 2), and relative
prices across countries are approximately four times more volatile than the nominal
exchange rate (fact 3). The shock to relative aggregate productivities is essential for
matching fact 3 because it increases the dispersion of international relative prices, beyond
the levels that would be created with a relative unit labor cost shock alone.
Table 25 shows that the model has reasonable implications for other moments. In
particular, price-change correlations are approximately 80% within the US and Canada,
and are very close to zero across countries (fact 4). The shock to relative aggregate
productivities is also important for matching this final fact, since it decreases the corre-
lation of international price changes, relative to the correlation of within-country price
changes. Finally, the average relative price also closely follows the unit labor costs ratio,
which is natural given the assumption of fixed nominal wages.
The model can match evidence of price dispersion using a regional bias parameter
that is close to one. In fact, assuming complete segmentation yields pricing statistics that
are almost identical to our baseline results, as shown in row four of table 24 and in row
three of table 25. This result is consistent with the evidence presented in Gopinath et al
(2011), who conclude that the US and Canadian markets are virtually fully segmented.
However, we generate this result using regional segmentation alone. We return to the
issue of identifying regional versus national segmentation in section 3.5.
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3.4.3 The Importance of Pricing-to-Market
We next investigate to what extent our results are driven by pricing-to-market, as
opposed to retailers simply sampling from producers with different marginal costs. Since
producers in our model only set one price in each period, we define pricing-to-market as
the tendency of producers with equal marginal costs to set different prices depending on
the market in which they are located. We parameterize the model so that search costs
are high enough that, in equilibrium, retailers always purchase from the first producer
they search, and producers always charge the monopoly price (rather than one of the
reservation prices). This parameterization shuts down the pricing-to-market created by
the presence of different reservation prices across countries.
The third row of table 24 shows that, under this calibration, the degree of additional
price dispersion created by the border is significantly reduced, though it is still evident.
Yet, qualitatively, the pricing facts cited above remain unchanged. In our model, the
basic pricing facts can be matched without any pricing-to-market. Further study is
required in order to determine if a similar model, with detailed locations of production,
can generate the pricing-to-market evidence of Burstein and Jaimovich (2009) for goods
sold in both countries, but produced in a common location.
3.5 Identification
In the previous section, we demonstrated that the model of regional bias without any
additional international segmentation can match the recent empirical evidence regarding
price dispersion within and across countries. We now introduce the possibility that
retailers have a greater chance of sampling prices from a region within their own country
compared with one of the two foreign regions. This is the case of additional cross-
country segmentation. We first show that, although the model’s pricing implications
remain intact when we introduce cross-country segmentation, using price data alone is
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insufficient to separately identify the degrees of regional versus national segmentation.
We then illustrate how introducing quantity data, in particular trade relative to internal
demand, can yield the desired identification. Finally, we show how while matching
statistics on price dispersion implies a very high degree of segmentation, trade data
suggests that markets are much more integrated across borders, at least viewed through
the lens of our model.
3.5.1 Prices and Segmentation
Without loss of generality, we continue to assume that the Home country is relatively
less expensive, with reservation prices satisfying p̂r,a < p̂r,c. For ease of exposition, we
focus on the behavior of retailers in region c of the Foreign country, who do not search in
equilibrium. As noted above, the region-c retailers sample prices from the distribution
given by (3.20), reproduced here for convenience:
f retc (p̂) ≡ γ1fa(p̂) + γ2fb(p̂) + γ3fc(p̂) + γ4fd(p̂). (3.28)
The regional search bias can be re-expressed as λ ≡ γ3/γ4. Similarly, we can express
the degree of additional cross-country segmentation induced strictly by crossing the
national border with the parameter B ≡ γ4/γ1. Given symmetry across the Home
regions,













We find that a broad range of combinations of the segmentation parameters λ and B are
consistent with the empirical evidence on price dispersion. In fact, the two parameters
cannot be independently identified using price data alone. Using the symmetry of regions
within each country, f retc (p̂) = γfa(p̂)+(1− γ) fc(p̂), as before. Therefore, we can express





λB +B + 2
. (3.30)
If aggregate output is held fixed, then reservation prices and demand, and thus the
producers’ pricing functions, are determined only by γ, and not by the particular break-
down between regional versus national segmentation. However, since aggregate output
depends only on γ as well, there exists a continuum of different combinations of regional
and national segmentation parameters that are observationally equivalent.
3.5.2 Quantities and Segmentation
In this section we show that the degree of regional versus national segmentation can
be determined using additional empirical evidence on the patterns of trade within and
across countries. In order to generate empirically-based measures of the different degrees
of segmentation, we begin by relaxing the assumption that all regions are of equal size.
Let sr denote the size of region r, r ∈ {a, b, c, d}, namely the mass of producers and
retailers operating in that region. Incorporating relative size differences, the relative







so that λ > 0 now measures the degree of regional segmentation for region-c retailers
that cannot be attributed to size differences between the two regions. A retailer in
region c is more likely to sample a price from her own region than from region d if her
own region is relatively larger, or if there is larger regional search bias, λ. For λ → ∞,
γ → 1 and retailers in region c never search in any other region; hence the producers
in region c are entirely isolated. For λ = 1, the two regions are perfectly integrated
from the perspective of retailers in region c. Conversely, for λ < 1, retailers in region c
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are more likely to search region d than they are to search their own region. Although
this situation could arise for particular product categories, it is unlikely to apply to the
representative good. Hence, we focus on the case λ ≥ 1.







with B ≥ 1 measuring the degree of cross-country segmentation for region-c retailers
that cannot be attributed to relative market size differences or to the spillover from
regional segmentation.
Next, we determine the fraction of purchases by retailers in a particular region from
producers in all regions, as a function of the retailers’ sampling distribution. Let QF ≡∫
fc (p̂) p̂D (p̂) dp̂ be the expected (or average) value of purchases made by a retailer,
conditional on having sampled a price from the distribution of Foreign producer prices.
Then, the quantities purchased by a region-c retailer from producers located in each
of the two Foreign regions are given by Qc,c = γ3QF and Qc,d = γ4QF . Similarly,
QH ≡
∫
fa (p̂) p̂D (p̂) dp̂ is the expected value of purchases made by a retailer, conditional
on having sampled a price from the distribution of Home producer prices. The quantities
purchased a region-c retailer from producers located in each of the two Home regions are
given by Qc,a = γ1QH and Qc,b = γ2QH . From the perspective of retailers in region c, the




(1− γ)QH + γQF (3.33)
τc,d =
γ4QF
(1− γ)QH + γQF . (3.34)
Together with empirical estimates of the size of each regional market and an estimate
151
for γ, these trade fractions identify regional versus national segmentation. First, note







The relationships determined in equations (3.35) and (3.31) yield an estimate of the







Regional segmentation is estimated to be higher the higher is the fraction of demand
that is satisfied internally and that cannot be attributed to relative size differences
in the production sector. Regional sampling bias, which incorporates both regional





Using these values, the degree of excess segmentation at the border is identified using
γ




The above analysis establishes that adding trade quantities to the set of moments
targeted in the calibration is, in principle, sufficient to answer the question of whether














markets are segmented primarily within countries, or primarily across countries. Yet, it
also raises a new challenge for theories calibrated to match pricing data alone: pricing
data suggest that markets are so isolated as to effectively preclude any substantial de-
gree of international trade. In our model, for example, the calibrated value of γ implies
trade levels between the US and Canada that are well below one percent of GDP, which
is clearly counter-factual. Simultaneously matching pricing evidence of market segmen-
tation (whether regional or at the border) and the reality of substantial international
trade appears a difficult task, one which we leave for future research.
3.5.3 Border Effect Regressions
This section reviews the empirical specifications that are commonly used in
estimating the border effect. The original regressions of Engel and Rogers (1996) are
intended to measure failures of relative LOP in city-level price indexes. They regress the
time series volatility of relative real prices on distance and a border dummy variable:
std(dt(i, j)) = β0 + β1dist(i, j) + β
ER
2 D(i, j) +Xγ
′ + ε(i, j), (3.39)
where dist(i, j) is the log-distance between locations i and j, D(i, j) is a dummy equal to
one if the locations are in different countries, and X is a vector of variables controlling for
demand characteristics in each city. Engel and Rogers (1996) find that βˆER2 is positive
and significant, and refer to the magnitude as the border effect. Other papers (Parslet
and Wei, 2001, Engel and Rogers, 2001) consider multi-country versions of this regres-
sion, as this allows for additional controls in this regression, notably nominal exchange
rate volatility.
Arguing that using price indexes can create significant bias in the Engel and Rogers
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regression, Broda and Weinstein (2008) estimate the cross-sectional regression:
dt(i, j)
2 = β0 + β1dist(i, j) + β
BW
2 D(i, j) + εt(i, j) (3.40)
on product-level price data. This regression is different from the Engel and Rogers
regression in a few key respects. First, since the authors have good-level prices (as
opposed to indexes) the constant βˆ0 can be used to test absolute LOP. Second, the
regression is run cross-sectionally (t is fixed) implying that the coefficient estimates will
vary over time. We study this property of the regression below.
Finally, Gopinath et al (2011) use a regression discontinuity approach to test for
discrete jumps in the price level at the border. Their regression takes the following
form:
pt(i) = β0+β1dist(i, b)+β
G
2 I(i ∈ Home)+β3dist(i, b)I(i ∈ Home)+Xγ′+ε(i, j). (3.41)
Here, dist(i, b) represents the log-distance from location i to the countries’ common
border. The value of dist(i, b) is positive whenever i is in the “home” country, and
negative if i is a location abroad. X is a vector of variables controlling for demand
characteristics in each city.
In regressions (3.39)-(3.41), rejections of the null β2 = 0 are typically taken as evi-
dence of segmentation. We simulate data from the model with and without any segmen-
tation, and show that estimates of β2 from the simulated data cannot correctly identify
whether (or the degree to which) markets are segmented. We view our model as a
model of residual price dispersion once distance and other variables are controlled for.
Accordingly, we fix the distance and the controls coefficients to zero.
To better understand the properties of the regression measures of the border effect,
we study the empirical distributions of the coefficients using data simulated from the
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model. The first row of table 26 gives some basic statistics for the ER regression under
the baseline calibration. The ER regressions are performed on 1,000 time series of 100
periods each, with 15 cities per country. Column one shows that the mean of βˆER2 is
greater than zero. Furthermore, the first row of column two shows that, according a
standard t-test, we always reject the null βER2 = 0. Under the baseline calibration, we
would conclude (under the standard interpretation) that markets are more segmented
across borders one-hundred percent of time, even though the model takes no stand on
this fact.
The second and third rows of the table demonstrate results using the cross-sectional
regressions of Broda and Weinstein (2008) and Gopinath et al (2011). These regressions
are performed on a single time-series simulation of 1,000 periods, with 50 locations per
country. Again, on average, these regressions would typically lead to the conclusion
of greater segmentation across the border. Importantly, however, the regressions each
do not reject the null of βˆ = 0 around ten percent of the time. This suggestions that
disagreements about the size of border effect, e.g. between the authors of these two
papers, could well be explained by the time period in which the data for the regressions
is collected.
Figures 25 and 26 show estimated coefficients βˆBW and βˆG over a simulated 50-quarter
time span, along with the nominal exchange rate. The coefficients are highly time-
varying, and strongly correlated with the nominal exchange rate, in much the same way
as the real exchange rate is correlated with the nominal exchange rate. Furthermore, this
high correlation holds as long as there is some degree of segmentation (namely, γ > 0.5).
According to our model, these cross-sectional regressions are informative about the state
of exchange rates far more than they are about the extent of segmentation within or
between countries.
Finally, table 27 shows regression results for simulations of a world with no segmen-
tation (γ = 0.5), but with cross-country differences in the distributions of producers’
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idiosyncratic shocks. In this case, the regressions correctly fail to reject a zero border
effect. This result stands in contrast to Gorodnichenko and Tesar (2008), who argue that
such asymmetries can lead to falsely rejecting the zero effect null. There is no contra-
diction, however. In our model retailers are sampling prices with equal probability from
producers in both countries. Since retailers in both countries have the same reservation
price, they never re-sample a second price within a period, and the prices paid by all
retailers are identically distributed. It is important to note, however, that we would get
an entirely different result if we considered the price posted by producers, rather than
prices paid by retailers. These two distributions are not equal, as shown in figure 20,
and would therefore falsely imply segmentation.
3.6 Conclusion
We have demonstrated that a simple model of customer search can replicate the most
prominent facts about international real exchange rates at the good-level. It can do so
without relying on any additional friction in international trade. While the extent of the
border effect remains in some dispute, we have shown that the standard interpretation
of the border effect as a measure of market segmentation may be quite misleading.
In our model, price data alone are not sufficient to answer the question of whether
international borders create market segmentation beyond that which already occurs
within countries. Incorporating data on trade shares resolves this identification problem,
but raises a tension between the high dispersion of observed prices across the border
and the relatively large quantity of international trade that occurs between countries.
Other models incorporating endogenous price dispersion are likely to generate similar
difficulties.
One possible objection to the calibration of the model is the high volatility of average
productivity across countries. This shock is crucial for matching both the volatility of
156
international prices relative to the exchange rate, and the low correlation of international
price changes. A more general version of the model could include many sectors and,
therefore, sector-specific productivity shocks. Both of the roles played by the aggregate
shock could then be played by sector specific shocks which are more correlated within
countries than across.25 This would permit matching the targeted moments without
resorting to large aggregate shocks.
In our view, model-based structural estimation represents a promising avenue forward
for exploring the extent of barriers to international trade. Identifying the degree of
market segmentation, however, is likely to require data on variables other than prices,
most notably quantities. Although the model we have presented here incorporates a
reduced-form wage friction, we leave for future work the introduction of nominal price
stickiness. Although it cannot account for the data on its own, it is possible that in a
dynamic setting, price stickiness interacts in an important way with our search friction,
supporting the persistence of price dispersion.
25Burstein and Jaimovich (2009) create a similar effect using Bertrand competition, assuming that
firms always face the same latent competitor within countries, but only sometimes face the same com-
petitor across countries.
Table 23: Parameters values for the baseline model calibration.
Parameter η κ α1 = γ3 ρms σms σζ,us σζ,can σ
Value 5.000 0.006 0.998 0.950 0.029 0.093 0.052 0.059
Table 24: Targeted model moments. Moments are computed directly from policy func-
tions and a discretized approximation to the shock processes.
µ¯us σ∆dt,us σ∆dt,can σ∆dt,bord ρ(d¯t,bord, log(et))
σ∆dt,bord
σ∆ log(e)
Target 0.150 0.060 0.050 0.130 0.700 4.333
Baseline Calibration 0.150 0.061 0.050 0.131 0.696 4.377
No P.T.M. 0.223 0.184 0.103 0.191 0.699 6.377
Pefect Segmentation 0.150 0.061 0.050 0.136 0.719 4.531
Table 25: Other model moments not targeted.
µ¯can σ∆log(e) ρ(d¯t,bord, rwt) ρ∆pt,us ρ∆pt,can ρ∆pt,bord
Baseline Calibration 0.195 0.030 0.696 0.789 0.849 0.010
No P.T.M. 0.223 0.030 0.699 0.300 0.576 -0.000
Pefect Segmentation 0.195 0.030 0.719 0.801 0.854 -0.026
Table 26: Simulation of regression results for baseline calibration - 1000 exemplars of
each regression.
Mean(βˆ2) % Reject
Engel-Rogers (1996) 0.066 1.000
Broda-Weinstein (2008) 0.018 0.794
Gopinath et al. (2009) 0.073 0.861
Table 27: Simulation of regression results under no segmentation, country asymmetry -
1000 exemplars of each regression.
Mean(βˆ2) % Reject
Engel-Rogers (1996) -0.000 0.006
Broda-Weinstein (2008) -0.000 0.012






















































































































Figure 4: Median net price, imputed cost, and markup cross-border gap and exchange rate
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Figure 19: The two-country setup.
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Price Function − Home





















Figure 20: Pricing functions and price distributions for symmetric, unsegmented
economies with different cost dispersions (σζ,H > σζ,F ).
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Figure 21: Pricing functions and price distributions for symmetric, unsegmented
economies with different unit labor costs (wH < wF ).
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Figure 22: Pricing functions and pricing distributions for symmetric, segmented












(a) When marginal cost is below pHr /µ, Foreign










(b) When marginal cost is between pHr /µ and











(c) When marginal cost is between c∗ and








(d) When marginal cost is greater than pFr /µ,
Foreign firms charge the foreign reservation
price.
Figure 23: Profit as a function of marginal cost under different pricing policies.
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Figure 24: Median real and nominal exchange rate for a single time series realization
under the baseline parameterization.
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Figure 25: Time series of the nominal exchange rate versus the border coefficient in the
regression of Broda and Weinstein (2008)
.
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Figure 26: Time series of the nominal exchange rate versus the border coefficient in the
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A Addendum to Chapter 1
A.1 Implementation of Filters
The V-shaped Sales Filter
I implement the v-shaped sales filter proposed by Nakamura and Steinsson (2008).
The algorithm requires choosing four parameters: J,K, L, F . The parameter J is the
period of time within which a price cut must return to the regular price in order to be
considered a transitory sale. For asymmetric v-shaped sales, in which a price cut is not
followed by a return to the existing regular price, several options arise regarding how to
determine the new regular price. The parameters K and L capture different potential
choices about when to transition to a new regular price. In the case of asymmetric sales,
the parameter F determines whether to associate the sale with the existing regular price
or with the new one.
1. r0 = p0
2. If pt = rt−1, then rt = rt−1
3. Else, if pt > rt−1, then rt = pt
4. Else, if rt−1 ∈ {pt+1, ..., pt+J}, and the price never rises above rt−1 before returning
to rt−1, then rt = rt−1
5. Else, if the set {pt+1, ..., pt+L} has K or more distinct prices, then rt = pt
6. Else, define pmax = max{pt+1, ..., pt+L} and tmax = first occurrence of pmax. If
pmax ∈ {ptmax +1, ..., ptmax +L}, then
(a) if F = 1, then rt = pmax
(b) elseif F = 0, then rt = rt−1
7. Else, rt = pt.
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The Reference Price Filter
The reference price filter proposed by Eichenbaum, Jaimovich and Rebelo (2011)
requires one parameter, W , the width of the fixed window.
1. Divide each price series into non-overlapping intervals of length W .
2. For each interval, compute the modal price, pR.
The Rolling Mode Filter
The rolling mode filter proposed by Kehoe and Midrigan (2010) requires two param-
eters: W , the width of the rolling window, and C, the minimum required frequency for
the modal price to count as a regular price.
1. For each rolling window of width W
(a) compute pMw , the modal price
(b) compute fw, the fraction of observations with pt = pMw
2. For each t, set pRt , the regular price, equal to the modal price for that t, if fw ≥ C
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B Addendum to Chapter 2
B.1 Proofs
Proof of lemma 1. See Woodford (2008).
Proof of corollary 1. Follows from lemma 1.
Proof of lemma 2. Prices are distributed independently of states conditional on sig-
nals. As a result, by the data-processing inequality theorem (Cover and Thomas, 2006),
the relative entropy between prices and states is weakly less than the relative entropy
between signals and states. If prices are a random function of signals, then the inequality
is strict.
Proof of corollary 2. Follows from lemma 2.
Proof of lemma 3. Recall that the objective is given by





pi(q − yτ )− θp
[
log fτ (q|$τ )− log f (q)
]}
. (B.1)
Forming the Lagrangian with multipliers µ and η (q) on the constraints specified in


















η (q) fτ (q|$τ ) .
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For fτ (q|$) > 0, such that η (q) = 0, differentiating L(f) with respect to fτ (q|$),
for a fixed f (q), yields
1
θp
pi(q − yτ )−
[
log fτ (q|$τ )− log f (q)
]− 1− µ
θp
= 0 ⇔ (B.3)
log fτ (q|$τ )− log f (q) = 1
θp

















pi(q − yτ )
}]
− log φ ⇔ (B.5)






pi(q − yτ )
}
. (B.6)

















pi (q − yτ )
}∑




pi (q̂ − yτ )
} . (B.8)
Finally, note that if f (q) > 0, then fτ (q|$) > 0, such that the multiplier η (q) is
indeed zero for all q, as was assumed above.
The conditional distribution, fτ (q|$τ ), only depends on $τ through its dependence
on the normalized post-review state, yτ . Moreover, it depends only on the time-invariant
profit function, pi, and on the invariant distribution, f . Hence, we can write it directly
as f (q|yτ ), for all τ ≥ 0, and for each normalized target price yτ in each $τ .
Proof of lemma 4 . From lemma 3, the firm’s per-period profit net of the cost of the
price signal is an invariant function, Π (y), for all y ∈ Y . The value Vτ ($˜τ ) depends
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on $˜τ only through the dependence of the expected profit, Π (yτ ), on the value of yτ .
Hence, equation (2.50) can alternatively be written as
Eτ




′−τΓτ,τ ′ ($˜τ ′−1)

(1− Λτ ′ ($˜τ ′)) Π (yτ ′)
+Λτ ′ ($˜τ ′)
[
V − κ]
−θrIr (Λτ ′ ($˜τ ′) ,Λ)

 (B.9)
Recall that y˜τ is a random walk and yτ = y˜τ + ντ , where ντ is i.i.d. Therefore, the
probability distributions for realizations of y˜τ ′ and yτ ′ conditional on $˜τ depend only on
the value of y˜τ for any τ ′ ≥ τ. The maximum attainable value of the objective specified
in equation (B.9) must therefore only depend on the value of y˜τ , Vτ ($˜τ ) = V (y˜τ ), for
some invariant function V (y˜).
The problem of maximizing the objective specified in equation (B.9) has the recursive
form
V (y˜τ ) = max
Λτ+1($˜τ+1)
Eτ
Π (yτ ) + β





−θrIr (Λτ+1 ($˜τ+1) ,Λ)

 , (B.10)
where Eτ {·} integrates over all possible innovations to the state, $˜τ+1, that follow $˜τ
under the current review policy. The expression (B.10) defines the problem of finding
the optimal hazard as a function of the difference between the value of updating to a
new policy, V −κ, and the value of continuing with the existing policy, V (y˜), net of the
information expenditure required to receive the signal from this hazard function.
For each state $˜τ+1, the hazard function Λτ+1 ($˜τ+1) is chosen to maximize
(1− Λτ+1 ($˜τ+1))V (y˜τ+1) + Λτ+1 ($˜τ+1)
[
V − κ]− θrIr (Λτ+1 ($˜τ+1) ,Λ) . (B.11)
This problem, and hence its solution, depends only on the value of V (y˜τ+1) and is oth-
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erwise independent of the time elapsed since the last review, τ + 1, and of the particular
history of past signals in $˜τ+1. Therefore, the solution is of the form Λτ+1 ($˜τ+1) =
Λ (y˜τ+1) , where Λ (y˜) is a time-invariant function.
Differentiating (B.11) with respect to Λ (y˜τ+1) yields















1− Λ − log
Λ
1− Λ . (B.13)
Hence
Λτ+1 ($˜τ+1)







V − κ− V (y˜τ+1)
]}
(B.14)
for all $˜τ+1 and all τ > 0, which can be written directly as
Λ (y˜)







V − κ− V (y˜)]} , (B.15)
for all y˜ ∈ Y˜ .
The maximum attainable value under the current policy can now be seen to satisfy
the fixed point equation
V (y˜) = E
{
Π (y) + β
[
(1− Λ (y˜′))V (y˜′) + Λ (y˜′) [V − κ]− θrIr (Λ (y˜′) ,Λ)]} , (B.16)
where E {·} denotes expectations over all possible values y˜′ = y˜ + ν˜ and y′ = y˜ + ν,
conditional on y˜.
Finally, the continuation value upon conducting a review is
V = V (0) . (B.17)
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Proof of lemma 5 . Given the definition of Ir
(
Λ (y˜τ ) ,Λ
)
in equation (2.12), the min-









Λ (y˜τ ) log Λ +
(
1− Λ (y˜τ ) log
(
1− Λ))]} . (B.18)







) [Λ (y˜τ )
Λ
− 1− Λ (y˜τ )(
1− Λ)
]}













E {∑∞τ=1 βτΓτ (y˜τ−1) Λ (y˜τ )}
E {∑∞τ=1 βτΓτ (y˜τ−1)} . (B.21)
Proof of lemma 6. Follows from lemma 5 and the law of motion for the normalized
pre-review state, y˜.
Proof of lemma 7. Forming the Lagrangian with multiplier µ, the first order condition





















E {∑∞τ=0 βτΓτ+1 (y˜τ ) f (q|y)}
E {∑∞τ=0 βτΓτ+1 (y˜τ )} . (B.24)
Proof of lemma 8. Follows from lemma 7 and the laws of motion for the normalized
states y˜ and y.
Proof of lemma 9. The proof follows from the strict concavity of (2.69) in f (q|y) and
f (q). See also Csiszar (1974) in the information theory literature.
Proof of lemma 10. Forming the Lagrangian with multipliers µ and η (q) on the con-


















η (q) f (q) .
(B.25)







pi (q − y)}∑




pi (q̂ − y)}dy + µ+ η (q) = 0. (B.26)
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For f (q) > 0, such that η (q) = 0, multiplying by f (q), and then summing over







pi (q − y)}∑




pi (q̂ − y)}dy + µf (q) = 0, (B.27)∫
G (y) dy + µ = 0, (B.28)







pi (q − y)}∑




pi (q̂ − y)}dy ≤ 1, (B.29)
with equality for each q such that f (q) > 0.
Proof of lemma 11. The following proof follows the method of proof indicated by Fix
(1978).
Let Z(q) be a complex analytic function on the entire complex plane.
1. If Z(q) is equal to some constantM for all q ∈ C, then the roots of the function
Z(q)−M are the entire complex plane.
2. If Z(q) is non-constant, then the roots of the function Z(q) − M , for any
constant M , are a set of isolated points.
Hence, the real roots of Z(q) −M are either the entire real line or a set of isolated
points.




, defined in equation
(2.73) for q ∈ R, and for fixed f , Q, and G (y) , can be extended to a complex function
on the entire complex plane.
The function pi (q − y), which is specified in equation (2.83), is a sum of two expo-




is a composition of exponentials. The exponential
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is analytic. Any real analytic function on some
open set on the real line can be extended to a complex analytic function on some open




, for q ∈ C, is complex analytic




either the entire real line or a set of isolated points.




) − 1, it then follows that the support of the distribution of prices is either the
entire real line or a discrete set of prices.




f(q|y)G (y) dy = 0. (B.30)
The optimal support is the subset of the points q satisfying condition (B.30) that











f(q|y)G (y) dy ≤ 0. (B.31)
Using Bayes rule, the two conditions are rearranged as in equations (2.75) and (2.76).
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B.2 Computational Method
The algorithm for finding the optimal policy iterates between finding the optimal
review policy for a given pricing policy, and finding the optimal pricing policy for a
given review policy.
The review policy requires from the pricing policy the expected per-period profit net
of the cost of the price signal, Π (y), defined in equation (2.49), while the pricing policy
requires from the review policy the distribution over all possible states, G (y), defined
in equation (2.67), as a function of the hazard for reviews, Λ (y˜) .
I begin by determining the optimal review policy when the optimal pricing policy
involves a single price, q, such that Π (y) = pi (q − y) for all y.
I then find the optimal pricing policy for different values of the unit cost of the
price signal, θp, fixing the distribution of the possible post-review states, G (y), at the
distribution implied by this review policy.
Algorithm for the Optimal Review Policy for a given Pricing Policy
Solving for the firm’s optimal review policy, Λ, Λ, requires the discount factor, β,
the distributions of the shocks, hν˜ and hν , the function Π, implied by the pricing policy,
the cost of holding a policy review, κ, and the unit cost of the review signal, θr.
The steps that solve for the optimal review policy are as follows:
1. Initialize the frequency of reviews, Λ(0).
2. Iterate
(a) Initialize the hazard function, Λ(0).
(b) Given Λ(k), iterate on the fixed point equation (2.53) to solve for the value
function V(k).
(c) Given V(k), solve equation (2.52) for the hazard function, Λ(k+1).
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(d) Given Λ(k+1), solve for the frequency of reviews, Λ(k+1), using equation (2.57).
(e) If
∣∣Λ(k+1) − Λ(k)∣∣ exceeds a prescribed tolerance level, return to step 2.b. Oth-
erwise, continue to step 3.
3. Compute the implied distribution of post-review states, G (y), using equation
(2.59).
The method is the based on that used by Woodford (2009), hence I omit further
details.
Algorithm for the Optimal Pricing Policy for a given Review Policy
Solving for the firm’s optimal pricing policy, Q, f , f , requires the firm’s period
objective function, pi (q − y), the distribution over all possible states, G (y), and the cost
of the price signal, θp.
The steps that solve for the optimal pricing policy for an arbitrary information cost
are as follows:
1. Discretize the state, y ∼ G (y).
2. Solve for the full information solution.
3. Solve for the single-price policy.
4. Determine the boundaries of the support Q.
5. Initialize the cardinality of the support Q.
6. Iterate, for a given cardinality:
(a) Initialize the support, Q(0).
(b) Given Q(k), determine the optimal distributions f (k) and f(k).
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(c) Given f(k), determine the optimal support Q(k+1).
(d) If
∥∥Q(k+1) −Q(k)∥∥ or ∥∥f (k+1) − f (k)∥∥ exceed prescribed tolerance levels, return
to STEP 6.b. Otherwise, continue to STEP 7.
7. Check the cardinality of the solution:




> tolZ for any q ∈ Q, remove a point from the
support and return to STEP 6.b.
(b) Else, if Z
(
q; f
) − 1 > tolZ for some q /∈ Q, add a point to the support and
return to STEP 6.b.
(c) Else, if
∣∣Z (q; f)− 1∣∣ ≤ tolZ for all q ∈ Q and Z (q; f) − 1 ≤ tolZ for any
q /∈ Q, END.
Details
STEP 1: Discretize the state.
Let the discretization of y ∼ G (y) be denoted by the ny nodes {yi} and weights
{Gi}, i = 1, ..., ny.
STEP 2: Solve for the full information solution.
The full information solution is given by the set of prices QFI = {qFIi }, i = 1, .., ny,
qFIi = arg max
q
pi (q − yi) . (B.32)
STEP 3: Solve for the single-price policy.
The single-price policy, if optimal, is given by the price




Gipi (q − yi) . (B.33)
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The threshold information cost, θp, below which the cost of information is sufficiently












pi (q − yi)
)2]
= 0, (B.34)
where the derivatives are evaluated at q.
STEP 4: Determine the boundaries of the support Q.












i. Construct a grid Q(j) of ny equidistant points on the interval [a(j), b(j)], where
ny is the size of the set QFI . Let w(j) denote the distance between points in
Q(j).
ii. Given Q(j), find the optimal distributions f (j) and f(j) using the Blahut-
Arimoto algorithm (detailed in a later section of this appendix).
























- find the first point in Q(j) for which Z
(
q; f (j)
) − 1 ≥ tolZ ; denote this
point by qfirst; set the new lower bound
a(j+1) = qfirst − w(j); (B.38)
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- find the last point in Q(j) for which Z
(
q; f (j)
) − 1 ≥ tolZ ; denote this
point by qlast; set the new upper bound
b(j+1) = qlast + w(j); (B.39)
iv. If a(j+1) = a(j) and b(j+1) = b(j), end this STEP; otherwise, return to i.
STEP 5. Initialize the cardinality of the support Q.
Set the initial cardinality of Q, n = ny.
STEP 6. Iterate for a given cardinality.
(a) Initialize the support, Q(0) = QJ , where QJ is the last grid in STEP 4.
(b) Given Q(k), determine the optimal distributions f (k) and f(k) using the Blahut-
Arimoto algorithm (detailed in a later section of this appendix).





pi (q − yi) = 0. (B.40)
(d) If
∥∥Q(k+1) −Q(k)∥∥ or ∥∥f (k+1) − f (k)∥∥ exceed prescribed tolerance levels, return to
(b). Otherwise, continue to STEP 7.
At the end of STEP 6, we have a solution that satisfies the necessary optimality
conditions for f (q|y), f (q) and q, for a given cardinality n of the support. Let this
solution be denoted by fn, fn, Qn, where the subscript indicates the current cardinality.






for each q ∈ Qn. Let this vector be denoted by Zinn . If 1−Zinn ≥
tolZ , set n = n−1, remove from the support the point q = arg minq Zinn , and return
to STEP 6.b. Else, continue to STEP 7.b.




for each q ∈ Qoutn . Let this vector
be denoted by Zoutn . If Zoutn − 1 ≥ tolZ , set n = n+ 1, add to the support the point
q = arg maxq Z
out
n , and return to STEP 6.b. Else, END
The grid Qoutn containsM+1 densely-spaced grid points over the entire range of QFI ,
where M is a very large number. The density of this grid is chosen such that for a point
q ∈ Qn and either of its nearest neighbors, qnext ∈ QDENSE, Zn
(
q; f
)− Zn (qnext; f) ≈
tolZDIFF .
Discussion
STEP 4: Determining the boundaries of the support.
Since the optimal signal is a compression of the full information solution, the support
of the price signal is weakly contained in the support of the full information solution,
QFI . Hence, the initialization of the support in STEP 4.1 ensures that we find a globally
optimal solution, given the discretization of the state, y. Since the boundaries of the
solution are constrained by the discretization of the state, the resulting solution needs
to be checked for sensitivity to ny and to the minimum and maximum values of yi.
STEP 4 improves the efficiency of the algorithm in later stages. Once it has con-
verged, it ensures that we search for the solution on the narrowest possible interval of
size ny. Maintaining the cardinality fixed at ny as we shrink the boundaries implies that
each iteration increases the density of the grid. As a result, STEP 4.2 also yields good
approximations to the first and last points of support in the solution.
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for the first iteration in the top panel, where the support of the
price distribution is initialized inside the interval bounded by a(0) = −1.1 and b(0) = 0.4,
and for the last iteration in the bottom panel, where the possible range of q has been
reduced to a(J) = −0.001 and b(J) = 0.178.
STEP 7. Checking a given cardinality.
The challenging part of this step is verifying that Z
(
q; f
) ≤ 1 for any q /∈ Q.




can be easily evaluated for any q, one could construct an
arbitrarily wide and dense grid Qoutn over which to evaluate the function. In practice, I
find that it is sufficient to evaluate the function over a union of a wide sparse grid and
a narrow, dense grid. For the sparse grid, I choose QFI , which serves to confirm that
although in STEP 4 the boundaries are determined using an approximation to the final
distributions, f and f , that step did not eliminate optimal points. The density of the
narrow grid is constrained by the numerical error in the computation of f and f .
It is convenient to err on the side of giving the algorithm too high of a cardinality. If a
candidate cardinality is too high, then procedure that computes the optimal distribution
in STEP 6 adjusts by returning zero mass at the excess points. This does not adversely
the computation of the mass at any of the other points, nor does it affect any of the other
steps in the algorithm. Doing so ensuring that when STEP 7 is reached, the cardinality
is mostly adjusted down, based on the computation of Zinn at the current points in the
support.
The initialization of the support in STEP 6.a is the most conservative approach,
which ensures that we rarely rely on Zoutn to adjust the cardinality of the support. An
alternative approach, which relies more on Zoutn but also substantially reduces the run-




at the end of STEP 4.
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Finally, if the algorithm repeatedly iterates between cardinalities n and n + 1, then
we are at a point where the solution cannot be accurately estimated. In this case, the
tolerance levels need to be reduced to obtain convergence.
The Blahut-Arimoto Algorithm
For a given support, the optimal marginal distribution is found by iterating on the
fixed point equation











pi(q˜ − y)} dq˜G (y) dy, (B.41)
which is obtained by integrating equation (2.48) over y. For a given f (q), the conditional
distribution is then given by equation (2.48). For a proof of convergence, see for example
Csiszar (1974).
For a given grid Q = {qj} of size n, the algorithm proceeds as follows:
1. If not preset elsewhere, set f (0)j = 1/n, j = 1, .., n.






































If TU − TL exceeds a prescribed tolerance level, go back to the beginning of step
3.
5. Compute the resulting conditional and marginal, and the associated expected profit






















The upper and lower triggers, TU and TL, generate, via successive iterations, a
decreasing and an increasing sequence that converge to the information flow I for a given
expected profit, Π, and hence information cost, θp (see discussion in Blahut, 1972).
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(a) initial support at the beginning of STEP 4






(b) final support at the end of STEP 4
Figure B.1: Determining the boundaries of the optimal support in STEP 4 of the algo-





B.3 Model of Price Setting
I explore the implications for price adjustment of the information structure developed
thus far in a standard model of price-setting under monopolistic competition. I assume
that all aggregate variables evolve according to the full-information, flexible price equi-
librium, and focus on the price adjustment of a set of information-constrained firms of
measure zero.
The Agents
The economy consists of three types of agents: an infinitely-lived representative
household, a continuum of infinitely-lived monopolistically competitive producers of dif-
ferentiated goods, and a government that follows an exogenous policy.
Households The problem of the representative household is standard. The household
is perfectly informed and supplies differentiated labor to all firms i in the economy. It
chooses sequences of consumption, hours, and bond holdings to maximize a discounted















where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor, Ct is the consumption basket, σ > 1 is the
constant relative risk aversion parameter, Ht (i) is the total amount of labor (in hours)
supplied by the representative household to sector i, and ν ≥ 0 is the inverse of the
Frisch elasticity of labor supply.
Maximization of the objective defined in equation (B.52) is subject to a standard
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budget constraint in each period t,
1∫
0
Wt (i)Ht (i) di+
1∫
0
Πt (i) di+Bt +Mt−1 + Tt ≥ PtCt + Et [Rt,t+1Bt+1] +Mt, (B.53)
where Wt (i) is the nominal hourly wage of sector i, Πt (i) is the dividend received
from sector i, Bt is the portfolio of nominal bond holdings in the period, Mt−1 is the
household’s money balance entering period t, Tt is the net monetary transfer received
from the government, Pt is the aggregate price index for the consumption basket Ct, and
Rt,t+1 is the stochastic discount factor used to discount income streams between time t
and time t+ 1.
The representative household also faces a no-Ponzi-scheme condition, and a cash-in-
advance constraint on consumption purchases,
PtCt ≤Mt−1 + Tt. (B.54)
Finally, the consumption basket, Ct, is given by a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator over a
continuum of differentiated products i ∈ [0, 1], with elasticity of substitution ε > 1












Inter-temporal consumer optimization yields the following standard first order con-















Intra-temporal expenditure minimization yields a demand function for each variety
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i,
























γ /Zt (i) , (B.59)
where γ ≥ 1 captures decreasing returns to scale in production, Ht(i) is the differenti-
ated labor input, and, for later convenience, Zt (i) denotes the inverse of firm-specific
productivity. The evolution of Zt (i) is described in the next subsection.
The firm’s nominal profit each period, excluding the resources spent to acquire in-
formation about market conditions, is
Πt(i) = Pt(i)Yt(i)−Wt (i)Ht (i) . (B.60)
In every period, the firm sets its price and commits to fulfill all demand at that price.






Government For simplicity, the government pursues an exogenous policy. The net
monetary transfer in each period is equal to the change in money supply, which is
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assumed to evolve exogenously, as described in the next subsection
Tt = Mt −Mt−1. (B.62)
The Shocks
The economy is subject to three kinds of shocks: (1) µt, permanent monetary shocks,
which are the only source of aggregate disturbances in the economy, are generally small,
and are summarized in the exogenous evolution of money supply; (2) ξt (i), permanent
idiosyncratic quality shocks, which affect both the demand for an individual product
and the cost of producing it; and (3) ζt (i), i.i.d. idiosyncratic productivity shocks.
The log of money supply26 is assumed to follow a random walk process,
mt = mt−1 + µt, (B.63)
µt
i.i.d.∼ hµ, (B.64)
where µt is independent over time and from any other disturbances in the economy.
The inverse of firm-specific productivity contains independently distributed perma-
nent and transitory components, where the permanent component is the same as the
household preference shock. In logs, this term evolves according to
zt (i) = at (i) + ζt (i) , (B.65)




i.i.d.∼ hζ . (B.68)
The permanent shock at (i) is a quality shock that increases both the utility from
26I use lower-case letters to denote logs of different variables introduced in subsection B.3.
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consuming the product and the effort required to produce it. The assumption that this
shock shifts both the household’s demand for the good and the cost of producing the
good implies that the firm’s profit is shifted in the same way by the permanent nominal
shock mt and by the permanent idiosyncratic shock, at (i). This assumption enables
a reduction in the state space of the problem, thus increasing tractability. The same
assumption is made by Midrigan (2010) and Woodford (2009). The permanent quality
shock will generate large and persistent movements in both individual prices and relative
prices over time, consistent with the data.
The shock ζt (i) is a purely transitory productivity shock that helps to generate large
price changes, as observed in the data.
Partial Equilibrium
In the flexible-price equilibrium with no information costs and no other costs to
nominal price adjustment, the firm chooses its price in each period to maximize its
per-period profit in units of marginal utility. The full-information optimal log-price,27
denoted by xt (i), is a linear combination of all the shocks in the economy:
xt (i) = mt + at (i) + φζt (i) , φ ≡ η
εη − ε+ 1 < 1. (B.69)
I assume that all aggregate variables evolve according to the flexible price, full infor-
mation equilibrium. A set of firms of measure zero are information-constrained. When
substituting the full-information equilibrium outcomes, the profit of an information-
constrained firm is proportional to pi(pt (i)−xt (i))28, where pt (i) is the log-price charged
by the information-constrained firm29, xt (i) is the optimal full-information log-price de-
27The optimal log-price is rescaled by a constant that is omitted.
28I omit a term that does not affect optimization.
29The log-price charged by the rationally inattentive firm and the optimal log-price are rescaled by
the same (omitted) constant.
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termined in equation (B.69), and
pi(p− x) = e(1−ε)(p−x) − ε− 1
εη
e−εη(p−x). (B.70)
Equation (B.70) defines the profit function introduced in section 2.2. Note that the
profit function defined in equation (B.70) is maximized at pt (i) = xt (i), hence xt (i)
is also the current profit-maximizing price for the information-constrained firm in the
static problem, excluding information costs. Therefore, the rationally inattentive firm
would like to set a price that is as close as possible to the target full-information price,
xt (i), subject to the costs of acquiring information about the evolution of this target.
The shocks are mapped into the notation used in section 2.2 by defining
υ˜t (i) ≡ µt + ξt (i) , (B.71)
υt (i) ≡ φζt (i) . (B.72)
To map the current model into the notation of section 2.4, which employs the nor-
malized variables q, y, and y˜, and the profit function pi(q− y), the full information price
in each period t can then be written as a function of the permanent state at the time of
the last review, τ periods ago, and the accumulated shocks since then,
xt (i) = mt−τ + at−τ (i) + yτ (i) , (B.73)







ξj (i) , (B.75)
with y˜0 (i) = 0.
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Conditional on no review, the information-constrained price is
pt (i) = mt−τ + at−τ (i) + qτ (i) . (B.76)
The per-period profit pi(pt (i)−xt (i)) is replaced by pi(qτ (i)−yτ (i)), a function of the
normalized price and the normalized state, both of which are indexed by τ , the number
of periods since the last policy review, with pi(q − y) defined by equation (B.70).
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C Addendum to Chapter 3
C.1 Details of Retailer Search
We present the problem of retailer search in the two-country model. Each region
is of unit mass. As shown in the main text, retailers in region a of the Home country
sample prices from the following distribution:
f reta (p̂) ≡ α1fa(p̂) + α2fb(p̂) + α3fc(p̂) + α4fd(p̂),
with
∑4
i=1 αi = 1. They have a regional bias captured by α1 > αi, i ∈ {2, 3, 4}. Since
the prices posted by producers in each country are identically distributed,
f reta (p̂) ≡ αfa(p̂) + (1− α) fc(p̂), (C.1)
where α ≡ α1 + α2. The regional bias translates into an apparent national bias, with
α > 1− α, since we assume for simplicity that α2 = α3 = α4.
Retailers in region b of the Home country sample prices from the following distribu-
tion:
f retb (p̂) ≡ β1fa(p̂) + β2fb(p̂) + β3fc(p̂) + β4fd(p̂),
with
∑4
i=1 βi = 1. They have also a regional bias, β2 > βi, i ∈ {1, 3, 4}. As in the case
of region-a retailers, using the within-country symmetry of producers, we obtain
f retb (p̂) ≡ βfa(p̂) + (1− β) fc(p̂),
where β ≡ β1 +β2. Although in principle the bias of retailers in region b may differ from
that of retailers in region a, since the two regions are otherwise identical, we impose
symmetry in segmentation as well, and assume that β2 = α1, and β1 = β3 = β4 = α2.
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Hence, retailers in region b sample prices from the same distribution, f retb (p̂) = f reta (p̂).
Retailers in region c of the Foreign country sample prices from the following distri-
bution
f retc (p̂) ≡ γ1fa(p̂) + γ2fb(p̂) + γ3fc(p̂) + γ4fd(p̂),
with
∑4
i=1 γi = 1. They have a regional bias captured by γ3 > γi, i ∈ {1, 2, 4}. In
turn, this translates into an apparent national bias since γ1 = γ2 = γ4. Using the
within-country symmetry of producers, we obtain
f retc (p̂) ≡ (1− γ) fa(p̂) + γfc(p̂), (C.2)
where γ ≡ γ3 + γ4.
Retailers in region d of the Foreign country sample prices from
f retd (p̂) ≡ δ1fa(p̂) + δ2fb(p̂) + δ3fc(p̂) + δ4fd(p̂),
with
∑4
i=1 δi = 1. They have a regional bias captured by δ4 > δi, i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. As in
the case of the Home country, we assume symmetry between regions c and d, such that
δ4 = γ3 and f retd (p̂) = f retc (p̂).
Hence, all retailers in the Home country sample prices from the distribution given
by equation (C.1), and all retailers in the Foreign country sample prices from the distri-
bution given by equation (C.2). Regional bias may be another source of heterogeneity
across the two countries, hence we allow for the possibility that α1 6= γ3, which in turn
implies that α 6= γ.
